Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1957, Volume XVII

256. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, March 29, 1957¹

Washington, March 29, 1957

SUBJECT

• Gaza, Gulf of Aqaba and Suez Canal

PARTICIPANTS

• Mr. Reuven Shiloah, Minister, Embassy of Israel
• Mr. Yohanan Meroz, Counselor, Embassy of Israel
• NEA—-Mr. William M. Rountree
• NE—Mr. Wilkins
• NE—Mr. Donald C. Bergus

Mr. Rountree said that he had felt it would be a good idea for him to call Mr. Shiloah in to convey to him the highlights of the Secretary General’s mission to Egypt and our views on it. He asked if the Israelis planned to see the Secretary General. Mr. Shiloah replied that he imagined Ambassador Eban would be seeing the Secretary General in New York next week.

Mr. Rountree said that the Secretary General’s report had not been entirely discouraging. On Gaza, we thought that the Secretary General’s conversations with Nasser had achieved constructive results. The Egyptians had undertaken that no Egyptian troops would move into Gaza. General Burns considered that the points of agreement of UNEF’s functions and concrete arrangements were to him satisfactory. The Egyptians had indicated a strong desire to prevent raids from Gaza into Israel territory. There were a number of details concerning courses of action which the UNEF might take in various circumstances which the Secretary General was discussing with the Advisory Committee.

On Aqaba, the Secretary General felt that the Egyptians had made clear to him that they had no intention to move into the Sharm el Sheikh area or to ask UNEF to leave. It was our impression that UNEF would stay indefinitely. Nothing of importance had been said on either side regarding passage through the Straits of Tiran.

Mr. Rountree felt it would be useful if at this point he informed Mr. Shiloah of the US/UK discussions on Aqaba at Bermuda. We had compared notes with the British and had agreed that our legal positions were broadly identical in substance. There would be further consultations between the British and ourselves as to how the legal position could be given permanency. We had discussed the possibility of obtaining either an advisory opinion or a decision of the International Court of Justice. We would consult further on this. No decision had been taken regarding an approach to the ICJ.

On the Suez Canal, the Egyptian position remained as publicly stated in their draft memorandum. We did not consider the Egyptian position satisfactory. It was not based on the Six Principles. There were no means of achieving organized international participation. We were studying the Egyptian memorandum. We had not yet responded to it but planned to do so soon. The main emphasis should be on arrangements for the Canal based on the Six Principles. We foresaw a difficult time ahead in negotiations with the Egyptians. One thing which had occurred to us was the extreme desirability of approaching this problem by negotiations at this stage. Mr. Rountree reminded Mr. Shiloah of Israel’s undertaking not to attempt to put a ship through the Canal without consulting the United States. Mr. Rountree urged that for the present Israel not try to test Egyptian intentions by attempting to put ships through the Canal.

Mr. Rountree summed up by saying that some progress had been made by the Secretary General. We were disappointed on Suez and were working on a response to the position taken by the Egyptians. This was urgent because the Egyptians had said they had intended to publish their memorandum soon. It was regrettable that the memorandum had leaked to the press. The United States had not released it. The Egyptians had, however, handed it to many governments besides the United States, including the USSR, India, Yugoslavia, and other Arab states. The fact that the terms of the memorandum were now publicly known would make it more difficult to persuade Egypt to accept amendments.

Mr. Shiloah said that he would convey the foregoing to his Government which would doubtless be conveying its response to the United States. His preliminary reaction was that Israel was not as optimistic as Mr. Rountree had sounded in evaluating both the achievement of the Secretary General and future prospects in Gaza. The Secretary General’s failure to insist on a reply to Israel’s question to Egypt on belligerency obviated whatever achievement Mr. Hammarskjold may have had. Mr. Shiloah inquired if we had any information as to how Hammarskjöld had handled the Israel request. Mr. Rountree replied that we understood the Secretary General had written a letter on the subject to the Government of Egypt which had not yet replied. Mr. Shiloah thought that Nasser wanted to consolidate his gains in Suez before making trouble in Gaza. He did not foresee organized Egyptian raids in the immediate future. Nasser was not yet ready to become involved in a military clash. The United States, Israel and the United Nations should not be satisfied with achievements of a temporary nature. There must be an arrangement to give the UNEF authority in Gaza. So long as it was there on sufferance, we could not derive satisfaction from its presence.

On Aqaba, Mr. Shiloah reiterated the Israel position that any Western initiative for an advisory opinion from the ICJ would be likely to be misinterpreted. Mere mention of the possibility by the U.S. threw doubt on the firmness of the American position on the Straits.

On Suez, Israel believed that acceptance of the Egyptian plan with its clear implication that there would be continued discrimination in the matter of transit would have serious effects on Israel and the Free World generally. Israel did not want to do anything precipitate in the Canal and did not intend to. This applied only as long as we all had the feeling that the United States had not abandoned its effort to bring about a suitable arrangement. The moment the United States de facto accepted Nasser’s dictate Israel would not say it was still incumbent on it not to try to find ways to exercise its rights. Even then he was not saying that Israel would not try to consult with the United States and get its support. Israel was for the time being at the stage where it still hoped that the United States would be firm on the position it had announced publicly. Israel assumed there would be no decision to give in. Israel had always urged that a stand be taken before the Canal was cleared. Israel had felt that this was a card. The U.S. position, as stated by the Secretary, had been that it was improper and inexpedient for the U.S. to use this as a card so long as we were operating through the United Nations.

Mr. Shiloah felt it was becoming more and more evident that the United Nations did not feel that Nasser should be pressured, that he was an aggrieved party and that it was first necessary to return to the status quo ante and then try to proceed from there. The Secretary had taken a different position at the very outset in his November 1 speech in the United Nations General Assembly. Mr. Shiloah made a strong plea that the U.S. call to the attention of world public opinion the fact that it disapproved of Nasser. U.S. failure to do so worried Israel.

Mr. Rountree said that on Gaza and what might transpire there in the future he did not believe Israel was under any illusions as to the U.S. attitude. We did not feel that we could relax in the expectation that the situation would relax. The main point was that we should not rest on our laurels. What Hammarskjöld had done merely provided us with an opportunity to improve the situation, not to maintain it as is.

On Suez, we would never think that the Egyptian memorandum was a good proposal. We were studying it and would react but the form our negotiations would take was not known. Mr. Shiloah asked if he could say that the U.S. had not changed its policy of insisting on non-discrimination in the use of the Canal. Mr. Rountree replied that Mr. Shiloah could report that the U.S. attitude on all Six Principles was unchanged.

Mr. Shiloah reiterated Israel’s interest in a U.S. reaction to the points made by Mr. Eban in his talk with the Under Secretary on March 19.² Mr. Rountree replied that we would press forward on this.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/3–2957. Confidential. Drafted by Bergus.
2. The memorandum of conversation among Eban, Raphael, Shiloah, Herter, Rountree, and Bergus of March 19 is not printed. (Ibid., 674.84A/3–1957) During the conversation, Eban offered comments and suggestions concerning Egyptian belligerency, Gaza, Aqaba, the Suez Canal, and the U.S. public attitude toward Nasser.

   In response to Shiloah’s query of March 29, a memorandum from Wilkins to Rountree was drafted, which summarized the points made by Eban and recommended comments which could be given in response. The memorandum is ibid., 674.84A/3–2957. Herter discussed these points with Eban on April 2; see Document 264.