Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Regulation of Armaments; Atomic Energy, Volume XX

127. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State¹

Paris, March 19, 1956—6 p.m.

4310. London For USDEL Disarmament. I saw Pineau today and took up with him United States memorandum on disarmament. I told him that we considered it a matter of first importance that the London meetings on disarmament not break up with an impression of serious disunity between the Western powers. I pointed out that we were relatively near agreement on immediate problem, i.e. stage one, and it did not seem worth while to have major public disagreement on more hypothetical questions involved in stage two and three. I said that the question of a permanent and total ban on the use of nuclear weapons was of great importance to the United States as we considered that it bore on the very safety and existence of our country. I told him that we could never even consider such a ban until there was foolproof control of all existing stocks.

I then asked him if I could pose a hypothetical question. Pineau said yes, and I asked him to consider the following circumstances. Assuming the third stage of the Moch plan² had come into effect and one day the United States discovered on their radar screens one or more missiles coming from the direction of Siberia toward the United States would he expect that we should refrain from using nuclear missiles in a defensive attempt to knock down the attacking weapons before they could reach their targets. Pineau replied that as he understood it the Moch plan did not require any such self denial on our part and we would continue to be free in such a case to use nuclear defensive weapons. I replied that if his thinking was correct, there certainly must be considerable misunderstanding between the delegations in London and I pointed out that unfortunately the Moch plan had been completed before the French had had a chance to receive United States views on disarmament. I admitted that the United States had only reached definite conclusions rather recently but I said that it did not seem proper for friends and allies to reach frozen positions on an important subject of this nature before they had the chance to thoroughly discuss and study their respective positions.

Pineau thoroughly agreed with the above and said that as he saw it the problem was the following: The French had some thoughts on the subject which had been developed with considerable care. They did not feel that any one power should have a total veto over what all the other Western powers should say. Therefore he felt that Moch would have to present the French position and the United States would then be free to present their views. Assuming that there would be divergencies he suggested that the proper procedure would be for one of the delegations, presumably the United States, to suggest that the conference be adjourned for a few weeks in order to allow time to try and reach agreement by private negotiation. During that period we would hope that by intense negotiations we could arrive at a common Western position which would be put up to the Soviets when the Disarmament Committee convened. He said that he would instruct Moch accordingly and advise him to accept such a postponement. He also said that he had already advised Moch to handle himself in such a way as to minimize any differences between the United States and the French and U.K. positions.

Comment: In view of the extensive publicity already given the Moch plan and in view of the fact that it represents standard Socialist thinking I feel it will not be possible to prevent Moch from submitting this text at this time. If USDEL is really certain that they will have wholehearted support from U.K. I would think that tripartite negotiations or four-power negotiations including Canada during an adjournment of the Disarmament Committee would have a good chance of substantially modifying French position. I must re-emphasize, however, that eventual results would depend to a great extent on the degree of support for our position forthcoming from the U.K. reps.

Dillon

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/3–1956. Secret; Priority. Repeated priority to London.
2. The Moch plan, a proposed synthesis of disarmament proposals which the United Kingdom cosponsored as an Anglo-French working paper submitted to the Subcommittee of the Disarmament Commission on March 19, is printed in Documents of Disarmament, 1945–1959, vol. I, pp. 595–598.