Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1957, Volume XVII

309. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom¹

Washington, May 1, 1957—8:57 p.m.

7692. Department agrees conclusions last para London tel 5932.² We should emphasize to UK and other SCUA members risks and inutility further SC consideration as follows: (1) We doubt that Egypt can be drawn out satisfactorily through a question on possible unilateral modification or withdrawal of Canal declaration; (2) To ask this single question would create erroneous impression of general satisfaction with declaration in its other aspects; (3) We doubt that further discussions with Egypt re declaration, inside or outside Council, would lead anywhere at this stage, and US for its part not presently prepared to undertake further discussions with Egypt; (4) US attitude toward declaration remains as stated by Lodge in SC April 26, and US would have nothing to add at present time; (5) Further SC discussion now, which could become detailed, might tend to bring out divergence of views among Western powers, which was not apparent last Friday; (6) Renewed Council consideration of declaration might serve to reinforce Egyptian prestige, which has suffered set-back in Jordan during past week.

FYIDillon on April 29, pursuant to Secretary’s request, informed Caccia of US disappointment that UK had not maintained position outlined in April 21 aide-mémoire. Caccia responded reason for change in UK position was unexpectedly strong adverse public reaction in England to Egyptian declaration. End FYI.

We fully appreciative British currency problem and need for time for negotiations between Bank of England and Egypt. Suggest, however, in place of renewed consideration of problem in SC, UK might find it adequate to talk with major members of SCUA re need for 4-5 more days holding line on use of Canal. Continuation present SCUA Council discussion until next week would supplement this approach.

Above program should serve purpose, without negative effects renewed SC consideration set forth earlier this message. Department understands major US oil companies, which are major US users of Canal still moving cautiously, and unlikely significant amount US-flag shipping will use Canal in intervening period.³

Herter

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/5–157. Confidential. Drafted by Sisco and Meeker; cleared by Moline and Shaw, and Rountree in principle; and approved by Dillon who signed for Herter. Also sent to USUN and repeated to Paris, Cairo, and Bonn.
2. In telegram 5932, May 1, the Embassy in London advised the Department of State that Lloyd’s proposal to call another meeting of the Security Council on the Canal question posed problems having political consequences for Anglo-American relations. According to the Embassy, further Security Council consideration would not produce an improved Egyptian position, but would create pressure on the United States to modify its wait-and-see line taken at the April 26 meeting. This, however, had to be weighed against the fact that political forces in Great Britain would seek to place on the United States the onus of an unsatisfactory solution to the Canal question, if the United States actively sought to dissuade the British and French from returning to the Security Council. The Embassy recommended, therefore, that the United States emphasize to the British the risks and inutility of further Security Council consideration, but avoid efforts to dissuade the British and French from taking this course. (Ibid.)
3. In telegram 5979 from London, May 2, Whitney reported that, at the SCUA Council meeting held on May 2, he made the points outlined in the first paragraph of telegram 7692, except for point 6, and closed by saying that while the United States recognized that developments in the practical operation of the Canal might make further Security Council consideration desirable, it believed that the best tactical procedure was to hold out the possibility of a Security Council meeting rather than offer a firm date for such a meeting. After some discussion, British Representative Beeley informed the Council that since unanimous support for the British proposal did not exist, his government would ask its U.N. Representative to write a letter to the President of the Security Council not requesting a definite date but stating that the British Government might call a meeting early the following week. (Ibid., 974.7301/5–257)