Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1957, Volume XVII

281. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State¹

Cairo, April 11, 1957—10 p.m.

3204. Re Embtel 3190.² This is more detailed account of meeting with Nasser and Fawzi:

I began by tracing course of conversations, covered points in Deptel 3341³ and suggested that discussion be directed to three main points, i.e. six principles, user representation and adherence, concerning which I outlined our position.

Regarding six principles, Nasser took very strong line. His reason, he said, was historical. Six principles had been product of SC meeting in which British and French had participated at time when, speaking in terms of peaceful solution, they were planning forceful seizure of canal. Furthermore, real thinking of British and French had been clearly revealed in vetoed part of October 13 resolution and unfortunately US had been “more or less on their side”. Against this background he saw insistence on inclusion six principles as a trap of West which would result in his being hailed before ICJ “every day” on one pretext or another. What was it we really wanted anyway? Did we have something up our sleeve? Was it some trick? I replied that, if it were, I naturally would not tell him (uproarious laughter by Nasser at this point) but it so happened that I was fully acquainted with background of matter and could assure him there was no double-dealing involved. Nasser had said he had suspicions arising out of history of case; we also felt we had good grounds have some serious doubts as I had explained to him exactly one week before (Embtel 3112).⁴ Inclusion of six points would be important step in restoring this shaken confidence.

After this little dust-up, Nasser settled down to serious discussion and said just could not see way clear to including something in declaration which not understandable because subject to various interpretations. Actually GOE had six points in mind in drafting declaration and had included number of points designed meet its interpretation of them. If this was not sufficient and further safeguards were desired, then he would be glad incorporate in declaration provided they were specific and not unreasonable. It was not further guarantees that he was opposing but guarantees which he could not understand. He would not even object to putting in something about insulation from politics if term could be clearly and reasonably defined. He, too, believed in insulation from politics—from international politics—and only natural there should be reciprocal guarantee from Egyptian politics. Was not this reasonable?

I replied interested in Nasser’s suggestions for finding solution this problem but had some doubts re practicability. Very often necessary to state objectives in general terms owing fact application would be too complicated to cover in detail; would be question of feasibility. However, would report.

He next discussed representation of users and Nasser put on another emotional act. He would never consent to anything that would allow outside management and control. He had even become allergic to word “users” with either small or capital “U”. Menon had submitted a plan for consultative body of users last October and he had turned it down. He believed in international cooperation; that only natural if Canal to be run effectively; but he would not submit to international control.

I asked if it to be understood then what Nasser opposed deal with any user group, even on purely consultative basis. At first Nasser replied in affirmative but, on second thought, he explained what he was really opposed to was governmental user representation. However, he saw no reason why there should not be some organization of business interests with which GOE could deal on consultative basis and also in connection paragraph 4 (B) re tolls and paragraph 7, both of which had been significantly amended.

Discussion on the question of form of declaration was brief. Nasser said could not accept suggestion re adherences of which Israelis could take advantage at this time. If we could suggest way in which adherences could be provided for and Israel excluded, he had no objection. Otherwise, he could not accept. However, advice available to GOE is that declaration would be legally binding by registration with UN and acknowledgment of type Hammarskjöld had proposed.

We then discussed various points of lesser importance in declaration, noting areas of agreement and disagreement but nothing of interest developed to supplement discussion earlier in day with Fawzi (Embtel 3185).⁵

Concluding part of talk re degree of coincidence of views covered in reference telegram.

Have learned today that probable reason for Nasser’s rather unusual behavior last night was that he was suffering from case of “gyppy tummy” which, combined with observance of Ramadan, had caused him so much discomfort that he had thought of postponing meeting but had not done so for fear of giving impression procrastinating.

Hare

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/4–1157. Secret; Priority. Received at 8:07 p.m.
2. See footnote 2, supra.
3. Document 276.
4. Document 270.
5. Dated April 10, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/4–1057)