665. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the Secretary of State in Washington and the Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) in New York, December 26, 1956, 5:15 p.m.1
TELEPHONE CALL TO AMB. LODGE
L. returned the call and the Sec. told him the handling of the Egyptian situation worried him.2 Hammarskjold is the fellow who has the titular responsibility and the Sec. supposes he wants us to keep still unless he calls on us but the fact of the matter is the effective power behind this thing is the US. We are in a position to put some pressures on Nasser. We will take the blame if things go wrong. The Sec. is upset re Nasser not letting them clear the Canal until the last Israeli is out of the Sinai.3 This he heard on the radio and read in the papers but does not know if it is true. The Sec’s first reaction was to get hold of Hare and Hussein and raise hell. But then he can’t do that in case it would cross wires with Hammarskjold. The Pres. is mad also. He said to get hold of the Egyptians and tell them if they don’t do better the whole weight of the US will be against them. The Sec. wondered re having a talk with Hammarskjold and see if we can’t help each other more. There are many problems and he doesn’t know H.’s thinking but he won’t get his problems solved unless we put our influence behind a solution. L thinks he realizes that. L. said he could not have a better relationship with H. L. mentioned getting instructions and the Sec said it is not a question of instructions. If the Egyptians are getting balky then H. should call and say here is the problem what can we do. Maybe he thinks everything is going all right. We don’t know. L. can easily find out. Are our pressures on the Egyptians as powerful [Page 1334] as pressures on the Israelis. No. L. asked if we thought about how long to leave the Int’s Force in there and is there a possibility legally to use that as pressure. Sec. would hope so. If N.4 doesn’t do what is asked, we should be able to use it. N. needs heavy pressure. L. said that is what he indirectly gets from Fawzi. They agreed N. does not do what F. recommends. L. asked if the Sec. would not contend the Force has to stay until there is a res to take it out. They agreed yes. L. will see H.5 tonight and call in the a.m. and try to set a lunch up for Monday6 for the three of them. The Sec. would like H. to know of our concern re what we hear—we want to help but sitting still because we assume he will let us know if he wants help. The Pres. is concerned. We are ready to cooperate but don’t dare for fear we may be crossing him up. Yet we don’t think things are going well. If there is anything he wants done now, have him let the Sec know.
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversation. Transcribed by Bernau.↩
- At the Secretary’s Staff Meeting that morning, Dulles “expressed concern at the unsatisfactory state of our posture in regard to the future of the Suez Canal, noting that while we are the keystone of much of what is happening and will happen, including financing, and thus have greater responsibility, we seem to have very little authority and unsatisfactory, diffuse methods of asserting influence. He thought it would be a great diplomatic failure if the situation deteriorates to the point where US Forces have to go in to get and keep the Canal open. He speculated on the possibility of the US being appointed agent of the UN to deal with the matter, as in the Korean case, and on the desirability of his talking to Hammarskjold.” (Tentative Notes; Department of State, Secretary’s Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75)↩
- On December 25, a spokesman for Egypt’s Suez Canal Authority publicly affirmed that there would be no work on clearing the waterway of obstructions until the last Israeli forces left. When asked if this meant leaving the Gaza Strip, the spokesman replied: “You can draw your own conclusions.” (The New York Times, December 26, 1956)↩
- Reference is to Nasser.↩
- Reference is to Hammarskjöld.↩
- December 31.↩