Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1957, Volume XVII

372. Message From President Eisenhower to King Saud¹

Newport, Rhode Island, September 12, 1957.²

Your Majesty: I have received Your Majesty’s two messages of August twenty-fifth concerning the situation in Syria and the matter of the Gulf of Aqaba.³ Your Majesty has spoken as one good friend should speak to another—in full frankness and sincerity. I am hopeful that out of such exchanges we can reach that measure of understanding which is so vital to all of us in this day of dangerous and conflicting currents.

I was gratified to learn that you will devote your wholehearted efforts to removing the danger which events in Syria have brought closer to the Middle East. There is no doubt that such action, as you say, is in the best interests of the Arabs.

I appreciate, further, your frank report on the thoughts and feelings of the Arab people as they appear from your vantage point. I cannot but be concerned that concepts concerning the role and attitudes of the United States persist which are not only without foundation but which distort completely the strong desire of this nation to support the independence and integrity of the free nations of the Middle East.

In this connection, we fully recognize the need of the nations of the area to possess adequate defense forces. We regret, however, that friendship should appear to be measured by the amount of arms one nation supplies to another. That is a Soviet Communist concept which coincides with the facts of their materialistic atheism and their ample stocks of surplus war material. We believe that Egypt benefitted far more from the steadfast adherence of the United States to the principles of the United Nations Charter than it did from the arms it had purchased from the Soviet Union. To possess powerful friends who are loyal to protective principles such as those in the Charter is a very valuable asset.

The United States did not, furthermore, refuse to provide arms to Egypt and Syria. These governments declined to acquire arms in this country under procedures well known to Your Majesty and accepted by Your Majesty.

We have, moreover, never been an important supplier of arms to Israel, nor are we now. You, of course, know that we are sending arms to Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon, and are aware of the special measures I have directed be taken to expedite the delivery of the arms Saudi Arabia is now obtaining in the United States.

I am sure Your Majesty notes, with me, that those nations which have turned to the Communists for arms are a minority in the Arab world. It is my firm belief that the Egyptian and Syrian Governments turned to the Communists, not under the pressure of any action taken by the West, but because it suited their purpose to do so. They believed that they could undertake close relations with the Communists and obtain benefits from them without endangering their national independence and the security of the Middle East. I am sure you share with me the belief that they were wrong.

My purpose in repeating again what is, I know, familiar to you, arises out of my fear that these misconceptions about the role of the United States gain currency and divert attention from the danger of Communist imperialism. Your Majesty has mentioned the Arab fear of Israel. Should Israel attempt to conquer any Arab state the United States would, as it did last October, take action to prevent this. To do so would present far less difficulties than preventing the assumption of Communist control of the Middle East should one or more states of the area become captives of the Soviet system.

The United States stands fully prepared to meet aggression against the free states of the Middle East. The most dangerous form of aggression, however, is that which takes place through the quiet and masked subversion of independent nations. To meet this kind, any nation needs more than the force of arms. We all need the understanding and support of our friends.

I wish also to acknowledge the receipt of Your Majesty’s letter on Aqaba. We received the Foreign Office note to which it refers on September ninth.⁴ You may be certain that the note will be given most careful study. I do wish to express initial regret, however, that, from your message, it would appear that you have found little basis for a closer understanding on this problem in the suggestions put forward by the United States in our Aide-Mémoire of July twelfth.⁵ This Aide-Mémoire was, as you know, drafted after extensive and fruitful discussions with your representative in the United States. In it we sought to emphasize that the rights for which we stand are primarily rights for United States vessels and not those of Israel or, particularly, for any other nation. The United States, a maritime power since its earliest days, has always stood for the right of its vessels to use the seas outside of the three-mile limit and in waters involving access to multiple states. Only recently the United States felt impelled to protest proposed action with respect to certain international waters in the Far East,⁶ even though United States vessels in recent years have not often transited such waters. Our Aide-Mémoire represented a sincere effort on the part of the United States, within the framework of its historic position in this respect, to assist in finding a meeting ground on this problem.

I have spoken frankly to Your Majesty because of the great value I place upon our friendship and because I know that you agree that good friends should not conceal from each other what is in their hearts. Even among the closest friends in the family of nations differences have existed and will continue to exist. This does not prevent mutually beneficial cooperation between these states. Though you and I may not always agree in all respects, I value our continuing fruitful collaboration. It is my hope and intention that the United States and Saudi Arabia will work together closely and harmoniously.

I send Your Majesty my warmest regard and best wishes.

May God have you in His safekeeping.

Your sincere friend,

Dwight D. Eisenhower⁷

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File. Secret. Transmitted to the Embassy in Bonn in telegram 704, September 11 with the instruction to deliver the message in writing personally by an Embassy officer to King Saud who was staying at the Hotel Schloss in Baden-Baden. (Department of State, Central Files, 783.00/9–1157)
2. The President had been staying intermittently at the summer White House at Newport since September 4. (President’s Daily Appointments; Eisenhower Library)

3. A summary of the letter concerning the Gulf of Aqaba is in Document 368. In the second letter, Saud contended that the West’s failure to supply Syria with the arms it had requested had contributed to the current situation in that country. Saud also conveyed Arab complaints that the West had prevented the sale of Arab goods and had kept the Arabs from arming leaving them nothing with which to defend themselves at a time when the West was giving aid to their enemy. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, King Saud/Eisenhower)

   On August 28, in a note to Secretary Dulles, President Eisenhower suggested that one response be written covering the two letters. (Ibid.) Dulles forwarded a suggested reply to Eisenhower on September 9 and Eisenhower approved it with a suggestion that the text emphasize the idea that Egypt benefited from U.S. adherence to U.N. principles. The letter to Saud was transmitted without revision. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File)

4. See Document 368.
5. Document 355.
6. On August 12, the Embassy in Moscow delivered to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs a note protesting the closure of Peter the Great Bay. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, September 2, 1957, p. 388.
7. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.