310. Editorial Note
On May 1, Secretary Dulles transmitted to President Eisenhower an additional account of his conversation with Lloyd of May 1 (see Secto 4, Document 308). It reads:
“Then when I got back to the Embassy Lloyd came to see me about the Canal problem. They are anxious to stage another meeting of the Security Council. I counselled against this on the ground that Nasser in his present rather ugly mood might use this to confront the Western Powers with a defiance which would then make de facto [Page 585] acceptance of the present arrangement extremely awkward and most of all awkward for the British who have on the one hand a highly sensitive public opinion and on the other hand an economic dependence upon the Canal such that they must use it on almost any terms. I suggested that a future Security Council meeting was a bit more valuable as a threat than as a reality. The British are anxious to have some such ‘threat’ in the hope that it will enable them to get the Egyptians to accept sterling in payment of tolls. This, I gather, is important not so much because of the volume of tolls but because of the impact of rejection of sterling upon the usability of sterling generally in the Middle East area.” (Dulte 1 from Bonn, May 1; Department of State, Central Files, 611.62A/5–157)
In response, Eisenhower cabled Dulles: “I agree with what you told Lloyd concerning the Suez problem. It appears that Nasser is having real difficulties both at home and with his neighbors.” (Tedul 5 to Bonn, May 2; ibid., 974.7301/5–257)
On May 2 in Washington, Counselor of the British Embassy Bailey summarized for De Palma the British Foreign Office’s account of the Dulles–Lloyd conversation. In addition to the United States accounts printed here, the British version noted that Secretary Dulles went on to suggest that Dixon might address a letter to Ambassador Lodge, in his current capacity of President of the Security Council, which would indicate that the United Kingdom might want the Security Council to meet May 6 or 7 and would let Lodge know by May 4 or 5. According to the British account, Dulles saw no harm in making public the fact that a letter had been sent, but he preferred it to be understood that the United Kingdom would not actually request such a meeting unless it had grounds for thinking that the Egyptians would be reasonable. (Memorandum of conversation by Shaw, May 2; ibid., 330/5–257; Tosec 13 to Bonn May 2; ibid., 396.1–BO/5–257)