Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1957, Volume XVII

264. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, April 2, 1957¹

Washington, April 2, 1957

SUBJECT

• Israel

PARTICIPANTS

• Mr. Abba Eban, Ambassador of Israel
• Mr. Gideon Raphael, Counselor, Israel Foreign Ministry
• Mr. Reuven Shiloah, Minister, Israel Embassy
• The Under Secretary
• W—C. Douglas Dillon (For part of meeting)
• NEA—William M. Rountree
• IO—Walter N. Walmsley, Jr.
• NE—Donald Bergus

Mr. Eban said he wished to review current problems. The first was that of economic aid. Three weeks ago the Under Secretary had informed him that the United States was prepared to resume consultations on this subject. Conversations had taken place in Tel Aviv and there were indications that a decision by the Department was necessary before further progress could be made. Mr. Eban pointed out that the time factor was important to Israel. Mr. Eban reported that he would be seeing the President of the Export-Import Bank on the following day. He hoped that the Department would make its views on the dispatch of an Export-Import Bank Mission to Israel available to Mr. Waugh before this meeting took place.²

Mr. Eban had seen the United Nations Secretary General the previous afternoon. It appeared to Israel that Nasser wished to have a respite in some matters while he celebrated the confirmation of his unilateral control of the Suez Canal. He wished to gain such a respite without making any commitments. Nasser also probably realized that this was not a suitable time to take steps which could provoke an Israel military reaction. We should be under no illusion that Nasser’s responses to the Secretary General indicated any basic change in Nasser’s attitude.

The Secretary General had informed the Israelis that he had stressed to the Egyptians their legal obligation to let shipping of all nations, including Israel, through the Canal. He had dismissed Egyptian attempts to link the Canal to the refugee problem. Hammarskjöld had said that he was pessimistic over the prospects of Nasser changing his position on this point. Israel looked with disquiet on this development as the consummation of Nasser’s victory.

On Aqaba, the Secretary General felt that Nasser may at this time be willing not to disturb the UNEF. The Secretary General had said that he thought he could “forget about Aqaba”, so far as the Egyptians were concerned but had made a reservation with respect to the Saudi attitude.

On Gaza, the same logic regarding Nasser’s desire for a respite seemed in the Secretary General’s mind to apply here. What the Secretary General had said and published about the role of UNEF in Gaza caused deepening anxiety in Israel. Egyptian control in Gaza was becoming established; the tendency for the United Nations to recognize this fact was becoming more marked.

The upshot of the Secretary General’s mission was that Egypt had not changed its position but had accepted a respite without giving any binding written or oral commitments. Israel had a “volcanic” feeling. The Secretary General’s letter to the Egyptians as to whether they regarded themselves in a state of war with Israel remained unanswered. At the same time, the Secretary General had addressed both Egypt and Israel on other matters. Mr. Eban had told the Secretary General that he could expect no answer from Israel on these other matters until there had been an Egyptian response to the first question. Mr. Eban would keep in touch with the Secretary General but Israel felt that nothing substantive had been solved.

Mr. Eban said that in the near future he would like a broad discussion with the Secretary on West-Middle East relations and United States–Israel relations in the context of the February and March discussions between the two Governments. Israel was apprehensive over reports from Bermuda which seemed to indicate that the two Governments felt that nothing could be done to resist the dynamics of the Nasser regime. There were also reports that the United States and United Kingdom had felt that we should not alienate other Arab states. Therefore, it would be better to approach the proposal to create an alternative link from the Red Sea to the Mediterranean through Israel in a negative fashion. The Secretary, during the February–March discussions, had spoken of a “New Deal” in United States–Israel relations. He had spoken of the Western interest in Aqaba and an alternative to the Canal.

On Suez, the Secretary had said that the United Nations and the United States, having physically opened the Canal, could not but oppose its illegal closing to some ships. This would be a problem with which the society of nations would have to deal. The concept of cooperation between the United States and Israel in resisting Nasser had appealed to Israel.

What could we do about the Israel aspect of the Suez Canal? Did the United States still hold to its view that we should not assume that Egypt would block Israel shipping? The Secretary General did not hold to this assumption. It seemed to Israel that there were three things we could do: 1) leave matters alone; 2) assume that the Egyptian attitude was a lot of talk and that under test conditions Nasser would carry out his international obligations; therefore, test Nasser; 3) in addition to 2) bring the matter to the Security Council and the General Assembly. Israel ruled out the first possibility and wanted advice as to what it should do and what the U.S. would do.

On Aqaba, the essence was to carry out actively the principles of the February 11 Aide-Mémoire and the March 1 General Assembly statements. Israel was disquieted at the Secretary’s suggestion that the initiative be taken in obtaining an opinion or decision of the International Court of Justice. For one thing, this was not the policy to which we had agreed. For another, if we believed our position on the Gulf of Aqaba was right, we should act as though it were right. We should only question our position if we felt it was mistaken. Israel would peacefully exercise its rights of innocent passage through the Straits of Tiran and thus build up a record.

There was need for development of this link between the Red Sea and the Mediterranean. It had been published that the U.S. favored the Iraq–Turkey pipeline but was unfavorable to the Israel pipeline. The Israel pipeline was the better alternative to the Canal because it did not run through the territory of any Arab League state. The line through Turkey was long and costly. The Israel Minister of Trade and Commerce had been in the U.S. the previous week. Israel was going to try to promote a sixteen inch pipeline from Eilath to the Mediterranean. Before investors would decide to put money in such a venture, they would want to know the U.S. Government’s opinion on it. He hoped the United States would reply in a constructive manner.

On Gaza, Israel would stand for maximum United Nations responsibility. Mr. Eban had told the Secretary General that Israel must know who was responsible in Gaza. Israel would certainly call for United Nations responsibility for security in Gaza.

The Under Secretary said that with regard to economic aid, we had begun by lifting the passport restrictions. Mr. Eban expressed his Government’s gratification at this step. The Under Secretary continued that there was reason to be optimistic and to feel that the paths would be cleared for further economic aid measures. Mr. Dillon would discuss the proposal for an Export-Import Bank mission with Mr. Waugh prior to Ambassador Eban’s meeting with the Bank.

On Suez, we had communicated our views to the Egyptian Government. We disagreed with the Egyptian memorandum on a number of grounds. It was a unilateral declaration and not an international agreement. There was no reference to the Six Principles. There was a failure to refer to the users of the canal and no provision for an organized relationship between the user and Egypt. We had conveyed our views to Egypt which had not so far responded. The Egyptians had not published their memorandum. Mr. Eban asked if the U.S. representations had included reference to the Security Council policy on Israel shipping. Mr. Rountree replied that we had specifically mentioned the Six Principles. Mr. Eban felt that perhaps the U.S. should have mentioned specifically the 1951 Security Council resolution.

The Under Secretary continued that on Aqaba our position had been clear from the beginning. We have never varied from the position that the U.S. intended to assert its rights “in the absence of a decision from the International Court of Justice”. Mr. Rountree, referring to Mr. Eban’s comment that what the Secretary had said was not in accordance with the policy to which we had agreed, said he would like first to say that the U.S. had not reached a decision to seek an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice; however, he personally was unaware of any agreement with Israel that the United States would not endorse seeking an opinion from the International Court of Justice. Mr. Eban said he had simply referred to Israel’s understanding that in the absence of an International Court of Justice decision we would operate under the assumption that there was a legal right of transit. Mr. Shiloah confirmed that Mr. Rountree was right in saying there had been no agreement as there had been no implication in the discussions that the U.S. entertained doubts as to its position. That was why Israel was disturbed at the reports from Bermuda. Mr. Rountree said that no decision had been taken at Bermuda or subsequently actually to seek an ICJ opinion, but there were of course advantages in having the view of the International Court of Justice. The Under Secretary asked if it was Israel’s position that the aggrieved party should take the matter to the International Court of Justice. Mr. Eban indicated general assent but expressed doubt as to the validity of any procedure whereby Egypt, which had not accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, took the matter to the International Court of Justice. Egypt would probably disregard the International Court of Justice as it had disregarded the Security Council. Mr. Rountree said that our seeking an International Court of Justice endorsement of our position on Aqaba might show confidence and strength. Mr. Eban felt that the practice of free passage was still too young and too fragile.

The Under Secretary said that on Gaza we were studying the Secretary General’s memorandum. Mr. Eban had raised the point of where responsibility lay. We felt this should be explored. We were more optimistic on the possibility of maintaining the status quo with responsibility in the hands of UNEF. UNEF outnumbered the Egyptians in the Strip. There appeared to be joint responsibility, but we did not know how this had been formalized.

Mr. Eban asked how the U.S. looked at the Suez question. Israel felt that many historic opportunities had been missed, such as the Anglo-Egyptian agreement of 1954, the withdrawal of French, British, and Israel troops, and the clearance of the Canal. Israel was stunned at the way the West had played all its cards and left Nasser holding his. Was all lost? Were we merely watching developments with fatal resignation? The Under Secretary felt that our attitude was neither fatalistic nor one of resignation.

The Under Secretary said that if approached by prospective investors in a trans-Israel pipeline we would say we had no objection provided they felt that this was a good investment.

Mr. Raphael said that Israel would want to test the Egyptian attitude on Suez. He wanted to know how we envisaged obtaining Israel navigation through the Canal. The U.S. could take it for granted that Israel would not let this matter rest. The Under Secretary said that the Israelis apparently wanted consultation on this matter. We would look into it.

Mr. Eban said there were two aspects: Israel flag ships, and Israel cargo in ships under other flags. The maritime countries had deferred to Egyptian regulations against the latter in the past. The U.S. and others should ask themselves if they would continue to pay heed to these regulations. The Secretary General had said that Nasser had abandoned his legal argument for keeping Israel ships out of the Canal by saying he could not face the problem which would be created by the sight of the Israel flag in the streets of Ismailia. Nasser had not, however, gone on to say that Israel cargoes in ships of other countries would not create such problems. Mr. Shiloah expressed the view that the U.S. should think of new measures to counter Egyptian boycott procedures.

Mr. Eban referred to previous conversations and said that Israel was addressing notes to the maritime powers, beginning with the United States, on the Gulf of Aqaba. He would like to bring in a draft Israel note on the subject together with a suggested U.S. reply for informal discussion in the Department. The Under Secretary said that Mr. Rountree would receive Mr. Eban for discussion of this matter.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/4–257. Confidential. Drafted by Bergus on April 3. Rountree sent Herter a briefing paper prior to the meeting on April 2. (Ibid., 784A.00/4–257)
2. In a memorandum to Dulles dated April 2, presumably written after the conversation with Eban, Rountree reviewed the status of various economic and financial assistance programs for Israel and recommended that the United States proceed: to implement the $25 million Development Assistance program and the Technical Assistance program; to release local currency and counterpart funds when an agreement had been reached on their use; to authorize a Department official to inform the Department of Agriculture and the Interagency Staff Committee on Agricultural Surplus Disposal of the political desirability of meeting to some extent Israel’s request for a PL. 480 Title I program, as soon as additional authority became available; and to authorize the notification to the Export-Import Bank that security and political conditions were satisfactory for the dispatch of the study mission to Israel. Dulles reworded the final recommendation and initialed his approval of all five recommendations. (Ibid., 41 1.84A41/4–257)