211. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations1

689. Re urtel 608.2 We are disturbed by reports indicating immediate return of Egyptians to Gaza Strip and appointment Egyptian “administrative governor UN”. We agree with SYG thinking that now not time for Egyptians seek resume administrative responsibilities in Gaza Strip, though early return small number Egyptian officers for MAC duty perhaps not unreasonable. We would hope that GOE would demonstrate continued forbearance that has marked its public position in recent past and that, while maintaining its rights, would cooperate fully in implementation measures set forth SYG’s report of February 22 as best means assure peace and quiet in area. It will be recalled SYG presented report in expectation there would be reasonable period of time during which practicable arrangements for the Gaza Strip could be worked out by UN.

Please ask SYG whether he would consider it helpful if Department were to instruct Ambassador Hare approach Nasser urging him refrain from any precipitate action that would serve to undo what has been achieved in area.

We would view such US approach as complementary to any made by SYG and in support his own efforts. In view potentially deteriorating situation Gaza we believe US approach to Nasser should be made soonest with view stressing desirability deferring for time being any moves implementing Egyptian control.

If SYG agrees, you should also convey above views to selected members Advisory Committee, urging they also seek persuade GOE continue cooperate fully with SYG as recommended by GA.

[Page 399]

Re urtel 6103 Dept believes SYG in best position determine, in light Bunche’s report and recommendation, desirability immediate trip to Cairo. We inclined agree early trip desirable.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/3–1157. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Gamon and approved by Wilcox who initialed for Herter.
  2. Supra.
  3. In telegram 610 from USUN, March 11, Lodge reported that, according to Cordier, the remainder of Bunche’s message contained a recommendation that Hammarskjöld go to Cairo earlier than planned in light of the Gaza developments. Lodge then expressed his own opinion that it would be best for Hammarskjöld to go immediately to Cairo because “he is in position to tell Nasser things which others may not be able to say, and to leave no doubt in Nasser’s mind as to what Egyptian position in world opinion will be if he continues pursue narrow, nationalistic approach.” (Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/3–1157)