Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Regulation of Armaments; Atomic Energy, Volume XX

149. Letter From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy) to the President’s Deputy Special Assistant (Peaslee)¹

Washington, August 15, 1956.

Dear Mr. Ambassador: Following upon the Secretary’s recent discussion with Governor Stassen,² I wish to pass along more detailed comments on the recommendations contained in Part III of Governor Stassen’s memorandum of June 29, 1956, to members of the National Security Council.³

• Paragraph A is generally acceptable. The language of the proposal, however, should be clarified to indicate whether it is intended to conform to the language of the President’s letter of March 1 to Premier Bulganin.
• Paragraph B requires further consideration and revision. A separate UN nuclear force raises questions of security loss involved through the access of foreign nationals to such weapons, and possibly of unfavorable reaction in Congress. Its implementation under Article 43⁴ would place it under the general strategic direction of a rotating command including the Soviet Union, and use of the force would be subject to the veto. The proposal might further be attacked by some states as an attempt to obtain the moral sanction of the UN in support of the use of atomic weapons.
• Paragraph C should be deleted, since many problems going beyond the field of disarmament are involved in consideration of a NATO nuclear force, and further study is required.
• Paragraph D, suggesting an arrangement with the UK to assure it a reasonable posture of nuclear weapons, does not appear to be a disarmament proposal. The UK reaction to the U.S. disarmament policy in toto should be ascertained before this question is further considered.
• Paragraph E is generally acceptable. The meaning of “supervised peaceful purposes” should, however, be spelled out more clearly.
• Paragraph F requires further study and consultation with the UK in particular to ascertain whether an acceptable scheme for test limitation can be devised. Such a proposal should not necessarily be linked to control of future production of fissionable materials. Before the United States opens any negotiations looking to a test cessation, however, we should have a clear idea of what would be involved in such an agreement and what its effect would be on prospective weapons development.
• Paragraph G is generally acceptable. International participation is probably feasible in testing or production of outer space objects, but probably could not be enforced in all research or development activities. The proposal to devote outer space objects exclusively to peaceful purposes should be stated as including missiles.
• Paragraphs H and J might be combined and drafted along the following lines:

  “The U.S. should continue negotiations looking toward the installation of the Eisenhower aerial inspection system, to be combined with the Bulganin ground control posts and with financial inspectors, for an effective method of safeguarding against the possibility of great surprise attack, and to verify agreed reductions of armaments, armed forces, and military expenditures on a gradual and safeguarded basis. The U.S. should make clear, however, that acceptance of such a system as a whole is not a condition precedent to any progress towards conventional or nuclear controls. The U.S. should be willing to consider favorably the progressive development of an inspection and control system which would be adequate to verify fulfillment of any agreed measures of disarmament even though at the outset it was not adequate for a permament arms control system. Partial aerial surveillance coupled with ground posts and radar installations, under some circumstances, could fill such a description. Inspection need not be more extensive than necessary to ensure compliance with any agreement.”

• Paragraph I, relating to suspension of withdrawal from the agreement, is generally acceptable.
• Paragraph K should be deleted since it is inadvisable to raise the question of force levels with the government of the Federal Republic at this time.
• Paragraph L might be deleted as being unnecessary since paragraphs A, E, and possibly F and G appear to include Communist China. You will recall that NSC Action 1513 of March 1, 1956,⁵ provides that reductions of conventional forces to 2.5 million men should apply to the U.S., USSR and China. Consequently, it would appear that any conventional reductions would have to apply to China, and that other provisions involving the application of an effective inspection system might well have to include China.
• Paragraph M appears to relate to matters which concern agencies beyond those represented in the President’s Special Committee and which are not directly a part of the disarmament policy review.

In addition to the above suggestions, it would appear desirable to include policy recommendations on levels of armed forces or reductions in conventional armaments since these questions will necessarily arise in any disarmament negotiations.

It would also be useful to indicate more clearly the relationship between the various proposals. It might be helpful to state, for example, that the U.S. is ready to enter into conventional reductions or nuclear controls or both, depending only on the possibility of agreeing on effective safeguards.

Sincerely yours,

Robert Murphy

1. Source: Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Disarmament Policy. Top Secret. A covering note from Peaslee to the NSC and the members of the President’s Special Committee on Disarmament Problems, August 17, indicates that this letter as well as an August 14 letter from Wainhouse to Peaslee and Peaslee’s August 16 reply to Wainhouse were transmitted to these two bodies in connection with a memorandum from Peaslee to the President’s Special Committee, August 15, on an armament regulation program. (Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records, Disarmament) The source text is identified as Enclosure 1.
2. No record of this discussion has been found in Department of State Files.
3. Reference is to Stassen’s memorandum to the President, printed as Document 143, a copy of which was transmitted to the NSC on June 29.
4. Article 43 of the U.N. Charter provided for member states’ contribution of armed forces and other assistance to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with special agreements, to maintain international peace and security.
5. Reference is to the Annex to NSC Action No. 1513, Document 112.