152. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State1
Delga 806. Re Palestine/Israeli withdrawal. Lodge saw SYG this afternoon following latter’s meeting at noon with Eban (Israel). Following is report on SYG’s conversation:
Eban began by telling SYG Israel “firmly opposed any restoration of Egypt in Gaza in any form”, and it was Israel’s “overriding policy to oppose Egypt’s return either directly or indirectly. On this Israel could not compromise.”
Being pressed by SYG on Gaza, Eban suggested fact-finding commission go to Gaza and report back with recommendations. When asked whether commission would report before or after withdrawal, Eban said he could not reply. Eban went on to say Egypt had no rights under Armistice Agreement since Egypt claimed for itself state of belligerency. SYG commented to us that under Israeli interpretation Gaza would fall like ripe apple into Israel’s lap since obviously UN could not hold Gaza forever. With no Egyptians permitted in, and with Israelis present in some form, nothing could prevent total annexation . . . .
Bunche said Israelis made it clear in their discussion of Gaza that, contrary to impression they had maintained in past both publicly and privately, and which they still maintained publicly, they are not really worried from security angle.
On question of Sharm el-Sheikh, Israelis referred to SYG’s memo of 5 January defining function of UNEF to prevent belligerency.2 They urged that this governed duration UNEF in Sharm el-Sheikh. SYG reminded Eban that in addition to above description of UNEF’s functions, he had clearly set forth idea, which GA had endorsed, that UNEF could not force solution of controversial questions, of which free passage in Gulf of Aqaba certainly was one.
On Israeli point about notification to GA prior UNEF’s disbanding, SYG saw no problem at all. He said this was subsidiary point which should properly be left to Advisory Committee, which could decide whether to take issue to Assembly.
[Page 277]Eban raised question of naval units in Gulf of Aqaba, telling SYGUSG agreed support this idea with Hammarskjold if circumstances warranted, but that it was up to SYG to decide whether or not use them. SYG said he felt this was outside original idea of UNEF since presence of naval UNEF units in Gulf not confined to single function of prevention belligerency. In fact real purpose would be to enforce innocent passage which was beyond original contemplation of UNEF.
Hammarskjold raised with Eban question of UNEF on both sides armistice line. Eban, according to Bunche ridiculed this matter and refused to discuss it. Eban said he had no time to take up peripheral question unrelated to withdrawal. He said he had not discussed this question with anyone for weeks. SYG and Cordier felt this stand by Israel shortened life of UNEF. It could not remain long in Egyptian territory after a “no” from Israel as to its side of line. It created great problems in Egypt which could lead to Egypt demanding UNEF’s withdrawal.
Lodge stated Eban’s stand against ever having Egypt in any form in Gaza was different from story given in Washington. To this SYG said Eban told him he was reading to SYG from same paper as he had read to Secretary.
Cordier said Eban claimed Aqaba problem easier to solve than Gaza, implying that Aqaba could be dealt with whether withdrawal from Gaza agreed or not. SYG, Cordier and Bunche felt this could not work out in practice. Acceptance of separate solutions for two areas would mean that UNEF would be in impossible position vis-à-vis Egypt. UNEF would be trying to secure cease-fire in Aqaba against shipping if it chose [closed?]. Hammarskjold sighed and said “there we are—stuck as ever”. Hammarskjold said he believed Israel’s stand must be on record. He gave us copies of memoranda based on this conversation, which will probably form basis of report to GA tomorrow. (Memoranda sent in Delga 802.)3
[Page 278]Hammarskjold expressed concern at public impression to be gathered from events last 24 hours. He fully expects Israelis will begin to make case that he (SYG) is one responsible for failure reach agreement. Eban had said in course of meeting that he “had been making progress until last hour,” i.e., until Eban had begun talk to SYG.
In view way situation has developed, Hammarskjold said, “there is no possibility to ask for further postponements.” “Deadlock” has been reached. Hammarskjold reported to Advisory Committee tonight on his talk with Eban.
Following conversation with Secretary this evening Lodge telephoned Hammarskjold who within few minutes was to have another meeting with Eban. Lodge said President and Secretary were very concerned over situation and that Secretary had suggested Hammarskjold might take position with Eban that neither Israel nor Egypt would be given [giving?] up any rights by agreeing to type of arrangement for Gaza that SYG had in mind. Israel could still assert whatever rights they had should arrangements there turn out to be unsatisfactory.
SYG said he would, of course, try his best with Eban to find way out and would follow up Secretary’s suggestion, but he was very pessimistic about chances of success. He said Ben Gurion had today made statement in Knesset that Israel could not permit return of Egypt to Gaza. This was now public knowledge. This made negotiating situation extremely difficult but, Hammarskjold said, he would try. Lodge said the alternatives were hard to foresee, that getting a two-thirds vote on sanctions was looking increasingly difficult and that he did not know what would be possible if SYG’s efforts did not succeed. SYG said he understood this and shared our concern and would do all he possibly could.
At 8:00 pm Cordier informed Lodge that in second meeting Hammarskjold had gone very far in effort to find common ground with Eban to reach solution. He said that he believed transcript of conversation which would be available to us later tonight would show how far Hammarskjold had gone and that we would be satisfied on this point. The issue was still whether Egypt could return in any form to Gaza or retain any rights there. Eban said that he wanted to give further thought to Hammarskjold arguments and wanted to talk to others (Cordier assumed Eban meant by this the Secretary), but Cordier doubted from Eban’s attitude that there would be any change in the Israeli position. Cordier said that most that Eban had done had been to modify his formulation of the Israeli position on Egyptian rights in Gaza but that there had been no change in substance.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/2–2657. Confidential; Niact. Received at 1:41 a.m.↩
- Reference is presumably to Hammarskjöld’s report of January 15 concerning compliance with General Assembly resolutions calling for withdrawal of troops and other measures. (U.N. doc. A/3500 and Add.l)↩
- Delga 802 from USUN, February 25, contained the verbatim texts of two memoranda from Hammarskjold. The first listed the important points made by Eban and Hammarskjöld during their conversation of February 25 concerning the Gulf of Aqaba and Straits of Tiran, Gaza, and the deployment of U.N. forces. The second memorandum was prepared in response to a request from Eban for clarification of Hammarskjöld’s statement of February 22 (see Document 137). In it, Hammarskjöld noted that his statement “obviously was made within the framework of the legal situation established by international agreement. He could neither detract from, nor annul any rights existing under the Armistice Agreement. His statement indicated practical arrangements, envisaged within the framework of Egyptian control of the territory as established by the agreement, and could, therefore, not be understood as limiting Egyptian rights within the area under the terms of the agreement.” On February 26, Hammarskjöld released as U.N. doc. A/3563 his two memoranda of February 25 with an introductory note.↩