49. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, February 1, 19571
SUBJECT
- Israeli Views Concerning Secretary General’s Report on the Question of the Withdrawal of Israeli Forces
PARTICIPANTS
- Mr. Reuven Shiloah, Minister, Embassy of Israel
- IO—Francis O. Wilcox
- NEA—James M. Ludlow
- UNP—Samuel DePalma
Mr. Shiloah called at his request to discuss the pending action in New York on the Secretary General’s report. He began by expressing Israel’s appreciation for the general tenor of the discussion in the General Assembly which he attributed largely to the statements of Ambassador Lodge. These statements, he thought, had injected a realistic note into the debate. He went on, however, to say that Israel is deeply concerned over the tendency to water down our resolution in order to obtain maximum support. He wondered if any constructive purpose would be achieved by a very general resolution which did not give the Secretary General any specific mandate even if it obtains the support of two-thirds of the Assembly. Israel feels that the Secretary General will not be able to overcome Egyptian objections if he is not given a very specific mandate from the Assembly. He added that it is the view of the Israeli Delegation that certain members of the Asian-African bloc could be induced to follow our lead if they were confronted with a more specific resolution.
Mr. Wilcox expressed the belief that the language now being considered for the resolution will accomplish the purpose we have in mind provided we follow it up persistently with such further action as may be necessary. He explained that we had preferred a resolution which, after calling for a complete Israeli withdrawal, would have gone on to specify the measures required to restore peace and stability in the area, but we are convinced that the situation in New York precludes this approach. We are also inclined to believe that more progress can be made with Egypt by a general endorsement of the Secretary General’s recommendations which would not confront Nasser with the necessity of having to take a public position on the specific measures envisaged. Mr. Wilcox suggested that Israel might also wish to avoid being confronted with very specific recommendations [Page 76] at this time. He added that we are inclined to the view that a general endorsement of the Secretary General’s proposed measures by an overwhelming majority of the General Assembly would be preferable to a specific resolution which could not obtain a decisive majority.
Mr. Shiloah questioned the tendency of the United States to work out compromises with certain leaders of the Arab-Asian group, particularly Mr. Menon, because this tends to solidify the bloc and to make it impossible for those members of the bloc who wish to support us on certain occasions to disagree with the leaders of the bloc.
Mr. Shiloah went on at some length to indicate that Israel has no confidence whatever in the Secretary General’s ability to obtain the necessary cooperation from Nasser. They believe the Secretary General has progressively watered down his own mandate under the Assembly resolutions and they are convinced they cannot rely on him to achieve any concrete results in the area unless he is able to rely on a very clear-cut mandate from the General Assembly.
Mr. Shiloah expressed the fear that Israel will again find itself in the position of having to defy the General Assembly, which is something his Government does not wish to do. However, although Israel has no illusions as to its ability to defy the entire General Assembly, it may have to persist in attempting to do so as long as such action appears necessary in the interest of its national security.
Mr. Wilcox summed up the General Assembly debate on this matter as having indicated an overwhelming census in favor of an immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces, but also an awareness of the need to take the necessary measures to prevent a return to the state of affairs which helped bring about the recent hostilities. He indicated he was convinced that by a continued refusal to comply with the General Assembly’s recommendations, Israel would incur far more disadvantages than it would by prompt compliance and support for the measures set forth in the Secretary General’s report. These measures, he added, if promptly and effectively implemented, would have the effect of giving Israel a large measure of the assurances she has been seeking.
Mr. Shiloah at this point expressed Israel’s complete disagreement with the Secretary General’s report which, he said, did not contain a single concrete element. He foresaw the probability that within a few weeks of Israel’s withdrawal, the recurrence of Fedayeen raids and interference with Israeli shipping would bring about a renewal of the fighting. He feared that at that point Israel would again be told to rely on the processes of the United Nations which have thus far failed her completely and asked what the U.S. would be prepared to do for Israel in those circumstances.
[Page 77]Mr. Ludlow pointed out that, practically speaking, the only course of action likely to give Israel a substantial measure of what she seeks is prompt compliance. The longer Israel delays in withdrawing its forces, the more difficult it will be to put into effect the only measures open to us to meet most of Israel’s demands.
Mr. Wilcox then read to Mr. Shiloah the text of the two draft resolutions under consideration in New York.2 He pointed out that they expressed the prevailing view in the Assembly that there must not be a return to the conditions which helped bring about the recent hostilities. He expressed the strong hope that the Government of Israel would find it possible to work with the Secretary General in achieving the promptest possible implementation of the measures set forth in his report.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/2–157. Confidential. Drafted by DePalma.↩
- See Document 51.↩