273. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State1
Cairo, April 7,
1957—7 p.m.
3148. Re Embtel 3134.2 Embassy’s recent telegrams on Canal question, despite volume, have of necessity been reportorial and, even then, have been confined almost entirely to Fawzi’s and Nasser’s remarks since it has been taken for granted that Department would assume full use would be made of its guidance and also that I would improvise supplemental argument as required. Even now time does not permit of detailed analysis but following observations and suggestions submitted:
Observations
- (1)
- It is still not clear exactly what GOE had in mind in deciding postpone issuance declaration. Delay in reaching understanding with BIS (board of which understood be meeting today) may have been consideration but so also have been press conferences of Secretary and President (to which both Nasser and Fawzi referred), cumulative effect of representations here and possibly rumor of French-Israeli moves. Not unlikely may have been result combination all these.
- (2)
- As result conversations with Nasser and Fawzi, Egyptians have been found willing, even eager, discuss and explain their position but thus far changes accepted by them have been essentially of drafting, not substantive, nature. They do not close door to our most important substantive suggestions, i.e. mention six principles, specifying some form user representation and multilateral adherence, they even invite suggestions; but obvious they have given these matters much thought and that their ideas not only strongly held but believed right from Egyptian standpoint. Deep suspicion of British, French and Israeli intentions dominates their thinking this regard.
- (3)
- Of three most important points, GOE seems feel strongest on citing of six principles as distinct from undertaking specific obligations to carry into effect. In this connection they frankly admit suspicion and fear that these principles having already been subject on record to widely varying interpretations, could be used as instruments of unpredictable coercion. Thus far they have given no indication of disposition yield on this point. Only alternative suggestion thus far by Fawzi was to express hope USG would, as result present talks, find GOE declaration in accord six principles and be prepared so to state.
- (4)
- Re users, GOE, according Fawzi, entirely agree they should play a role on understanding users spelled with small, not capital, “U”. Two main difficulties which they see are (1) inappropriateness of GOE specifying manner in which users should be represented and (2) danger that users would be given powers of overriding character which would infringe Egyptian sovereignty. Although these misgivings seriously held, believe there is possibly greater latitude for negotiation here than re six principles. Recurrent theme in discussion this point is that GOE must consider rights of all users, both direct and indirect, which raise prospect of East-West political problem in developing any user association.
- (5)
- Regarding adherence of other countries, GOE argument twofold: they maintain (1) that their proposal does in fact constitute legal obligation to countries to which declaration will be sent and to world community through UN and (2) that they do not wish be trapped in invidious position by opening adherence to Israel and thus injecting Palestine settlement in Canal arrangements. Believe these factors do in fact concern them but also seems obvious they would feel more comfortable with declaration in form proposed.
- (6)
- As contrasted with proposals which would give assurance to users in form of some degree outside control, GOE takes position it has gone far beyond previous commitments, which limited to 1888 Convention, in effort satisfy world community in accord its understanding of six principles, and wishes emphasize its understanding that not only interests of users but Egypt’s own interests dependent on just and [Page 524] reasonable Canal administration. However, they maintain that, should GOE be so misguided as fail live up to its commitments, it then would lay itself open to recourse, including reference ICJ.
- (7)
- GOE would undoubtedly prefer following declaration procedure but to be borne in mind that they have occasionally referred in past to possibility of throwing whole matter into conference of all nations if insurmountable difficulty developed.
Suggestions.
- (1)
- Despite imperfections in Egyptian draft, it goes quite far toward meeting user needs and believe that effort should continue be concentrated on its improvement and avoiding open break since recourse available to us is limited and possible Nasser would gain prestige victory from open break going beyond partial victory resulting from reaching agreement on declaration.
- (2)
- Believe some adjustment possible on user question if role limited to advice and recommendation. Seems possible that Users Association might in fact have more real power if its prestige built up as advisory group of which Egypt would find it difficult, or at least embarrassing, to disregard counsel as contrasted with giving it dubious functions which would generate more trouble than benefit. McCloy’s suggestions would fit in with this line of thinking.
- (3)
- Regarding six principles, seems possible that, if efforts fail find device acceptable to GOE for inclusion in declaration, GOE might be persuaded issue accompanying announcement in which they would develop their frequently expressed thesis of recognition that principles recognized and GOE willing be guided thereby in light of what it regards as reasonable interpretation. Such statement would, of course, have to be positive, not negative; otherwise it would be worse than useless.
- (4)
- Re adherence, in case suitable formula for inclusion in declaration not found, recourse might also be had to covering in announcement in which GOE would give forthright expression of its views as to binding effect of declaration. To be recalled in this connection that various expedients such as limiting to countries recognized by Egypt or with which it maintains relations have been considered and discarded as being either too obviously aimed at Israel or too broad.
Hare