115. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the Secretary of State in Washington, and Arthur H. Dean in New York, February 19, 1957, 9:53 a.m.1
TELEPHONE CALL TO ARTHUR DEAN
D returned the call and said Eban leaves at noon. D got the impression it is negotiable. The Sec said he knows that re Eban but dubious re Ben Gurion. D reviewed his conv with E. D said if we advance from the stand we have taken which is a major effort and BG [Page 207] says no, D does not think the US would want to be put in that position. The Sec said some of the things he is talking about cannot be given assurances on because [it is] a UN matter. D wondered if we could say anything re UN forces moving in and then out—say that they would move in on an appropriate basis. The Sec said we can’t give guarantees about other peoples’ shipping. No doubt but what if the Israelis accept this it would place a heavy moral responsibility on the US and the Sec thinks they are crazy not to do it. E was pleading for something to take back to BG. E said Pearson said he did not think they have a prayer of getting in Gaza Israeli adm. The Sec said there is a possibility that while recognizing the ostensible Egyptian right of occupation there would in fact be a UN adm. Hammarskjold is working on it. And the Sec thinks it likely there will not be a reversion to total Egyptian adm. We play cautiously and would not assume the moral responsibility unless we probed to be fairly sure it would work out that way. D said when he was with Mrs. M[eir] and E they told him Lucius Clay came in and advised them to stick to their guns and not retreat. Some prominent Americans of the Jewish faith are advising them. The Sec concurred and said he thinks Silver2 is one. D told them they are dipping dangerously close to the bottom of their good will, in the US. The Sec said if they don’t get out and hostility is resumed etc. etc. they will be blamed in the future for it. D was trying to think up wording—non-committal general language. He had said E was pleading for something further to put up to BG. The Sec told E several times that if they want some slight modifications and tinkering with the text of our declaration that was something we could consider on the assumption this is acceptable but merely to get into it and have it turned down again is something we will not do. We could put in a sentence that we hope there would be established in accord with Egypt some adm of the area under the auspices of the UN. Perhaps strengthen other words. But the Sec will not go into this unless he knows in principle they would withdraw. D repeated the above and the Sec said they know it as he has told them but no reason why D should not tell him that again. We are willing to spell out hopes and expectations and what our policy will be and put in the sentence re different form of adm which we hope could be mutually agreed upon by Egypt and the UN for some sort of a practical adm.