194. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State1
Delga 848. Re Palestine/Israel withdrawal. UNSYGHammarskjold asked to see me at 2:30 p.m. regarding various immediate problems.
He noted that Egypt had agreed that when General Assembly had concluded its present debates on Middle East situation, they would negotiate all outstanding issues. In fact, he would negotiate them with Nasser directly. However, there were two definite points on which Hammarskjold foresaw trouble.
[Page 365]First point was that UNEF’s duration depended upon balancing its presence on Egyptian side of demarcation line with its presence on Israeli side. This was position consistent with resolution of UN; it was one that Pearson (Canada) had made in debate and with which, SYG understood, United States did not disagree.
Second point involved Gaza. Egypt would say they were glad to have UN assistance, but on understanding that future status of Gaza remained to be settled in peace negotiations. In those negotiations Egypt could not permit Israel basis for claiming that Egypt had given up Gaza in March 1957. While Egypt would not put it this way, Hammarskjold said they wished to retain Gaza for its bargaining value in an ultimate peace settlement. SYG said US statement of March 1 in GA was consistent with this stand in saying ultimate disposition would have to be made within framework of Armistice Agreement.
Hammarskjold feared that, although UN and US agreed basically with Egyptian position on these points, if they emerged only after Hammarskjold had gone to Cairo they would immediately be pictured in world press and particularly by British and French, as UN’s submission to Nasser’s dictation. SYG felt it would be unfortunate psychologically to permit consistent UN stand on these points to remain ignored.
When we pointed out that Res II of February 2 offered basis for putting UNEF on Israel’s side of line, Hammarskjold replied he feared that on basis of UK/French press statements and Mrs. Meir’s speech, it would be said that SYG had ignored major development in Washington that superseded Res II.
Hammarskjold therefore asked for simple statement from US before Secretary departs for SEATO meeting as to US understanding of legal basis of UN activities in Gaza.
Hammarskjold outlined three current theories regarding UN’s legal status in Gaza upon Israel’s withdrawal:
- (1)
- Extreme Israel stand was that Gaza would be given to UN by Israeli occupation force. This implied that Israel would delegate to UN re Gaza authority stemming from such occupation (Israel contended that Armistice Agreement—at least insofar as it applied to Gaza—was dead). As result UN could not permit anything in Gaza which Israel would not have permitted. In Hammarskjold’s opinion, to accept this thesis would be to legalize Israel’s claims to occupation of Gaza and at same time annul Armistice Agreement.
- (2)
-
UK/French theory, which Dixon (UK) had expounded to him today, was that “UN would be in Gaza because UN had decided to be there.”
Hammarskjold has pointed out to Dixon undesirable precedents such thesis established. For instance, if Algeria or Kashmir or some other disputed area could not be agreed upon, UN could under this theory decide to take it over. Dixon had immediately reacted that such [Page 366] legal theory would be unacceptable. Hammarskjold had replied to Dixon that if General Assembly could not take such action, neither could Secretary-General.
- (3)
- Third and only tenable theory in SYG’s opinion was that UN’s legal status for activities in Gaza stemmed from Armistice Agreement. It followed from such thesis that extent of UN’s activity there depended upon Egypt’s agreement. It was also clear that Egypt would not permit UN activities in Gaza to go so far as to give rise to appearance that Egypt had given up its rights in Gaza.
Hammarskjold wished to have US statement on above question to fall back on when, as he fully expected, Israel challenged basis of his negotiations with Nasser regarding UN activities in Gaza. Hammarskjold had asked UK for expression of its opinion and did not expect receive any reply. He would, he felt, have to ask French for their opinion and sincerely hoped they would not reply. He now asked for US opinion. He felt he already had clear-cut statement of points of view of Canada, Colombia, Norway and India supporting 3rd theory above.
Hammarskjold raised question of whether any further authority was needed from General Assembly regarding UN activities in Gaza and future UNEF. He said he felt no further authority was needed as far as UN administration in Gaza, except insofar as financial aspects arose. He said it would not in present atmosphere be possible to obtain two-thirds for substantive resolution on all desirable aspects.
He had, therefore, concluded that desirable course was for him to have available as UN document report from him Friday morning prior to General Assembly renewed consideration of Middle East question. In that report, he felt, he could make a reasonable statement regarding withdrawal. While all Israeli forces would not be out by then, he could, as he put it, “put all the cards on the table,” i.e., set out timetable for completion of withdrawal.
He again cautioned strongly against any premature leaks regarding timetable for withdrawal in order to avoid riots, etc.
In his report on Friday, in addition to stating that all Israeli forces would be withdrawn, he could bring up substantive parts of Resolution II of February 2. In this fashion, he could, in effect, “re-date” that resolution in his report.
With regard to Gaza, he said it would be somewhat extraordinary to set up UN administration there, although it was nothing more than “marriage” of UNEF and UNRWA, without terms of reference or any concrete mandate for UN administration in Gaza. He felt he should spell out in more detail just what that administration would be, while making it clear it would be dependent upon agreement being reached with Egypt. As he put it, it would be “UN administration in Gaza, not of Gaza.”
[Page 367]Hammarskjold intended to get unanimous agreement of members of Advisory Committee on text of his report. With such broadly representative agreement, he would then hope GA could note Israel’s withdrawal and note with approval his report.
After Hammarskjold concluded his presentation, I asked him when he expected to go to Cairo. He said early next week. . . .
In response to further questions, Hammarskjold said he felt he would have to meet issue of having UNEF on both sides of armistice line next week in Cairo. He would also have to face problem then of Egypt’s “return” to Gaza. If Israel absolutely refused to have UNEF on its side of armistice line, UNEF’s life expectancy was two months at most.
I said problem for him was how these issues could be put so as to avoid charge being leveled that UN was subject to Nasser’s dictation. I suggested that it ought to be tied in in some way with something else so that unpleasant aspects for Israel could be submerged in something more pleasant for Israel.
Hammarskjold replied that he had thought of trying to get from Israel and Egypt a reaffirmation of Article I of the Armistice Agreement as a kind of non-aggression pact. He was afraid, however, that Nasser would immediately ask about Articles VII and VIII of the Armistice Agreement which were tied in with Article I.
Cordier said he felt there was nothing in present situation which could be developed, given present position of parties, which would be pleasing to Israel.
I said I thought UNEF was popular idea in this country and idea of prolonging its life would be well received. Indications that UNEF’s life expectancy was only two months would cause disappointment in this country.
Hammarskjold replied that only way to prolong UNEF was to balance its presence in Egypt by placing it also on Israel’s side of line.
I pointed out that February 2 resolution had already made that point.
Hammarskjold said we could never get two-thirds majority for keeping UNEF in Egypt in face of Israeli refusal to permit UNEF on Israel’s side of line. That being Israel’s present position, he could see no way out of this impasse, other than to make it clear-cut, on public record, that views as stated by U.S., Canada, and others were UN policy.
While it was there in UN documents, no one looked at them.
I asked Hammarskjold to let me mull over what he had said and I promised him an early reply.
[Page 368]Recommended action:
- (1)
- I recommend that Secretary verbally convey to Secretary-General our understanding of legal authority for UNEF being in Gaza or that I be authorized to do so verbally for him.
- (2)
- I recommend that intensive study be begun immediately to avert mortal danger to life of UNEF which is implicit in Israeli unwillingness to station it on her side of demarcation line. It should be possible to persuade Israel to allow a token force which would preserve appearances. Ending of UNEF and re-entry of Israel into Gaza would be a disaster of immense proportions which would at least once again bring up pressure for sanctions and could well result in an immediate Russian entry into area at Egypt’s request.
(Above drafted before conversation reported NiactDelga 847.)2