193. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State1
Delga 847. For the Secretary and Wilcox. Re: Israeli withdrawal. Hammarskjold requested further urgent meeting this evening. (For previous meeting see Delga 848).2 He had just had long and disturbing talk with Mrs. Meir in which she had stated Israel position to be as follows:
- (1)
- Israel will exercise right to go through Straits of Tiran next week and will use warships if necessary. Innocent passage meant conduct not character of shipping.
- (2)
- Return of Egypt “in any way, shape or form” to Gaza would bring into action Israel’s right of return to Gaza. This applied not only to initial takeover period which Israel wished extend as long as possible but for future as well. Israel wished Secretary-General consult in Jerusalem before end of initial takeover in order to work out Israel’s participation in long-range Gaza administration.
- (3)
- Mrs. Meir stated that Israeli position as set forth above had been endorsed by all those who stated in General Assembly debate that Israel’s assumptions and expectations were reasonable. In fact, Mrs. Meir stated that every single word of her statement of March 1 had been so endorsed, including the reference to Israel’s rights under Article 51. She said, moreover, that her statement had been written not by Israel but by those with whom Israel had consulted.
Hammarskjold asked specifically whether SecyDulles had endorsed the Israeli position as Mrs. Meir had given it. Her answer was yes.
Hammarskjold stated he had carefully avoided taking any position on substance of Mrs. Meir’s statement because he wished avoid any excuse for stopping withdrawal. He could not, however, in these circumstances negotiate in Cairo either on Suez or arrangements for Gaza. Israel’s position and that of Egypt and rest of Assembly, except France, were totally irreconcilable. Hammarskjold said that Israeli statement to him today put clash clearly on the record, and precluded further action by him. If he were to negotiate with Egypt re Gaza, it would have to be on the basis of Egypt’s coming in in some way. That would bring Israelis in, as they have now clearly announced, and fighting would be resumed. UNEF meanwhile would collapse. He could not alone take responsibility for these consequences.
[Page 364]Alternative would be for him to accept the Israeli thesis, but this would lead Egyptians to demand withdrawal of UNEF and consequent withdrawal of UNEF units by participating countries. The result in this case also could be a resumption of the fighting.
In either event, if this issue now came to the Assembly, as it might well do, Israeli withdrawals would undoubtedly be jeopardized, if not totally stopped.
At end of meeting, Engen (Norway) who had been present throughout, reported conversation with Eban this afternoon which substantiated all of above. In addition, Engen said Eban showed him text of French note to Jerusalem in which France explicitly guaranteed Israel’s position regarding right of action if Egypt were re-established in Gaza. Hammarskjold interpreted French guarantee, together with other indications of French involvement in present situation, as indicating France might be laying groundwork for renewed military intervention on Israel’s side.
Hammarskjold’s conclusion was that he did not know what to do. He was aware of the Secretary’s imminent departure and asked that this situation be brought to his immediate attention.3