Office of the Historian

130. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom1

Washington, April 5, 1956—3:59 p.m.

5866. For USDEL Disarmament Subcommittee. In treatment Parts I and II Soviet proposals March 272 following general considerations might be taken into account.

1.
On basis preliminary analysis, Department believes March 27 proposals despite many vague and unacceptable features constitute departure from past Soviet positions of degree similar to that represented by proposals of May 10, 1955 and, language-wise at least, appear significant further move by USSR toward more serious negotiating approach.
2.
Department accordingly believes in treatment Parts I and II of Soviet proposals USDEL should reflect attitude of giving serious consideration proposals, of recognizing forward movement and apparent flexibility they represent, and of willingness US maintain flexible position in course of negotiations designed seek clarifications and broaden areas of agreement.
3.
A major objective of USDEL should be to seek to determine to what extent Soviet position is negotiable in following major respects.
a.
Aerial inspection—While emphasizing that aerial survey is integral initial component of any acceptable plan, seek determine under what conditions Soviets would accept and at what stage implement?
b.
Force levels—To what extent might Soviets be prepared negotiate initial reductions without specifying ultimate levels?
c.
Adequacy of controls—Are Soviet-suggested controls and objects of control initial, illustrative, or exclusive of additional essential safeguards?
d.
Nuclear controls—Are Soviets prepared to proceed concurrently with or at least to negotiate concurrently about measures of limitation and control in nuclear field?
4.
In course of seeking clarifications of Soviet proposals following more specific questions appear to be of particular importance:
a.
What kinds of armaments would be subject to control—submarines, aircraft, small arms, etc.? As suggested London 4303,3 question whether nuclear delivery systems included of particular importance.
b.
By what formula would armaments subject to control be related to force levels?
c.
Among clarifications regarding extent of control USDEL might in particular seek to determine whether objects of control as defined by USSR negotiable to include other elements set forth in US positions.
5.
USDEL should take maximum advantage weaknesses and inadequacies Soviet position as revealed in probing suggested above to bring pressure upon Soviets to move further toward agreement.
Dulles
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/4–556. Confidential. Drafted by Baker and approved by Bond.↩
  2. See footnote 4, supra.↩
  3. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/3–2856)↩