Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1957, Volume XVII

317. Telegram From the President’s Special Assistant (Richards) to the Department of State¹

Tripoli, May 4, 1957—noon.

728. From Richards. Report on Israel visit² follows: Israel appeared interested primarily in two matters—1. Extent which doctrine could be construed as security guarantee in event of attack by Arab state “influenced” by international Communism; 2. Minimum public statement endorsing doctrine regarded to assume Israel maximum benefits available. Israelis started with assumption that Israel’s destiny bound up with that of free world and consequently Israel’s firm opposition to international Communism not in question. However, did not wish to jeopardize Jews behind Curtain. Economic aid requested to provide housing for increasing number of immigrants from Curtain countries but subject not pressed and I made no commitment. Subject military aid to Israel not raised.

Israel took position that because of short notice, briefness of visit and occurrence of both Sabbath and Independence Day decision by government on doctrine not possible before departure mission. Foreign Minister said undertaking had been given to consult Cabinet before government took public position on doctrine and it impossible to convene Cabinet until next week. Consequently we left matter that Israel’s representatives would draw up public statement, obtain Cabinet approval and subsequently consult upon it with US through Embassy Tel Aviv before public announcement made.

I drove to Jerusalem morning May 3 and met first with Ben Gurion. He immediately launched inquiry regarding protection which doctrine would afford Israel in event of attack by Arab state. He stressed smallness of country and expressed fear that with Soviet support Arabs might destroy Israel before aid could arrive from abroad. He sought answers to specific questions regarding military moves US would make in event of attack. I explained policy in general terms but after drawing attention to existing US military strength in area declined to become involved in details of what action might be taken.

In subsequent plenary meeting with Foreign Minister Meir and Finance Minister Eshkol together with Herzog, Lourie,³ Rafael and Kollek, I outlined principles of doctrine. I made clear that while mission naturally interested, it not charged with finding solutions intra-area problems. Pointing to Israel’s past record and anticipated progress I said I doubted that Israel was in danger of isolated attack by state controlled by international communism or that government threatened by Communist subversion. Consequently, although fully recognizing major economic problems faced by Israel, I did not believe that money should be allotted from limited funds available to mission. I said I hoped nevertheless Israel would endorse principles of doctrine and make public statement to this effect.

In reply Foreign Minister said she would not waste words describing Israel’s attitude towards communism. Israel had no choice in matter and would live or die with free world. Fortunately Israel did not need ask anyone for help against subversive elements. Because of clear position regarding international communism Israel suffered from lack of “nuisance value”. US did not need to worry about stand of Israel but did need to worry about stand of others. Situation comparable to that during World War II when no one had to question attitude of Jewish people or Hitler. She then spoke at some length of dangers to Israel arising from lack of peace in area and efforts international communism stir up trouble. Peril to Israel arose from connection of great power like Soviet Union with Arab neighbors. She repeated Ben Gurion’s theme that before help came Israel might be destroyed. Doctrine of little value to Israel unless it provided almost automatic help. She pressed strongly for opinion on whether Syria and Egypt could be considered Communist dominated states, saying that if US declared them to be so Israel’s worries would disappear. She thought that in case of Israel there was inseparable link between question of international communism and intra-area problem of relations with Arab states.

I said Israel would have to rely on good faith of President and Congress insofar as application of doctrine concerned. It would be up to President or President and Congress together to determine an actual situation if particular state was dominated by international communism. If case arose I said I thought answer to question of whether or not state dominated by international communism would be obvious. USSR knows we will back up our word. This fact remains good part of danger of attack.

[Garble]⁴ commented briefly on Israel’s readiness at any time to conclude peace with neighbors. He then set forth brief for aid from Mission basing argument on new wave of immigration facing country. 12,000 to 13,000 immigrants expected this month mainly from Poland. Israel also heard some might come from Rumania. Others proceeding from USSR to Poland then to Israel. He anticipated at least 100,000 immigrants during present calendar year and same number in 1958. From January through May 1957 inclusive figure would be 40 to 43,000. Immediate need was for housing. Total cost housing project $100 million of which $20 million represented imported materials. Heavy strain placed by this emergency situation on Israel financial position but government must always open gates to new immigrants regardless of economic consequences.

Foreign Minister explained Israel now estimated 3 to 3 1/2 million Jews behind Iron Curtain. Many Jews who had been living “underground” in Poland were now seeking opportunity move to Israel. In addition Poles currently being repatriated from USSR probably included number of Jews. She thought Gomulka and his circle not anti-semitic and trying solve problem officious anti-semitism existing in Poland by permitting Jews migrate. However, Polish Government under strong pressure from USSR to cut off immigrants. Referring to question of housing, she said Israel did not want Jewish immigrants to write back to Poland that conditions in Israel were such that others should postpone immigrating, thus losing present opportunity. Kollekargued encouraging flow of immigrants by provision of housing fitted into concept of doctrine since deprived Soviet bloc of skilled personnel while increasing resources of free world. He also contended that on principle Israel should not be excluded from assistance under doctrine, since this would be misinterpreted, especially in Arab world.

After admitting difficulties and expressing sympathy for problem immigration, I maintained [that] was really long range problem and difficult to relate directly to doctrine. We said should be considered in context relations with Israel in general and regular economic programs. We would report Israel’s needs even though Mission could extend no assistance. I said all Israel could anticipate in any case under doctrine would be .5 million to 1.5 million dollars. Such a token could do more harm than good. It would not really help significantly in housing problem and might be open to misconstruction that endorsement of doctrine had been purchased. I also said I thought Israel would fare better in FY 1958 regular program if such token assistance not given by mission. I called attention to favorable effect to Congress of forthright statement on international communism. Meir and [Eshkol] appeared to agree preferable for Israel not accept token aid under doctrine of magnitude I mentioned.

Considerable discussion took place on nature of statement which might be made by Israel. Mrs. Meir inquired whether declaration such as issued with Afghanistan⁵ would be sufficient for Israel to be regarded as having accepted doctrine. I pointed out special situation of Afghanistan and indicated we would hope for more forthright stand by Israel.

[Mrs. Meir] stated Israel did not want to be ruled out from being full-fledged recipient of doctrine’s benefits by wording of statement but most concerned at effect on Jews in USSR.

We agreed press would be given only “technical” reasons why Israel unable to make final decision on doctrine at this time. Mrs. Meir urged, and we agreed, that in public statement or in any discussion before Congress no mention be made of problem of immigration from behind Iron Curtain. She stressed that public disclosure this part discussion could result in ban on further movement from Curtain countries.

At conclusion meeting Mrs. Meir phrased following question— repeatedly brought up in various forms during discussion—government took positive stand on doctrine and if USG approved public statement suggested, could Israel count on receiving assistance under doctrine, if requested, in event of attack by country under Communist “influence”? We pointed out that joint resolution did not use phrase Communist “influence” but spoke of country “controlled” by international communism. Said we must be bound by language of resolution. I also made clear that joint resolution conferred on President authority to determine whether it should be invoked. Jernegan called attention to fact doctrine not sole US policy applicable to ME and that US had stated repeatedly its opposition to aggression from any quarter. Thus, in event of Arab attack, Israel need not consider its only reliance would be on applicability or non-applicability of American doctrine.

Talks with Israelis wound up by second meeting with Ben Gurion devoted to social pleasantries.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/4–1957. Secret. Repeated to London, Paris, Tel Aviv, Afghanistan, Beirut, Tehran, Karachi, Ankara, Addis Ababa, Khartoum, Amman, Damascus, Cairo, Athens, Rabat, Tunis, Rome, New Delhi, Moscow, Warsaw, Kabul, and Jidda.
2. In response to Dulles’ and Eisenhower’s decision that he should not visit Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, Richards telephoned Herter from Athens on May 1 to convey his strong personal feelings that if he did not go to Syria, Egypt, or Jordan, he should not go to Israel, and would do so only over his protest. He felt that the visit to Israel would do more harm among the Arab states than any good it would do on Capitol Hill. Herter, in turn, informed Richards that the decision to visit Israel had been made by President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles and that if Richards returned to Washington without visiting Israel it might jeopardize the entire Mutual Security Program which was then pending before Congress. (The memorandum of telephone conversation is scheduled for publication in volume XII.) It was subsequently arranged that Richards should arrive in Israel at 7 p.m. local time on May 2 and depart at approximately 7 p.m. on Friday, May 3 which was the beginning of the Sabbath. (Telegram 1277 from Tel Aviv, May 2; Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/5–257)
3. Arthur Lourie, Assistant Director, Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
4. The speaker, whose name is garbled on the source text, was presumably Eshkol.
5. For text of the Afghanistan Joint Communiqué, signed in Kabul on April 2, see Department of State Bulletin, May 6, 1957, pp. 729–730.