Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Regulation of Armaments; Atomic Energy, Volume XX

152. Letter From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy) to the President’s Special Assistant (Stassen)¹

Washington, August 31, 1956.

Dear Harold: 1. We have noted that in their comments on your disarmament proposals the Atomic Energy Commission recognized “that there may be overriding political considerations that would make it advisable for our Government to propose negotiations looking toward an agreement for limitations on testing of nuclear weapons.”²

2. We believe there are political considerations which make it highly desirable that the US take the initiative with regard to nuclear tests. The Soviets have come out for discontinuing tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons independent of general agreement on disarmament.³Eden has stated that the UK is prepared to discuss the matter of tests separately from a disarmament convention.⁴ The Canadians and the French have stated that the question of suspension of tests should be promptly taken up in the UN.⁵ The general growth of world opinion against tests has been demonstrated by the Indian proposals, the Japanese Diet resolutions, the Indonesian Parliament resolution,⁶ and statements of various other countries. The US is now virtually isolated in its opposition to any limitation on nuclear weapons tests except in connection with broader disarmament agreements.

3. Furthermore, public opinion, including US opinion, has become increasingly concerned with effects on health and genetics arising from radiation. The reports of the UK Medical Research Council and the US National Academy of Sciences,⁷ although generally reassuring on the particular effects of weapons testing, have focused new public attention on the hazards of radiation.

4. In this situation it would be of utmost political advantage if the US were to make a unilateral announcement of temporary cessation for a one-year period of thermonuclear and large-yield nuclear tests. Such a US announcement would undercut Russian propaganda, put the Soviets on the defensive, and help us with other countries and in the forthcoming UN General Assembly. If the Russians conducted any large-yield tests after such a US unilateral renunciation they would be in a very difficult propaganda position. Even if, in their current series, they were the first to conduct only small-yield tests after such a US announcement they would be open to effective political attack.

5. We believe such an announcement could not be harmful on security grounds, … and we have no plans for tests in the Pacific proving grounds for a period of well over a year.

6. A US initiative of this nature would, of course, have to be thoroughly worked out with the British since it would have an obvious effect on UK plans … There are some indications, however, that the British are not completely happy about their plans … and we think there are possibilities that we might be able to get them to go along with us in some such announcement.

7. I am attaching a draft of a proposed US announcement which the Secretary has approved as a basis for discussion with you and the agencies concerned,⁸ with a view towards submitting it to the President. We would appreciate your reaction to this proposal. We are discussing it informally with AEC and Defense.

Sincerely,

Bob

[Enclosure]

DRAFT ANNOUNCEMENT

The United States is determined to pursue every possible avenue to bring the nuclear threat under effective control and to assure the dedication of fissionable materials to peaceful uses. An essential part of any international program to control the nuclear threat will be a control over weapons tests. In order to facilitate agreements in the disarmament field, the United States is taking the following actions:

1. For a period of at least one year, the United States will abstain from conducting any tests of nuclear weapons with a yield equivalent to 100 kilotons or more of high explosive. Existing means are adequate to detect explosions of this size anywhere in the world.

2. Certainty in checking on testing of weapons with smaller yields will require detection facilities within the territories of present or potential nuclear powers. In order to enable such tests to be effectively restricted, the United States proposes that representatives of the USSR, the UK and the US, the countries which presently conduct nuclear weapons testing, should meet promptly to agree on the technical facilities needed to detect any nuclear weapons test and on conditions for limiting such tests.

3. After the period of one year, the United States will continue to abstain from weapons test in excess of 100 kilotons yield so long as this appears justified by the actions of other powers having nuclear weapons programs.

1. Source: Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Disarmament Policy. Top Secret.
2. The quotation is from Strauss’ letter to Stassen, July 26, in which Strauss commented on Stassen’s June 29 memorandum to the President. (Eisenhower Library, Project Clean Up, Defense—Classified)

3. A draft agreement on the reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces introduced in the Disarmament Subcommittee by the Soviet Union on March 27 proposed a discontinuation of tests of thermonuclear weapons, and a statement by Soviet Representative Gromyko to the Disarmament Commission on July 12 called for an agreement providing for the immediate cessation of all atomic and hydrogen bomb tests. These proposals are printed in Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959, vol. I, pp. 607 and 682, respectively. Bulganin raised the subject again in a letter to Eisenhower, September 11, which reads in part:

   “It is a known fact that the discontinuation of such tests [of atomic and hydrogen weapons] does not in itself require any international control agreements, for the present state of science and engineering makes it possible to detect any explosion of an atomic or hydrogen bomb, wherever it may be set off. In our opinion this situation makes it possible to separate the problem of ending tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons from the general problem of disarmament and to solve it independently even now, without tying an agreement on this subject to agreements on other disarmament problems.” (Ibid., pp. 688–694)

4. Eden presented his thoughts on nuclear tests and disarmament to the House of Commons on July 23 and 24. See Parliamentary Debates, 5th Series, vol. 557, cols. 46–47 and 207–209.
5. The views of the French and Canadians in the United Nations are summarized in Yearbook of the United Nations, 1956, pp. 99–102.
6. An Indian proposal for the cessation of nuclear weapons tests introduced in the United Nations Disarmament Commission on July 12 (U.N. doc. DC/98) is printed in Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959, vol. I, pp. 665–667. Regarding the Japanese Diet resolutions, see footnote 3, Document 118. Documentation on the Indonesian Parliament resolution has not been found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.
7. Regarding the report of the Medical Research Council, see Document 142; the report of the National Academy of Sciences is discussed in The New York Times, June 13, 1956, pp. 1, 18–20.
8. A draft agreement identical in wording to the one printed below, which was attached to a memorandum from Murphy to Dulles, August 8, is stamped “approved— John Foster Dulles, August 29, 1956.” (Department of State, Central Files, 711.5611/8–856)