Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Regulation of Armaments; Atomic Energy, Volume XX

217. Telegram From the Office of the Permanent Representative at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the Department of State¹

Paris, June 2, 1957—2 p.m.

Polto 2883. Sir Frank Roberts² tells us that at dinner Jebb³ gave Friday⁴ evening for Sandys, Bourges-Manoury raised question of paper he understood Stassen had handed to Zorin. He expressed worries about certain points he understood were in paper, but particularly upset that position had been given to Zorin in advance of consultation with Allies. Line was apparently similar to that taken by Pineau with Yost Saturday morning (Embtel 6149 rptd London 957).⁵

Sandys indicated that UK also was disturbed about procedure. UK tried to calm French a bit by saying thought paper had not actually been given to Zorin.

Spaak was present and greatly disturbed that so soon after good first go-around Wednesday⁶ substantive paper had been made available to Soviets on which there had been no consultation. Had thought plan was not to present anything specific to Soviets for some time and that there would be chance for exchange of views in NATO on general principles presented Wednesday and perhaps discussion of more specific Western ideas before anything presented to Soviets. While primary NATO interest was of course European inspection proposal, thought it had been fully understood there was fundamental interest in all aspects any disarmament proposals as all affect military strength Western world in which NATO has vital interest. Thought should perhaps call NAC meeting Monday to consider this new disturbing development. Saturday morning Parodi⁷ confirmed to Roberts that paper was given Zorin. Roberts says they have now also been so informed. Both UK and French NATO delegations have copies of paper and tell us it contains many substantive points not reported to NATO and hence not now even being considered by NATO govts as basis for future comment in NAC.

Coleridge⁸ tells us as far as he now knows Spaak has not made up his mind about special meeting Monday on this subject.

I believe that in order to maintain excellent impression given by Wednesday session of desire of United States not to act without consulting its Allies, it is imperative that I receive urgently copy of paper given Zorin, be authorized to go over its points with Spaak, and tell him of basis on which it has been presented to Zorin.

If it is felt for some reason unwise similary to inform NAC at this time, I shall need arguments to present to Spaak on this point, though I cannot guarantee he will be convinced. In any case, I hope we can start informing Allies here of substance of our position on specific points at earliest possible date. I do not think it can be long postponed and retain their confidence in our negotiating tactics.

Should emphasize that I think there is clear understanding here of difference between NATO position with respect European inspection scheme and other disarmament matters. But this understanding is based on belief as result statements made Wednesday that NATO countries would have opportunity to comment on other major points before they were negotiated with Soviets, though their views would obviously have much less weight than in case Euopean inspection scheme in which their national interests would be directly involved.

Should also note that when it was pointed out to Roberts that it had been made clear to Zorin that paper given him was subject to amendment on basis views of Allies, he expressed great skepticism that we could be sure of retaining real flexibility of decision after presenting Soviets with position in writing. Believe many others would share his doubts.

With respect Arctic proposal (London’s Embtel 6630⁹) would note that inspection of Norway involves SACEUR area and unlikely Norwegians will respond without consulting NATO. Do not think it is in United States interest that they should do so. Question is rather who raises matter and in what context than whether NATO should get involved. Should point out also that at meeting Wednesday attention was called to fact that principles of inspection agreed for Arctic area were bound to set precedents for European arrangements and hence of great direct interest to all European members of NATO.

Regardless of whether Spaak calls special meeting on disarmament, matter is bound to come up either at special meeting which may be called to consider Near East notes (Topol 2348¹⁰) or at regular meeting Wednesday.¹¹

Since dictating above have learned British or French have informed some other NATO dels of fact that substantive United States proposal has been handed Zorin.

Perkins

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/6–257. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Repeated to London.
2. British Representative at NATO.
3. Sir Gladwyn Jebb, British Ambassador in France.
4. May 31.
5. See footnote 5, Supra.
6. See Document 210.
7. Alexandre Parodi, French Representative at NATO.
8. Richard Duke Coleridge, Executive Secretary of NATO.
9. Telegram 6630, June 1, contained a suggestion from the U.S. Delegation to the Subcommittee of the U.N. Disarmament Commission that “this arctic zone should not get involved and stalled in NATO machinery” and that therefore a draft memorandum to Norway and Denmark the delegation had prepared should “not be circulated at this time to wider group and that wider group attention should be concentrated on European-Russian zone which they have had under study since Wednesday.” (Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/6–157)
10. Topol 2348 to Paris, May 31, contained the text of the U.S. reply to an April 19 Soviet note on the Middle East. (Ibid., 661.80/5–3157)
11. Topol 2356 to Paris, June 2, replied that it was “unnecessary and premature to call special NAC meeting on subject” and preferable that the British and French raise subject “in first instance with US rather than in NAC.” (Ibid., 330.13/6–257)