Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Regulation of Armaments; Atomic Energy, Volume XX

111. Memorandum of Discussion at the 275th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, February 7, 1956, 4 p.m.¹

Washington, February 7, 1956, 4 p.m.

The meeting was impromptu in its nature, resulting from the President’s having asked me the day before to invite into his office for “a few minutes after Cabinet” the officials to whom Governor Stassen had sent the material on disarmament prepared in response to NSC Action 1510–b (copy attached), along with his covering note dated February 2, 1956, indicating the distribution (copy of which is also attached).²

The following were in attendance: The Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Deputy Attorney General,³ Director of Office of Defense Mobilization, Director of the Bureau of the Budget, Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chairman of Atomic Energy Commission, Director of Central Intelligence Agency, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, Director of U.S. Information Agency, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Mr. Bernard Shanley (in and out), and Colonel Andrew Goodpaster.

The President began the meeting by stating that he had given considerable study over the week-end to Governor Stassen’s material above described, and that in the first place he felt that Governor Stassen had done a good job in preparing the proposed messages with the material that he had, in order to see what it would look like in the form of actual draft documents. These had been circulated in order to obtain critical comment as to form and substance. The President said that nevertheless he feared there was not anything new in it except possibly the idea of seeking agreement upon limited test strips in which the inspection idea advanced at Geneva could be tried out on a small scale. He said that this idea and another one which had been proposed by Admiral Strauss had been considered rather seriously by him over the week-end as possible innovations which would support some kind of public announcement of progress in the development of policy proposals by the U.S. The method suggested of publicizing the proposals is one more applicable to a great change of policy, or to a great new proposal.

The idea which had been suggested to the President by Admiral Strauss was as follows: that in connection with the ear-marking of 20,000 kilograms of fissionable material for domestic peaceful uses of atomic energy, there would be a corresponding offer to ear-mark 20,000 kilograms for peaceful uses elsewhere in the world, substantially as follows:

a. 1,000 kilograms to be an out-and-out gift to the International Atomic Energy Agency when the organization thereof is completed under the auspices of the U.N. (the value thereof to be 25 thousand dollars per kilogram—total of 25 million dollars);

b. 5,000 kilograms would be made available to EURATOM (but not as a gift);

c. The remaining 14,000 kilograms would be made available to the other nations in the world at reasonable cost for the development of peaceful uses of atomic energy.

This would be a 5 year program and it would be combined with an offer to match within 5 years all contributions from all other nations in the world, and if the latter countries exceeded 20,000 kilograms in such period then we would match it. The President thought this program would have great appeal throughout the world. The President said that even with the development of these two ideas, he felt that the elaborate scheme for public announcements, radio addresses, messages to Congress, addresses to the United Nations, and sending a delegation to Moscow was somewhat like taking a sledge hammer to drive a tack. The President then went ahead to say that though he did not see at this time a clear alternative to the drift toward war which is manifest to serious students of international affairs, nevertheless we simply had to find some method for getting at this thing,—otherwise we are headed for an armaments race that would be ended in only one way,—namely, a clash of forces which could not result in victory for anybody, or at the least, stupendous expenditures for an indefinite period. He said he hoped that his advisers would give thought to this awful problem and bring forth any ideas which occurred to them as to how we could get the endeavors of mankind channeled for peaceful pursuits and the production of nuclear material channeled for peaceful uses. If we could only do the latter, he said, we could be safe in that our plants which produce this material could keep running for a long time, even without an effective disarmament agreement.

He explained that he had called the meeting in order to save further detailed work on the drafts which Governor Stassen had circulated, if it was felt that the lack of major new ideas or proposals made this unjustifiable.

Governor Stassen thereupon said that the Strauss’ proposal was entirely OK with him, and could be brought into his over-all plan. He said he feared that the President had underestimated the degree of world impact that would accompany the announcements, speeches, etc., which he had prepared. In other words, the Governor felt there was enough new in his proposals that it would be accepted by the world as progress inspired by the President, and a significant step to succeed the dramatic announcement of the President’s position at Geneva.

Governor Stassen said that we are now at a critical time—the big question in the minds of people all over the world, friends, neutrals, and enemies, was what is the U.S. policy going to be now? He said he had talked with Senator George and Senator Knowland about the matter, and they agreed with him that in general his proposals would be progress toward convincing the world of our good faith interest in disarmament. He spoke of a conversation he had had with Minister for External Affairs Lester Pearson of Canada, who had explained that as a result of his visit last year to Moscow he had become convinced that the Soviets were abysmally ignorant of our true position and attitude on the subject of disarmament. The French likewise are giving top emphasis to disarmament. He cited this as additional support for his views that his material would be an aid to elaborating and clarifying the real spirit of the President and the American people in reference to disarmament. He thought we have a sound basis for action in the work of the study groups.

Governor Stassen insisted that there were really two new propositions (at least new in the sense that they had not been announced to the world and proposed before, although both had been discussed in our own circles), which would be for the first time announced as a development of the American position,—namely,

a. the small test area to try out inspection techniques, and

b. the concept of mutual exchange of notifications between ourselves and the USSR of all major movements of armed forces—which could be preliminary to an attack.

The President said he thought that the latter point had been the subject of discussion with the Russians. Governor Stassen said “no”. The President said nevertheless it had been discussed informally in Geneva with members of the Russian delegation. Therefore, said the President, we still have not got enough grist for a big announcement, and we would be, by following Governor Stassen’s proposed course, like the mountain which labored and came forth with a mouse. The President said we need a concrete and understandable proposal which would be accepted and understood by the world as an American contribution toward progress in the direction of disarmament.

Secretary Dulles then spoke. First he said he agreed with the President that the substantive content of the proposal did not justify the proposed announcement. He said everything in substance had already been put forth and had already been rejected by the Russians and for the most part rejected many times. Then he turned to the proposal in Governor Stassen’s material that we agree to work toward the reduction of our total force levels to 2½ million men in consideration of the same kind of reduction by the Soviet bloc. He said he was fearful of any such criterion of disarmament; that it was the old numbers racket, and there are so many ways that it could be evaded by the Russians that it was in his opinion unsound ground. He spoke of the possibility of reserves being built up and trained and not included at this or a later point. He mentioned the fact that our national guard would not be included, and that if we could handle numbers in this way, so could the Russians, and there would be no check on it, particularly where we are dealing with those whose good faith we do not accept. Secretary Dulles said that to look at numbers along with men under arms would be meaningless and a better test was the implements of war on which the Western European Union limitations were postulated. Secretary Dulles also said that there was no way to have Governor Stassen’s proposal on limitations on numbers of Chinamen. Dulles said he thought quite well of Admiral Strauss’ proposal, and concluded these remarks by the statement that he felt that “Harold had done all that could be done with what we have at this time by way of the elements of the position.”

The President then said that he was inclined to agree with Stassen that there was novelty and possibility of progress in the proposal that we develop these little inspection strips as a test, and he would like to see this explored, but not in such an elaborate fashion as Stassen had proposed in his February 2 material. The President said he felt it took more cross-checks or double-checks than merely force levels or even quantitative limitations on armaments to achieve reciprocal reductions or tearing down of the trend in the armaments build-up. He mentioned two other elements,—namely, the rate of expenditures (the French idea at Geneva) and the 4th element, that is an opening up of the Soviets to inspection. He said he felt that these four things could be done concurrently and that we could achieve real progress for genuine disarmament.

Governor Stassen said the Soviets are distorting our plan as simply reconnaissance, and claiming that we are saying nothing about a decrease in strengths. He said that an added new element in his plan is the idea of inspection around atomic plants, which can serve as steps toward verifying the use of atomic materials produced for peaceful purposes. He said we must consider what the future means if we have simply more and more missiles and weapons. He said that 4 elements would be inspected to limit forces—men, armaments, money, and munitions production. Governor Stassen said that all of these elements were in his proposal, but they were all keyed to the President’s inspection proposal that would lead to opening up the Soviet. Stassen then added that the concern of Dulles about reserve components, national guard components, etc., that are now in the Soviet picture had all been taken into account by his Task Forces, and that it was intended to insure that in the negotiations which would be in the succeeding phases that all related military components would be reciprocally reduced.

Secretary Dulles said that he had not understood that this was so, or that the action was contemplated. Governor Stassen said that if all the material had been read this point would have been clear. Secretary Dulles said that we must assure ourselves that the line of action we are proposing to enter can be carried through to reach a satisfactory solution. He did not feel that assurance now.

The President said we must not take the stand that we cannot disarm. Even if we cannot be sure we will be able to keep track of all elements of the other side’s armed strength, our inspection proposal would let us know about movements and build-ups that threaten surprise attack.

Secretary Humphrey expressed the idea that we are on the wrong track in this business of reducing forces to certain levels of manpower alone. He said he thought there was a trap in it for us in that if we proposed the reduction by the Russians to the end that the Russians reduced manpower under arms, the area in which they have great superiority over us, then they could come back and propose that we either ban the bomb or reduce our superiority in the nuclear field to parity with them. Humphrey then posed the question as to how we would answer such a proposition. The President said the Soviets proposed simply renouncing use of the bomb, and he would not agree.

Governor Stassen pointed out that the Russians had already made the proposal as to the reduction of manpower in their May 10, 1955, announcement, and suggested that we might be nearer a psychological show-down than Humphrey had described.

The President then spoke, saying that if we could somehow eliminate the H-weapon, the world would be better off. He feared some of our thinking overlooked a transcendant consideration, — namely, that nobody can win a thermonuclear war. Therefore, he said “We’ve got to move or we are doomed”.

Secretary Humphrey said he felt that our best way to get started was by gradual stages, including the “test strip” plan which he thought was a sound idea. Could we not, he said, spare the dramatic and negotiate toward such a beginning as the actual inclusion of the test strip plan.

The President said this idea was very appealing to him but only if all would agree we must move, even if only a small distance at first, in this matter.

Governor Stassen thought there should also be some reference to a decrease in strengths; otherwise the proposal would appear to be unfairly favorable to us. The President and Secretary Humphrey indicated general agreement. The President then said there had been always in his mind in connection with the proposal for exchanging blue prints the profound consideration that this would really furnish a test of the Russian good faith in the disarmament negotiations as distinguished from the pure propaganda of numbers.

Secretary Dulles then said that we must also realize that today the world is afraid of nuclear war and its consequences, and that this state of mind led many people and many governments—who do not take responsibility for maintaining peace—to go for superficial panaceas of the sort the Soviets were continually throwing about, such as the “ban the bomb” idea. He said we in the United States who take real responsibility must always explain the true meaning of proposals, and see that nothing unsound is done. We have the task of convincing the world that we genuinely desire peace and at the same time, coming forward with genuine proposals which might lead to world peace through some practicable plan for the reduction of armaments and tension and threats. In other words, it is up to us as the last best hope of the world for our way of life, to explain why the Russian panaceas being used for propaganda purposes will not work, and then to provide affirmative, saleable, understandable, and workable substitutes for such panaceas as “ban the bomb”. He thought if we approach the problem in this way, we can find more sound things to do, such as inspection, atoms-for-peace, etc.

Secretary Dulles then reiterated his view that he was for some kind of approach to limitation of the elements beyond which force levels would be postulated to include limitation on types of weapons, on submarines, on guided missiles and means of delivery, and other measurable elements of armed forces. He felt there might be some room for progress in the field of cutting down the quantity of fissionable material in the future that goes into weapons, or even to agree if this can be done safely that after a certain point all future use of fissionable material would be dedicated to peaceful purposes. He thought undue stress on numbers of men under arms was not good. The President agreed, pointing out that it encouraged our Allies to taper off.

Secretary Robertson then spoke and said he agreed with Secretary Dulles about the numbers game being a poor way to get at disarmament. He pointed out that we had come down from 4 million men to something less than 3 million men, and operating very thin, considering the nature of our commitments world-wide. He said it is the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that we should stay where we are at this level during the first year of any kind of trial inspection and only negotiate during that year on the degree, nature, and quantity of reduction in other elements that might be made.

The President said he could understand Secretary Dulles’ apprehension about the numbers game, in which Secretary Robertson concurred. He said “Foster saw how the limitations passed on the numbers game got burned at Versailles”, and made some further reference to the position taken at Versailles by Marshal Foch. He said, though, referring to men, money, etc., that if inspection verifies the information given, we could begin to make progress. The President, by way of summing up the discussion, said first that he felt sure that this was no time to put out a lot of material that looks like a big program and was really nothing concrete or new in it, and that the timing in his opinion would be bad for the release of the Stassen type of material. Our announcement should be quite modest in the beginning. He said let’s adopt the idea of agreeing to a test strip where the techniques of inspection can be carried out. If this makes progress, we can think about going to see Bulganin.

Governor Stassen felt that now is the time to act. The U.N. resolution was a very favorable result for the U.S. Now we need a new impact. We should turn the level of arms downward.

The President restated his view that we should start modestly, then dramatize.

Ambassador Lodge spoke up at this time and called attention to the U.N. resolution adopted in December by a vote of 53 to 7⁴ on this subject. He pointed out that only the Russians and the satellites disagreed with it and that they had to go along with nations such as India and other neutrals who frequently do not agree with us on the subject of disarmament or bombs. He pointed out that the resolution was amended to accept the President’s concept of air inspection and the exchange of blue prints, announced in Geneva; that it also called upon all nations to work toward the reduction of such armaments as can be adequately safeguarded.

The burden of Lodge’s comments was that some of the steps proposed in Stassen’s material might be safely negotiated in a forthcoming meeting of the Disarmament Subcommittee in March in London, and that this could be done without taking any chance and we could be consistent with the UN resolution in the negotiating of some of these points because we have 4 qualifying conditions that must be met before we would have to agree to any of the steps,— namely:

a. they must be safeguarded;

b. they must be safeguarded adequately to our satisfaction;

c. they must be feasible;

d. they must be feasible now.

He stressed the fact that we have got to have something to talk about on the reduction of arms (Part 2 above cited of the UN resolution). He said everybody expects that there will be talk in the negotiations by the United States on this subject of reduction of armaments, and that it is not enough to reiterate the aerial inspection or the exchange of blue prints ideas. He said that in the Subcommittee “they are all going to be after us on this, friends and enemies alike. We cannot afford to split off from the British and the French on this”.

Then the President pointed out that the British and the French for the time being are pretty strongly committed to some kind of plan whereby reductions could be geared to the test of the number of men under arms (numbers racket).

Governor Stassen then spoke up and reminded the Council that Bulganin called specifically for something tangible in this matter of the reduction of armaments. Therefore, can’t we, he asked, hold out some concrete prospect of turning down the trend of armaments build-up if we get the Soviets opened up. Otherwise we may lose world opinion.

At this point, Admiral Radford said our allies do not have the same kind of responsibilities that we have and we should always have this in mind in dealing with their proposals in the field of disarmament. Our allies do not have the same alternatives either, he said, or choices which must be made in the right way or else, in view of our responsibilities, the whole thing may be lost. He said it was the view of the Joint Chiefs that we cannot have an effective system of armed limitations and maintain the safety and security of the U.S. vis-à-vis the Soviet. The Joint Chiefs, he pointed out, do believe however that we can have an effective inspection which would minimize the danger of surprise attack and thus perhaps minimize the danger of all-out atomic war. He went ahead and said that if he were in the place of the Russians today he would start off the inspection proposal and then the arms limitations proposal for about a year or a year and a half, then he would accept it because at that time, in Radford’s view, the Russians will have built up all elements of power to approach parity with our own, building vast fleets of large bombers designed for one purpose— for long range delivery of nuclear weapons. He pointed out that they are building submarines at an unprecedented rate (the rate is about 100 per year) and that these and other features of their preparatory program reminded him in deadly fashion of the activities going on in Germany in the early ’30’s. He said that from the nature of the speedup and intensive building program of submarines, airplanes, and other weapons, it appears they are shooting at a target date for action. Therefore, in Radford’s view, a decision made by the President on this subject would be one of the most important decisions which had to be made during his service as President of the United States. He said he believed the Russians could wait one and a half years, and then accept our proposal to limit things from there on, and they would have us “at a hell of a disadvantage”. Radford then spoke of the limitations which in his mind are inherent in the idea of inspections and exchange of blue prints. The substance of his view here was that inspections alone will not protect us; that it will only help to prevent, or enable us to get ready for a surprise attack. In conclusion, he said he was afraid if our proposals as set out in Governor Stassen’s material were made to the Russians, his greatest fear would be that the Russians would accept, because as he saw it, by waiting a year and a half, and then accepting them, they would gain an unacceptable advantage over us. We would be unable to abrogate the agreement, since our Allies would hold that tantamount to war.

Governor Stassen said that the armament race and the disarmament race grew out of the kind of analysis that Admiral Radford had just made of the situation. He was working on some approach that would open up the Soviets and enable us safely to turn down this upward trend of arms build-up.

Admiral Radford replied that the trouble with any such efforts was that the Soviets were not people who would live up to agreements. He said there were many reasons why the Russians declined the President’s “open sky” offer—that they did not want us to see how little they had at that time. By about a year and a half or so, they would have enough that they would perhaps agree to it, and be in a position thereafter to enjoy the advantage of which he spoke.

Governor Stassen then asked him whether or not he agreed with the idea of negotiating for the development of test strips. Radford replied that he did.

So apparently from the entire discussion, there seems to have emerged at least this clear decision,—namely, that we will propose and work sincerely for the development of test strips. Secretary Humphrey thought we should go through with a pilot trial, with the objective of reducing armaments as soon as the pilot trial demonstrates adequate safeguards.

Admiral Radford concluded his statement with remarks that under no circumstances should we agree that after a certain point further production of fissionable material would be devoted exclusively to peaceful purposes, since inspection will not be sufficient to assure that material is not being diverted into weapons.

The President came back into the conversation and said that when he was told of the equivalent in tons of TNT now contained in our stockpile, and when he considered the possibility of the danger upon this country of such a volume of destructive power, it was a completely staggering picture. “What is left of either country after the first 72 hours?” The President referred to the Net Evaluation Subcommittee Report as indicative of the kind of world it would be in the event of the use of thermonuclear weapons.⁵ He said the statesmen of today must search their hearts and brains for some way out of the collision course upon which these two nations are embarked. “What”, he asked the group, “can we do about it?” An arms race, he pointed out, particularly when such weapons as we now have can be employed, can lead but to disaster. He asked what we can suggest as a kind of thing we can reduce.

The President thought Governor Stassen might make a proposal for a trial inspection while in London. He said we should then negotiate during the year on things our experience shows us we can adequately inspect for.

Governor Stassen then asked the President whether he would approve a second step beyond which I took it the President had approved (test strips),—the authority to agree and to explore and negotiate, but without commitments, during the first year of the test period, other kinds of reductions of armaments, mentioning an illustrative figure. There did not appear to be agreement on mentioning a figure.

I took it from the President’s response that Governor Stassen would have good authority, and that this would be a broad determination.

Admiral Strauss then suggested that one of the proposals that might be made in the course of the negotiations in the Subcommittee could perhaps be his plan above stated of contributing 20,000 kilograms. The President thought only a generalized reference to atoms-for-peace should be made.

Secretary Dulles objected to any specific statement, and said he felt this was one which should be held up and dealt with later, and that Stassen’s talk on this subject should be limited to generalities and not to specifics. The President appeared to agree.

Governor Stassen asked about replying to the Bulganin letter of last summer on disarmament. The President thought it must be answered promptly, but that a delegation should not be sent to Moscow at this time.⁶

Dillon Anderson⁷

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Dillon Anderson on February 9.
2. Regarding NSC Action No. 1510, see footnote 9, Document 103. For information on Stassen’s covering note and enclosures, February 2, see footnote 2, Document 109.
3. William P. Rogers.
4. The vote was 56–7. See Document 88.
5. Documentation on the Net Evaluation Subcommittee is scheduled for publication in volume xix.
6. No record of actions taken at this meeting is attached to the source text, but see infra.
7. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.