114. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations1
Gadel 146. Suez—Interim arrangement.
- 1.
- US, UK and France now have agreed position to present to SYG on interim arrangement for Suez Canal. The remaining outstanding issue (Gadel 143,2 para. 5) has been resolved by UK and France withdrawing their previous position that users must be parties to agreement. The agreed Aide-Mémoire and enclosure thereto, text below, spell out the agreed position. The last sentence of the Aide-Mémoire makes clear that the four governments (including Norway) expect SYG will secure their views on any Egyptian counter-proposal containing material changes.
- 2.
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Text of Aide-Mémoire and enclosure: “The Governments of France, Norway, United Kingdom and the United States of America have consulted together with a view to presenting to the SYG of the United Nations, as requested, an agreed position regarding interim arrangements which they consider should govern the operation of the Suez Canal pending a final settlement in accordance with the six requirements set forth in the Resolution of the Security Council of October 13, 1956 and in light of the letters of the SYG and the Foreign Minister of Egypt of October 24 and November 2, 1956. This position is set forth in the enclosure to this Aide-Mémoire.
“The four Governments desire, in addition, to inform the SYG of their view that the question of repayment of advances for clearing the Canal should not be dealt with in the agreement for an interim arrangement, but should be considered in the negotiations for a final Canal settlement.
“The four Governments would appreciate it if the SYG would initiate discussions with the Government of Egypt looking toward the prompt conclusion of an interim arrangement on the basis set forth in the enclosure to the Aide-Mémoire. In the event that in the course of these discussions the Egyptian Government should advance suggestions for material changes, it is the understanding of the four Governments that the SYG would communicate such suggestions to them for consideration.
“Enclosure: Points To Be Covered In Interim Arrangement Governing Operation of Suez Canal Pending Final Settlement.
[Page 206]- “1. Egypt would designate the IBRD or the UN as agent to receive, hold, and dispose of all Canal tolls under an agreement, the purpose of which is to protect the interests of Egypt and the users and to facilitate the operation of the Canal, as described below. The identity of the agent would be specified in the agreement.
- “2. All tolls would be received by the agent and placed in a Suez Canal account on terms providing that the agent should pay over to Egypt immediately one half of these tolls for operating costs, and that the remainder would be held by the agent in the Suez Canal account, to be disbursed at a later date in conformity with the provisions of a final Suez Canal settlement in accordance with the six principles approved by the Security Council on October 13, 1956 and in light of the exchange of letters between the SYG and Foreign Minister Fawzi dated October 24 and November 2, 1956.
- “3. The agreement would provide that operation of the Canal, pending a final settlement, would be in accordance with the six principles approved by the Security Council on October 13, 1956 and the obligations of the Constantinople Convention of 1888.”
- 3.
- Request that you concert with your UK, French and Norwegian colleagues (as reported Gadel 143, there have been no discussions here with Norway) and jointly deliver Aide-Mémoire and enclosure.3
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/2–1857. Confidential. Drafted by Meeker and Metzger.↩
- Gadel 143 to USUN, February 15, contained a report on discussions concerning an interim arrangement for the Suez Canal being held in Washington with British and French officials. (Ibid., 974.7301/2-1457)↩
- On February 19 in New York, Representatives of France, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United States presented the texts of the Aide-Mémoire and enclosure to Secretary-General Hammarskjöld. After reading the document, Hammarskjöld said that he would contact Egypt concerning the paper, and warned that recent publicity given to parts of the document damaged chances of obtaining Egypt’s agreement. (Delga 766 from USUN, February 19; ibid., 974.7301/2–1957)↩