Office of the Historian

318. Memorandum of a Conversation, Prime Minister Mollet’s Office, Hotel Matignon, Paris, May 6, 1957, Noon1

USDel/MC/7
Paris, May 6, 1957, Noon

PARTICIPANTS

  • United States
    • Secretary Dulles
    • Ambassador Houghton2
    • Assistant Secretary C. Burke Elbrick
    • Mr. Charles W. Yost
    • Mr. William R. Tyler
  • France
    • G. Mollet
    • C. Pineau
    • L. Joxe
    • J. Laloy3
    • P. Sebilleau4
    • P. De Beaumarchais5

[Here follows discussion of matters pertaining to NATO and the French presence in Algeria.]

Turning to the Suez Canal problem the Secretary outlined the current situation and stressed that it was not the US Government which had initiated the formula of accepting Nasser’s declaration as a provisional de facto solution but the UK Government, which was conscious of the economic factors involved. Mr. Pineau agreed with the Secretary that it was a bad idea for governments to specifically authorize shipping to go through the Canal; it was for this reason, he said, that the French had voted against the SCUA resolution. He said [Page 602] that the French Government was also not in favor of a Security Council meeting to discuss the Nasser declaration, since this could only result in the government’s being forced into acceptance of the declaration officially, even though reluctantly. The Secretary pointed out that the US Government only allowed US ships to go through the Canal if they paid under protest and without prejudice to future rights.

The Prime Minister then said he felt that the present conversation called for some frank talk on the subject of Nasser and the Canal . . . . being realists, the British had expected to allow their shipping to pass through the Suez Canal for economic reasons. He said that no French Government at least not the present, would ever accept to do so:

a.
To accept would mean confirming Nasser’s hold over Europe’s oil requirements which were vital for the necessary conventional military forces.
b.
…

The Prime Minister said that France was going through terrible difficulties with regard to her balance of payments, but she would never yield to Nasser and the French Government was prepared to go to the French people and tell it the reasons why. . . .

The Secretary said that he agreed that Nasser’s type of Pan-Arabism was dangerous. He also agreed that no agreements which might be made with Nasser would be dependable, whatever the words which Nasser might use. He thought that for this reason not much importance should be attached to what Nasser said he would or would not do. The Secretary said that while we had differed with France in the past on the methods to be used, he did not wish to bring up bygones. He said we could, however, feel encouraged by recent developments in Jordan which suggested that a basis might be found to constructive developments in the general area of the Middle East. He said that undoubtedly Nasser’s prestige had suffered compared with what it had been six months ago. The long-term answer, he thought, required that the present favorable trend should continue. However, whatever the prospects in the Middle East area might be, it was vitally important that alternatives to the Canal and to the existing pipelines should be developed. He thought that in retrospect the West should have paid more attention to the evacuation of the Canal Zone by the UK three years ago. Now, he said, we should look to the creation of the northern pipeline, since the Israel pipeline was vulnerable because we could not depend on Iran permitting its oil to be sent through that pipeline. The Prime Minister commented that he recognized the superiority of the northern line, but it would not be excessive to have both pipelines. The Secretary alluded to the oil possibilities of the Sahara. [Page 603] He also pointed out that in spite of the closing of the Suez Canal and the great strain on oil shipments, Europe had not collapsed as might have been feared at the time.

The Prime Minister said he was glad that the United States and France seemed to be in agreement with regard to the ultimate goal. His fear, however, was that the US approach might not bring about the desired result. He stressed the role of the Soviet Union as the real power behind events in the Middle East. He said that the Soviet Union was working through the peoples of the Middle East . . . . He referred to Nasser’s aims and methods set forth in his book, which the Prime Minister said he had read “at least 10 times.” … he hoped that the results of the noble efforts which the US was making would not be to prepare the way for the triumph of Nasser in 10 years’ time.

The meeting broke up at about 1:00 p.m.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.51/5–657. Secret. Drafted by Tyler. Dulles and his party stopped in Paris en route from Bonn to Washington.↩
  2. Amory Houghton presented his credentials as Ambassador to France on April 17.↩
  3. Jean Leonard Laloy, Chargé d’Affaires for Europe in the French Foreign Ministry.↩
  4. Pierre Sebilleau, Chargé d’Affaires for Africa and the Levant in the French Foreign Ministry.↩
  5. Jacques Delarüe Caron De Beaumarchais, French Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council.↩