Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Regulation of Armaments; Atomic Energy, Volume XX

128. Letter From the Officer in Charge, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs (Meyers), to the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Wilcox)¹

London, March 23, 1956.

Dear Fran: This is the third in my weekly “round up” letters.² The week was distinguished by the opening of the Subcommittee meetings, the introduction of the Anglo-French synthesis, the introduction of the two US proposals for preliminary measures on exchange of inspection personnel and test “strip” inspection, a US statement on force levels, and the fact that Mr. Gromyko said practically nothing other than to ask some pertinent questions about the synthesis and essentially not one meaningful word about the US proposals or views.

The above short-hand description of events is what appears on the record. It’s what’s behind the record that is more interesting. The problems of being on this delegation are illustrated very aptly by the following:

1. On Wednesday,³ apparently because he thought it advisable to forestall possible Soviet support for the Eden Plan for test inspection in East and West Germany, the Governor introduced the two US working papers on preliminary measures without showing them beforehand to any of our Allies, and after having given the staff approximately 15 minutes in which to see them. There had been some discussion in the delegation of the way in which to present these papers, during which General Gerhart⁴ and I both had stressed the need to avoid minimizing the pressure on the USSR of the President’s proposals for guarding against surprise attack by offering these preliminary measures as a substitute. Moreover, while the other Western delegations had been advised on Wednesday morning that the US would at some time in the near future introduce these ideas, they were obviously surprised at the appearance of the two papers without previous transmittal to them. Fortunately, Robertson of Canada⁵ made an effective speech in favor of the pragmatic approach taken by the US, which eased the situation. I believe the method in which the introduction of these papers was handled of sufficient interest to warrant this description at some length and I understand that General Gerhart has messaged Defense on the same matter.

2. As you undoubtedly have noted from Embtel 4163 (Disarmament # 55)⁶ the US statement on force levels did not contain any reference to “China”. I am attaching a memorandum⁷ which I gave Governor Stassen on this when I saw the statement, which I received approximately one-half hour before the Subcommittee meeting began. In this, I pointed out that the omission of China did not coincide with the delegation’s instructions nor with Secretary Dulles’ views as expressed most recently at his press conference in Tokyo.⁸ As you will note in the reference telegram, Nutting referred to the US force levels as applying to the US, USSR, and China, but Gromyko noted that Mr. Stassen had expressed views on the levels of the armed forces of “two Powers”.

3. Embtel 4162 (Disarmament # 54)⁹ describes, among other matters, the reaction of our Western Allies to the Governor’s definition of the forces included in the US concept of force levels. You will note considerable surprise that the US appeared to be excluding reserve and paramilitary forces, particularly the latter, since our Allies thought this would benefit the USSR and enable them to avoid including their security forces in the 2.5 million force levels. In the delegation prior to the Four-Power meeting, this issue was discussed at considerable length, with nearly all of the advisers urging that the question of application to paramilitary and reserves be settled in Washington. We took a line quite similar to that subsequently taken by the British, French and Canadians. In addition, the advisers questioned the advisability of making a statement of US views on force levels outside of the context of a broader US position. Fortunately, the views of the other Western representatives succeeded in modifying the Governor’s approach, since he had rejected his own advisers’ suggestions on this matter.

4. On the whole, the advisers, with the exception of Matteson, appear used by the Governor principally as sounding boards for each other, and have little or no effect on Mr. Stassen. He does not want a coordinated presentation of views, ostensibly so that there will be no “screening out” of suggestions but more practically, I believe, to avoid the presentation on paper of a possibly unanimous approach by State, Defense, and AEC representatives and his own staff. There is also an exceptional amount of “make work” assignments, which rarely bring practical application of the work which results. In all seriousness, however indiscreet I may seem to be in saying this, it looks as though the delegation advisers are here as nominal representatives of their Departments or Agencies but without any real influence on developments. This interpretation is supported by the operations in the Subcommittee itself, where requests for advice on tactics are made only to Matteson, although the rest of us do pass notes up, through me, in an effort to influence the course of action.

I have given considerable thought to the advisability of informing you in such detail on developments here within the delegation, but have concluded that it is most advisable to do so. I trust things will improve in subsequent weeks, but frankly I doubt it.

Respectfully,

Howard

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/3–2356. Confidential. A copy was sent to Bond.
2. See also Meyers’ fourth and sixth letters to Wilcox, April 5 and 16, infra, and Document 133, respectively.
3. March 21.
4. Major General John K. Gerhart, MAAG Chief in the United Kingdom.
5. Norman A. Robertson, Canadian High Commissioner in London.
6. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/3–2256)
7. Not printed. (Ibid., 600.0012/3–2356)

8. At his press conference in Tokyo on March 19, Dulles remarked:

   “I said that as far as ground disarmament was concerned, I thought it would be very difficult to arrive at limitations of ground forces unless China was limited, too. The President’s proposal was designed as a beginning, to allay fear of a great surprise attack. China is not capable of surprise attack against the US so as far as the present stage is concerned, there is no problem as far as China is concerned.” Meyers, who quoted Dulles’ statement in his attached memorandum, perhaps derived it from telegram 2217 from Tokyo, March 19, not printed. (Ibid., 110.10–DU/3–1956)

9. Not printed. (Ibid., 330.13/3–2256)