Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Regulation of Armaments; Atomic Energy, Volume XX

119. Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense (Wilson) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, February 24, 1956.

SUBJECT

• Department of Defense Position on the International Atomic Energy Agency

Reference is made to my memorandum of February 3, 1956,² transmitting the general views of the Department of Defense on the proposed United States position concerning the functions of the International Atomic Energy Agency as set forth in the draft statute and working paper accompanying your memorandum of January 20, 1956.³

I am informed that at the meeting in your office on February 3, 1956.⁴ with Mr. Stassen and representatives of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense, it was agreed that certain of the broader functions of the agency proposed in the working paper and discussed in my memorandum of February 3, 1956, should not be sponsored by the United States, and that the present inter-departmental position is that the statute as now drafted should substantially represent the United States position for the forthcoming meeting of the twelve-nation drafting committee.⁵

It is the Department’s position that the draft statute of August 22, 1955, represents the maximum functions which should be assigned to the agency at this time. Changes in the draft statute, except for clarity and in regard to organizational and administrative matters, should be in the direction of limitations rather than expansions for the reasons that:

a. The Department feels that one of the principal objectives of establishing such an agency is to promote world confidence in an international organization of this character. To that end the agency should be established as soon as practicable and on a basis of minimum interference with the sovereign rights of any country.

b. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have concluded, and I agree, that the military risk of such increase in nuclear weapon potential as may be occasioned by International Atomic Energy Agency assistance in peaceful use programs is not of such significance as to require or justify an extension of the agency’s functions beyond those authorized in the draft statute.

There are certain changes in the agency’s activities as would be authorized by the draft statute which the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe, and I agree, would further United States interests in establishing the agency and minimize such risks as may be occasioned through its activities. These are:

a. Elimination of the responsibility of the agency for storing and protecting materials as provided by Par. F, Article X, except to the extent necessary during the process of analysis and transfer from the supplier to the recipient.

b. Deletion of the provision that the agency shall establish a central pool as implied by Par. G and H of Article X.

For the foreseeable future there would appear to be no requirement for the agency to receive and safeguard a stockpile of fissionable or source materials for direct transfer from the agency to recipient countries or to establish its own facilities for the fabrication and reprocessing of fuels. It is recognized that one of the purposes of identifying a “peaceful use stockpile” is to provide concrete evidence of a turn from military to peaceful uses. However, until such time as a practicable and effective means of regulating armaments can be instituted it is unlikely that contributions to a central pool will be of such magnitude as to significantly affect the military posture of any nation. Accordingly, from the practical standpoint the establishment of an international pool would serve only to increase the cost of atomic developments in the recipient countries.

I recognize that the President’s address to the United Nations General Assembly of December 8, 1953, implies a commitment on the part of the United States to the support of an international pool, and therefore that the political and psychological aspects of the matter may well outweigh these practical considerations. It is the Department’s view, however, that regardless of the amounts of fissionable material and source materials which supplying nations may agree to contribute, the amounts held in the physical custody of the agency should be limited to the minimum necessary to uphold the international pool concept.

Although not directly related to the forthcoming discussions of the draft statute, there are two aspects of international cooperation in the atomic energy field which the Department considers basic to United States interests:

a. The United States should continue a vigorous program of direct cooperation through bilateral and regional agreements, and should give preference to this method over dealing through the International Atomic Energy Agency. In so doing, however, it should observe the general principles established by the agency with respect to reports, inspections, controls, and other miscellaneous details.

b. No commitment in connection with the establishment and functions of the International Atomic Energy Agency should in any way affect the relationship between the United States and any country with respect to agreements for the procurement of source materials by the United States.

C.E. Wilson

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 398.1901/2–2456. Secret.
2. Not printed. (Ibid., 398.1901/2–356)
3. Dulles’ memorandum of January 20 and the working paper have not been found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files. For the draft statute of IAEA, August 22, 1955, see Department of State Bulletin, October 24, 1955, pp. 665–672.
4. See Document 106.
5. Regarding the 12-nation discussions on the IAEA beginning February 27, see infra.