Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1957, Volume XVII

371. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, September 12, 1957¹

Washington, September 12, 1957

SUBJECT

• Israel and the Syrian Situation

PARTICIPANTS

• Mr. Abba Eban, Ambassador of Israel
• Mr. Yohanan Meroz, Counselor, Embassy of Israel
• The Secretary
• Ambassador Edward B. Lawson
• NE—Stuart W. Rockwell
• NE—Donald C. Bergus

Mr. Eban said that Prime Minister Ben Gurion had asked him to bring greetings to the Secretary and to give a full and frank account of Israel’s views on the Near East situation. There had been great changes in Israel during the period between Mr. Eban’s visit of last February and that of August 1957. Most of these changes had been for the better. The situation with respect to Gaza and Aqaba was quiet. No one who had worked to bring about the present arrangements there should regret them. The Secretary said that he was glad to hear this expression from Mr. Eban’s standpoint since it had been Mr. Eban who had taken much of the responsibility. Mr. Eban continued that the country had been liberated for peaceful pursuits. Israel was developing, in accordance with its mission, as a center of scholarship and art. All this had been overshadowed by recent developments indicating deepening Soviet penetration of the region. Israel’s task was to preserve sanity in a region in violent disequilibrium. The Syrian crisis was bringing back to Israel a preoccupation with matters of security, survival and defense.

Prime Minister Ben Gurion felt that the situation was grave in global terms. The USSR now had footholds of varying depth in Egypt, Syria, and Yemen. The infection would spread, unless there were effective resistance, to Jordan and other Near East states and would weaken Europe. Israel associated itself with the grave formulations stated by the President and the Secretary.

Israel thought that Egypt was the architect of these developments with which Nasser was completely identified. Israel felt that since the issue was not an Arab-Israel one, there was only one power, the United States, which could counteract these developments. If they continued, no free society and certainly no free Israel could live in the Near East. The Prime Minister was asking questions which he was sure other Near Eastern non-communist leaders were asking. Did the United States see the danger in grave terms? Was the United States willing to take some risks? Did traditional United States policy (such as that applied to Greece and Turkey) apply to the Near East? Anxiety led Israel to ask these questions. In all other areas Soviet encroachment had been checked when the USSR had come to believe that further expansion would meet United States resistance. For Israel it was of vital importance that the spread of communist influence be checked. There were other countries which had the same interest: Turkey, Lebanon, Iran, and the present regimes in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Iraq. The United States must assure leaders of the free societies in the Near East of its determination which should be publicly restated.

Israel wished to put forward a few suggestions for United States consideration: It was hoped that the United States would take a most serious view of developments and not be consoled by a lull from time to time. This is what the Syrians would seek in their hope to consolidate the position of the regime. The United States should have no illusions regarding the role of Nasser. Israel was disturbed at a movement which seemed to be emerging, particularly in the United Kingdom, which looked to Nasser for salvation. The most urgent problem was the fragility of the regime in Jordan which Egypt and Syria were trying very hard to undermine. Jordan needed not arms but better internal security. The regime there was unaware of internal movements which sought to undermine it. The king was unaware of the identities of the leaders of these movements. Israel received information from time to time on these matters which it would make available to Jordan through a friendly state. Israel had previously sent through such channels assurances that it had no designs on Jordan. These could be renewed. It was also worth exploring alternative communications to Jordan across Israel. Israel would hope that Jordan, for its part, would cease provocative utterances and gestures.

As to Lebanon, Israel wondered if the Lebanese were sufficiently alarmed to help themselves and the region. There was currently throughout the area a sense of Soviet proximity but a feeling that the United States was remote. There was no real United States military presence in the area. Israel wondered whether Lebanon might not wish to seek a defensive arrangement with the United States which would facilitate United States military presence. This would be a source of great assurance.

As to Saudi Arabia there was a danger of greater cooperation between Nasser and Saud. Saud had played a clear role in the Jordan crisis but his recent attitude had been much more equivocal. It would be fruitful, if United States influence with Saud were still great, to warn him against a tendency to accept the developments in Syria.

Israel felt that if Turkey and Iraq believed that they could prevent the present Syrian regime from consolidating itself that it should be encouraged to do so. Communism never left a country in which it had once established itself. There might still be a few months left in Syria in which to work despite the fact that Syrian foreign and security affairs were probably already under Soviet control and Soviet techniques in Damascus were more intense than those in Cairo. Israel had the impression that the Turks and Iraqis felt prepared to use their influence fully in Syria.

Israel advised against United States adherence to the Baghdad Pact. This would cause the United States to lose freedom of maneuver in the area and its present medial position. The United States could assist the Pact without joining it.

Israel looked upon growing Soviet influence as a plague which should be prevented from spreading. The United States should exercise vigilance regarding peripheral countries such as the Sudan, Ethiopia, Libya, and Yemen. For example, the forthcoming elections in the Sudan were to be decided on the issue whether the Sudan should be an independent African state or a satellite of Egypt. The success of Israel in resisting Nasser had awakened interest in Israel in African countries such as Ghana, Ethiopia, and Tunisia.

Israel believed that Western propaganda should be intensified in the Arab world. At present the other side had greater volume and intensity. Western propaganda might be linked to the traditional religions of the area.

Israel assumed that the danger to oil communications must be in American minds. Alternatives such as the Turkey–Iraq pipeline should be speeded up. There were practical discussions now going on in commercial circles with regard to an oil link from Elath to the Mediterranean. Israel did not seek United States support but might ask for an expression of benevolence at an appropriate time. 200,000 tons of oil had already been delivered to Elath.

Israel doubted the utility of trying to meet Soviet arms programs with deliveries of United States arms. The press had been wrong in ascribing to Israel an attitude of nervousness or weakness with regard to United States arms deliveries to Jordan. The political psychology of such deliveries was wrong. In such a competition the USSR would always win because it faced no considerations of conscience. The Arabs should not be given to believe that arms deliveries were a measuring rod to be applied to the United States and the USSR. The whole level of armaments had been raised in Syria. This inevitably created a problem in Israel. Israel could not avoid a sense of public insecurity. Israel must divert its own resources to arms purchases at the expense of its development budget. Israel sought not the same number of weapons as the Soviets were delivering but at least a few weapons of each category. Israel thought it would be wiser for the United States to deplore the obsession of the area with arms. Could not the United States give equal dramatization to development programs? The impact of the Marshall Plan in Europe had been great. This was a field in which the United States could beat the Soviets.

Israel felt that the most urgent and central point at this time was that we must take seriously the prospect of armed aggression in the area—even though it might not be immediate. The American commitment to oppose aggression must be clarified. There must be some act to close the door to the prospect of successful aggression by any state. If this door were shut, arms deliveries would lose their point. There appeared to be areas of potential miscalculation. Under the Middle East Doctrine the United States had said that it would come to Israel’s aid if attacked by a state dominated by international communism. Syria had not been so defined. In fact there had been public expression in the United States to the contrary. The President’s statement of April 9, 1956² also had relevance in this context and was more comprehensive. This question had been discussed with Ambassador Richards when he was in Israel. He had said that the Doctrine did not mean that the United States would remain idle in the face of non-communist aggression but that Israel could expect vigorous action.

Mr. Eban urged that the loopholes be closed and that the Soviets must be made to feel that any attack on any state would engage the United States. It would be helpful psychologically if Mr. Eban could tell his Government that it can place its reliance on the April 9, 1956 statement and the Doctrine. Israel had taken some comfort in the fact that the Secretary’s statement at the White House on September 7³ had spoken of subversion of Syria’s Arab neighbors but aggression against Syria’s neighbors.

Mr. Eban turned to the forthcoming session of the UNGA and said that discussion of Near East items should be limited to the agenda items already subscribed⁴ and that there should be no attempt to seek an Arab-Israel settlement. He felt that the UNGA might be the proper place for the United States to make it clear that all Near East states could count on United States help against aggression.

There were various other matters which Mr. Eban had not stressed. The Israelis had considered whether, in the light of Soviet arms deliveries to the area, they should seek military assistance from the United States. Mr. Eban said that “some of us” doubted the wisdom of such a course and understood the difficulties which it would present to the United States. Still, armaments were a heavy burden to the Israel economy. Indirect assistance, by way of economic aid, was some substitute. Mr. Eban would prefer that the United States-Israel bilateral relationship would stress economic cooperation. He hoped these thoughts would guide the United States in fixing the level of economic aid to Israel. The most urgent matter was PL. 480 assistance which should shortly be up for negotiation.

Israel hoped there could be more consultation between the United States and Israel on Near East matters. While Israel was “alone in the Arab world”, it had some relations with Turkey and Iran which the United States should help to strengthen.

Mr. Ben Gurion’s final message had been an expression of hope that the Secretary would agree that Israel’s concern was not exaggerated. He felt that there was a need for fundamental and frank discussion at the highest level in the United States Government. Israel would need steady nerves to live in the Near East during the days ahead.

The Secretary welcomed the Ambassador’s presentation. While the Secretary would be unable in the time available to cover all the points raised, he would direct a few words to the essential part.

We had no illusions as to what was taking place in Syria. The fact that there might be more moderate manifestations would not delude us into thinking that things were going well. We had no reason to doubt the Ambassador’s judgment with respect to Nasser. While it was some exaggeration to state that he was the architect of recent developments—Moscow had played this role—there was no doubt but what he was an aider and abettor of them. There was no hope for Nasser as a means of retrieving the situation in Syria.

Developments there were extremely grave. While we did not believe that it would be wise for Israel to take any active part in efforts to remedy the situation, the Secretary could assure the Ambassador that the United States was not discouraging elements in Arab or Moslem countries who wished to do something. On the contrary, we were extending a large measure of encouragement. We did not know whether anything would come out of this because these Governments were indecisive and unsure of themselves. It was preferable that something be done under Arab auspices rather than by the Turks acting alone. The course of events was not readily predictable.

The Secretary wished to make it clear that we judged recent developments very seriously. We were not discouraging anybody. We were prepared to take grave risks if that would assist in reversing the present trend. While we were not without hope that there might be action, this did not mean that we had exaggerated hopes in the view of the uncertainties and vacillation that existed.

The USSR had been threatening Turkey sharply. The Gromyko statement of September 10 had been one of the most intemperate and vicious Soviet statements ever to appear.⁵ Developments in the world suggested that the Soviets were taking a hard line. There was danger from the fact that Khrushchev was unpredictable and reckless. Previously the Soviets had been of a “chess playing” mentality but now there was a different type of mentality . . . . This very dangerous situation compelled us to look at the world scene from an overall standpoint. Nevertheless, the Secretary could assure the Ambassador that there was no disposition on the part of the United States to be intimidated or deflected.

The Secretary had been surprised to find that the press had interpreted his September 10 press conference⁶ as stating that there was no danger in the situation. The Secretary had taken a calm view because the situation was so dangerous that he had not wished to inflame it. He had not wished to say that things were calming down.

The Secretary could see that these trends would present special danger to Israel if, for example, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Egypt became communist dominated and there were a large buildup of arms, etc.

The Secretary had made a statement in the press conference which reaffirmed the President’s statement of April 9, 1956 and pointed out its relevancy to the situation in Israel. While this might not have the same weight as a more formal expression, we thought that Israel and other Near East states need not believe that the United States would be indifferent to armed attack from any quarter. While there had been no formal finding that Syria was controlled by international communism, in a borderline situation the decisive fact would be aggressive action on its part. This would be final proof if proof were needed.

The Secretary welcomed Mr. Eban’s concrete thoughts with respect to Jordan and offer of information concerning the internal security situation there. The vehicle for transmitting this information would probably be the Central Intelligence Agency. This was an important suggestion as we shared Mr. Eban’s view as to the frailty of the position in Jordan.

Mr. Eban’s suggestion regarding Lebanon merited further consideration on our part. We had given thought to the matter of United States presence in the area.

Saudi Arabia presented a difficult situation because of the King’s obsession with regard to Israel and the Gulf of Aqaba. His expressions on these matters had been very strong. We felt, however, that he was deeply concerned with regard to the situation and would like to reverse the present trend. While he would deprecate an outbreak he was not averse to using other methods which were more customary. The Secretary noted that the King had gone to Baden Baden and that the Crown Prince was in the United States.

Mr. Eban had asked whether the Secretary felt that the internal situation in Syria was hopelessly lost. There seemed little hope of a change brought about by internal means. The opponents of the present trend were intimidated and were not hopeful of any early change. This might alter if there were external pressures; Syrians now abroad might have greater hope. The Secretary recognized that one had to weigh the prospect of favorable events developing in time against the prospect of the Syrians being able to consolidate their position in time. The Syrians might have more assets in surrounding Arab countries than those countries had in Syria.

We shared Israel’s view regarding United States adherence to the Baghdad Pact and would concentrate on implementation of the Middle East Doctrine. We were aware of the deficiencies and needs of countries such as the Sudan. We were endeavoring to step up radio transmissions to the area but it might take some months.

We were endeavoring to hold arms shipments to a minimum. The Secretary had said to Arab leaders that arms were not a measure of friendship. We had held off as long as possible in Jordan. There we had done what had been advertised and would do a bit more. In the main what we were doing was designed to help maintain internal security. We might have to go beyond the minimum necessary for this purpose in order to maintain the prestige of King Hussein.

The other matters raised by the Ambassador should be discussed with Messrs. Rountree and Rockwell.

The Ambassador referred to the Secretary’s statement about defining Syria as a state controlled by international communism under the Middle East Doctrine. If it took an aggressive act to bring about such a definition, the deterrent effect of the Doctrine would be lost. The Secretary said that he or the President might find an occasion to say publicly that an aggressive act would result in a finding that Syria was controlled by international communism.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/9–1257. Top Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Bergus on September 13 and 16. A briefing memorandum by Rountree, prepared for Dulles prior to the conversation, is ibid., 780.00/9–1257.

   Eban discussed similar topics with Rountree on September 10. (Memorandum of conversation by Parker; ibid., 611.80/9–1057)

2. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, April 23, 1956, p. 668. Documentation is in volume XV.
3. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, September 23, 1957, p. 487.
4. These were: item 26, “Report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East”; item 64, “Clearance of the Suez Canal: report of the Secretary-General”; item 65. United Nations Emergency Force: report of the Secretary-General”; and item 69. “Complaint about threats to the security of Syria and to international peace”.
5. For excerpts from Gromyko’s statement of September 10, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1957, pp. 1068–1069.
6. The press conference transcript is printed in Department of State Bulletin, September 30, 1957, pp. 526–532.