Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI

606. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, November 23, 1956—8 p.m.

Delga 178. Re Palestine—Suez. Pineau invited me to lunch at his apartment today. Present also were Alphand and Broustra. The tone was very different from last visit when he not only expressed no regrets for what had been done in the Near East, but also said he was sorry they had not gone further. Today it was evident they wanted to get out. He said as far as he was concerned he would be willing to let General Burns decide the question of timing of withdrawal of all Anglo-French forces. I said that it was a fine thing to have said it in private but what we need is something to be said in public. Would he be willing to say it in public? He said he would say it from the GA rostrum. (This could still be done by French, but Pineau himself departs for Paris tonight.)

I told Hammarskjold of this and he thought it extremely helpful.

Pineau and Alphand next talked to Lloyd and Dixon. Alphand told me later they were completely unsuccessful and that Lloyd had refused to change.² Alphand said Lloyd’s entire preoccupation appeared to be with British domestic politics and the effect on Conservative Party fortunes of leaving the timing of the withdrawal of forces up to General Burns.

I then had a long talk with Lloyd, pointing out if he were to agree to this statement he was actually agreeing only to something that would happen in any event and which last night he had said privately to me was satisfactory.³

Lloyd replied by saying that he planned to vote no on the paragraph one of the Afro-Asian resolution which he called the “compulsory paragraph”. He planned to vote for the other paragraphs and then to abstain on the resolution as a whole.

He then gave vent to quite an explosion about being asked to give up the British right to decide on what terms they would get out. He said he would rather go down fighting than have these questions be decided by a “UN General”. He felt sure that in England they would “go right through the roof” and he felt like going right through the roof himself.

He also said “those bloody French, first they put planes all over Israel and now they flatten out completely.” He said he did not think we would reach a vote tonight on the Asian-African resolution and he would put the proposal to have General Burns make the decision on timing of withdrawals up to the Cabinet. He evidently did not relish doing so and did not expect them to agree.

In order maintain maximum pressure, I pointed out the Afro-Asian resolution merely reiterated principles we had stood for, thereby leaving him with impression we might vote for it. He said it would be very bad if we voted for it, but he was clearly engaged in making a demonstration to impress me.

Lloyd asked whether Egyptians would not make a concession concerning continuing present activities on clearance of Canal if British agreed to having General Burns decide timing of withdrawal. I said I doubted Egyptians would make such a verbal agreement in public but I felt sure when it came to actual operations, General Burns could run matters so that clearance would take place while troops were being withdrawn. In response to a question I said I based this on talks I had had with Egyptians which had led me to believe that the insistence that all troops must be withdrawn before any clearance was a talking point for publication and did not represent what they would accept when actual operations were under way.

Referring to Lodge-Murphy telecon⁴ concerning effects of a vote by the US in favor of the Afro-Asian resolution on the Atlantic Pact, I would say from my talks with Pineau it would have no effect whatever and that while it would anger the British at the time, it would not by any means be enough to cause them to give up the Atlantic Pact.

The French have come up with a very good face-saver and the British have put themselves in the wrong by not accepting it. This makes clear that their basic motivation is their own political status at home. Lloyd admits Burns and Hammarskjold would operate the thing so that the clearance and withdrawal would take place pari passu yet he refused to accept this face-saving device which changes none of the basic realities.

Afro-Asian feeling appears to be that British speech this morning took the position that it was up to the UN to measure up to British specifications before the British would withdraw. There is some justification for this view and there is also justification for the Afro-Asian contention that their resolution is very mild in view of the fact that it does not contain a specific condemnation and that it does not mention a date by which withdrawal should be complete.

1. Request Department make urgent representations in London and Paris urging them agree to make statement in GA that they will leave to General Burns decision on timing of withdrawals as Pineau has proposed. This must be done at once as matter will be decided tomorrow (Saturday) morning. On basis such statement, I believe question of withdrawals can be taken out of GA arena. British and French would recoup great deal of their position and provide practical basis for UNEF operation. Unless something like this is done, demand for complete and immediate Anglo-French withdrawal will grow and they will have to face issue of complying with or defying world opinion.

When Lloyd asked me Thursday night to make a statement about British progress towards withdrawal, I asked that I be given precise name of the British battalion which had been ordered to leave, the precise hour of its departure and the ship on which it was leaving. I said that, as fast as they furnished me evidence of progress, I would applaud that progress. Twenty-four hours have gone by and that information has not arrived. This point too might be conveyed to London.

2. Believe Department should realize that if we abstain on Asian-African resolution it may cause a distinct turn for the worse insofar as the withdrawal of troops is concerned. The whole question may thus get bogged down into a morass which will have consequences about which the best prediction that can be made now is that conditions will be even worse than they are now. Our abstention on this resolution will undoubtedly cause a slow-down in the present congealed snail’s pace of withdrawal. This endangers the settlement of the Canal question, of the Palestine question and the avoidance of war. In view of what I have been able learn of the attitudes of the two Foreign Ministers, I feel tonight it is clearly more harmful to abstain than to vote in favor, unpleasant though this latter is.

3. A vital element is the opinion of the SYG who thinks an abstention by the US would imperil the whole withdrawal and would cause everyone to ask “has there been a change in American policy?” This might well require a public rectification by the President, because I do not believe a statement by me on the floor would cut any ice at all as far as political effect in the world is concerned when compared with the effect of the vote. A rectification by the President, even though necessary, might conceivably do more harm to Anglo-American relations than the harm which would be done by my affirmative vote, which, I believe, would quickly pass. Knowing how keenly the President desires withdrawal and how wholeheartedly he wants to support the SYG, I feel the SYG’s opinion is entitled to great weight.

Lodge

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/11–2356. Secret; Niact; Limited Distribution. Received at 9:19 p.m.
2. At 10:30 a.m. on November 23, the Eleventh Session of the General Assembly began consideration of agenda item 66, “Question considered by the first emergency special session of the General Assembly from 1 to 10 November 1956”. During this meeting, Lloyd had described the British position on withdrawal as follows: “It will take place as soon as possible, as the United Nations Force becomes effective and competent to discharge its functions.” (U.N. doc. A/PV.591) The verbatim records of the meetings of the Eleventh Session (November 12, 1956–March 8, 1957) are printed in United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Eleventh Session, Plenary Meetings, 2 vols.
3. Reference is presumably to the conversation reported in Delga 172, Document 603.
4. No account of this conversation has been found in Department of State files.