275. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State1
3154. In reply Deptel 33322 (still being serviced for garbles) I feel most strongly that we should have at least one more session at Nasser level before having recourse to SC. As Department will recall Nasser told me on April 3 he was personally willing give as much time as necessary to this matter but it was agreed that preliminary spade-work should be done with Fawzi. In circumstances, I do not feel we can yet say that our efforts have been “without success”; to take such position could hardly fail to raise question of our motives. As of this time last week, it was entirely proper and desirable to take such a position and Deptel 32863 would have hit nail on head had Nasser not backtracked [Page 527] and delayed issuance of declaration. My recommendation therefore is that Department’s comments should be sent urgently for discussion at Nasser level.
In making this recommendation I have no great hope, after preliminary conversations with Nasser and Fawzi, that we shall be able to make sufficient progress to meet our own desiderata, much less those of French and British. Moreover, it is my understanding that in any event we are not engaged in actual negotiations but merely in an exchange of views involving no commitment either way.
Suggest therefore that we should complete present cycle by having at least one more talk with Nasser in order (1) to give Egyptians final chance to show their colors, (2) to avoid giving impression of questionable motives on our part, (3) to put USG in unassailable position if we should then decide take initiative in SC, assuming we in fact can foresee that Nasser’s position will be weakened rather than strengthened by so doing. On this point I am of course unable judge but I cannot but foresee difficulty if SC action inconclusive and matter thrown into GA or into a general international conference where Egypt might be able marshal impressive support. Also would seem inevitable that summary conclusion of our talks with Egyptians might be associated with rumors of French-Israeli plans for some sort of action in this area.
In making foregoing observations, I trust Department will understand I am not doing so out of any softheartedness for Nasser and his clique. I have none. I am however concerned that our own record should not be subject to reasonable criticism, especially outside Egypt.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/4–857. Secret; Niact. Received at 10:53 a.m. Repeated to London and Paris.↩
- Supra. In another response to telegram 3332, Barco advised from New York that he seriously doubted whether the United States at this stage could garner maximum support in the Security Council for even a non-acrimonious approach to the Canal question. Barco also expressed his agreement with the advice given by Hare in telegram 3148 from Cairo (Document 273) to the effect that the U.S. effort should be concentrated on improving the Egyptian draft and avoiding an open break with Egypt. (Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/4–857)↩
- Document 265.↩