666. Memorandum for the Files by Richard F. Pedersen1

SUBJECT

  • Suez

Confirming LodgeDulles conversation December 27,2 Ambassador Lodge met with the Secretary General at 9:00 a.m. on December 27 to discuss the latest problems in connection with the Suez Canal.

Ambassador Lodge told the Secretary General that the reports about Egypt not allowing clearance of the Canal until the Israelis were out of the Sinai had caused disturbances in high quarters in Washington. The Secretary General said that he had already taken [Page 1335] this up with Fawzi. Fawzi had said that the whole connection between the two points was unknown to Egypt and had categorically denied there was any. The Secretary General thought that the Israelis had probably inspired the story. (Similar information given to Wadsworth by the Secretary General was telephoned to Walmsley (IO) on December 26.)

Lodge told Hammarskjold that the fundamental reason the British and Israelis were forced to withdraw from Egypt was United States economic pressure. He asked what we could do to continue to help the Secretary General in his efforts. He asked how the Secretary General was planning to continue from this point. He commented that a failure to solve the Suez situation would be serious for the United States but disastrous to the United Nations.

The Secretary General said that he understood this situation. At a certain stage pressure on Egypt from the United States would be helpful and welcome. However, he did not think that that stage had yet arrived. The Secretary General said that Fawzi had not so far backed down on any commitment he had made. The Secretary General had a fairly low opinion of Nasser, thought that he was unsteady and local in his viewpoint, but Nasser had not yet pulled the rug out from under Fawzi. The Egyptians had been sticky in a bureaucratic sense, on phraseology, paperwork, legalisms, etc., but not in a political sense. The Secretary General thought this reflected an underlying recognition of Egyptian interest in getting the canal going again. He observed that there had been no blocks or bureaucratic hindrances about the UN Force, which Egypt easily could have done.

On the Egyptian statement that it was no longer possible to negotiate directly with the UK and France on a canal settlement, Hammarskjold pointed to the word “directly” as a key word. The reason for the Egyptian statement was that Krishna Menon was arriving in Egypt tomorrow (December 28). The Secretary General said that while Menon was in New York he had tried to undermine the 6 principles of the Security Council and that the Egyptian statement had been made to counter this. The Secretary General knew that the Egyptians did not want to exclude the continuance of his efforts with the UK and France. Hammarskjold could foresee a situation where the user interest could be protected without the necessity of the direct participation of the foreign ministers of the UK and France. He noted that their interests could be represented by outstanding individuals, such as the Foreign Minister of Norway or others.

Hammarskjold said he wanted to tell Lodge some of his innermost thoughts on the long-range canal settlement, which he had not given to anybody. When the ball got rolling (by which he meant [Page 1336] that, when the canal clearance was well under way and the Israeli troops were getting out of Egypt) toward the end of January, he intended to go to Cairo himself. He would need to know by that time clearly what the UK and France really wanted. This applied especially to the arbitration procedures which they had in mind. He felt that he could not push Egypt into an agreement until he was sure that the UK and France would also come to a firm understanding. About that time he thought that economic aid from the United States or pressure on Egypt might help in bringing about a settlement. He did not think that now was the time to do so.

The Secretary General also referred to the resolution on war damages which Egypt had presented on December 21.3 Fawzi had told him that he had presented this as late as possible before the recess and in an inconspicuous manner. Fawzi had said that he did not want to push this resolution but that Egypt wanted an impartial settlement of the damages. Fawzi thought that the real settlement would be by negotiation and that such negotiations could lead to negotiations on wider issues (meaning negotiations on the Palestine problem).

On the evacuation of the Sinai, the Secretary General also observed that on December 19 the Israelis had agreed to an evacuation plan which would result in a phased withdrawal by mid-January. They had subsequently backed down from this agreement, and the Secretary General had threatened to put out a report on the issue. Yesterday (December 26) they had again agreed on the original plan and would be out by mid-January.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/12–2756. Secret. Pederson was a member of the U.S. Delegation to the Thirteenth Session of the General Assembly and an Adviser on Political and Security Affairs with the Permanent U.S. Mission at the United Nations.
  2. The memorandum of this telephone conversation, which began at 9:45 a.m., December 27, is not printed. (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations)
  3. See the editorial note, infra.