197. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State1
Delga 854. Re Palestine: Israeli withdrawal; interim arrangements. After phone call with Secretary this morning,2Lodge called on SYGHammarskjold to convey Secretary’s views. Lodge told him we felt he should disregard completely what Mrs. Meir said yesterday and proceed with withdrawals on basis of public record. Israel knew US did not subscribe 100 percent to their viewpoint and US position fully contained in public documents. Secy felt Hammarskjold should try to get UNEF stationed on Israeli side of line. Israel’s position on this had been completely in wrong and SYG should make this issue fully public. Secretary referred SYG to his press conference yesterday. He extended his best wishes and thanks for good job SYG doing.
Hammarskjold expressed grateful appreciation for Secretary’s message. He referred to one section of Secretary’s press conference in which Secretary said Mrs. Meir’s March 1 speech, on UN being exclusive agent during initial takeover in Gaza, directly used words in SYG’s statement to plenary of February 22.3SYG noted that his language of February 22 referred to exclusive UN role “in the first instance”. He said when Pineau (France) had shown him notes on what Mrs. Meir would say to GA on March 1, sentence read “initial takeover,” but word “initial” had been crossed out. When Israeli statement [Page 371] delivered, it omitted word “initial”. SYG said Secretary Dulles was relying on his understanding of Israeli text, but Israelis had made this slight but significant change obviously without informing Secretary.
Hammarskjold went on to note that Mrs. Meir had … told her press luncheon yesterday Israel was opposed to Egypt’s return to Gaza in “any shape or form.” Lodge noted there was difference between her saying that in private, or to press luncheon, and on floor of GA. SYG agreed it was not same thing, but all the same regarded it as dangerous.
SYG then reported call from Eban late last night in which latter expressed concern as to length of initial takeover period. Hammarskjold had told Eban he had no fixed plan, and as far as he was concerned, “the longer the better”. Reasons he had as yet no plans included fact of Mrs. Meir’s statement to him of Israel’s position, which, as Eban knew, was not completely endorsed. SYG said Eban … sought to restate their understanding of Washington position as “wanting to see Israel’s expectations fulfilled, but not being able find legal formula therefor.”
Hammarskjold had concluded he must proceed in spite of risks. He said there was still basic contradiction in positions, but he prepared to accept its being partly “artificial” (or bluff) from Israeli side. If greater clarity were sought, regardless of how carefully it was done, he felt there was risk of new confusions. On balance he was inclined to gamble, proceed on basis present record and take calculated risks.
SYG therefore intended make report to GA, according to schedule reported yesterday. In it he would set out schedule for complete withdrawal. He would then say, in effect, “let’s get on with implementation of Res II of February 2”, and in particular parts of his January 24 report which GA called for putting into effect. This would include placing UNEF on both sides of Armistice Demarcation Line.
Lodge said at this point he heartily endorsed this procedure and would publicly state, probably in GA, that having UNEF on Israel’s border, inside Israeli territory, would be greatest assurance of security Israel could possibly achieve.
SYG then outlined risks as he saw them. He would hope to have initial takeover period last as long as possible. There was possibility Egypt could continue to live with lack of clarity on administration in Gaza. He felt he might be able convince Egypt of desirability of moratorium on public comment on Gaza issue. That would work so long as there was no provocation. For his part, he would “lie low, and appear reasonably happy.” It would be likewise incumbent upon Israel to refrain from public bragging or otherwise “de facto provoking” Egyptians.
[Page 372]If things went well, SYG hoped for 5–6 week period of calm in which to work matters out. By then, some Egyptians might quietly come into Gaza. Israel should by then have no reason fear adverse domestic reaction, although Egypt for its part should not try to make big thing of it.
SYG said he was more concerned about Israel’s intention, announced to him yesterday, of having Israeli shipping ready and waiting at entrance Suez Canal for opening of Canal. They should not, in his opinion, try to force Canal issue at start, because Egypt would be bound to deny passage.
Hammarskjold said Cairo was keen on making publicity out of his going to Cairo for negotiations. He would hope to avoid any negotiations for a while on Gaza and stick to Suez issue. However, it was difficult avoid question of Gaza since there were always issues on which he might have to negotiate with one side or other. As example, last night Burns had cabled about currency problem in Gaza. Bums had apparently issued instructions to exchange all Israeli pounds for Egyptian piasters. Israelis were insisting on their right to pass upon such transactions. Since currency issue involved aspects of sovereignty, this was very ticklish issue for Burns and UN to handle. This was part of risk, however, which he felt he and UN must run.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/3–657. Confidential; Priority. Received at 9:47 p.m.↩
- See Document 195.↩
- See Document 137.↩