603. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State1
Delga 172. Re Palestine—Suez. I saw Lloyd at his request late this afternoon. In response his question as to where we stood (which was way he opened conversation), I told him I felt Hammarskjold’s intention to employ Mr. McCloy, General Wheeler and General Clay [Page 1176] in operation of clearing Canal2 was kind of development on which British could justify their immediate withdrawal. I made clear US regarded withdrawal as key element in present situation. Once it had begun remaining matters could proceed.
Lloyd responded most favorably to use of McCloy, Wheeler and Clay, expressing greatest confidence in their abilities effectively proceed in clearance operation. Lloyd then referred to his letter to Hammarskjold (Annex 3, document A/3384)3 in which UK indicated decision withdraw at once an infantry battalion. He stressed UK withdrawal would proceed “as UN force becomes effective”. He said he had agreed with Hammarskjold not to equate UK withdrawal to arrival UNEF on man for man basis. In fact UK battalion would leave Port Said and only company of UNEF would go in.
Lloyd said timing of withdrawal had to be considered as practical matter. This, he asserted, was fact and not excuse. He noted with pleasure Ceylon Prime Minister Bandaranaike had in General Assembly debate speech today, at Lloyd’s request, made this very point.
In Lloyd’s opinion exact details on withdrawal Anglo-French forces and stationing UNEF would have be worked out between General Burns and British General in command. He felt Burns himself would insist on this as only practical manner of proceeding. Lloyd referred in this connection to instability in Egypt, saying things “could go sour at any minute”. For this reason Lloyd felt, and he believed Burns would agree, that command structure, support, etc., which would take some time, would have to be established and consequently all Anglo-French forces could not depart immediately.
Lloyd then referred to problem of clearing Canal. In British view, there were both long-range and immediate aspects this problem. As far as long-range aspects concerned, he was confident and most pleased with choice of McCloy, Wheeler and Clay, and in their ability proceed. He felt, however, it would take at least fortnight before their part in clearance operation would begin take hold. As Lloyd understood it McCloy and Wheeler would proceed to arrange [Page 1177] international consortium, negotiating contracts with salvage firms, and work out financial arrangements. All this would then have to come back to GA for approval. Given most speedy accomplishment these steps, he felt fortnight would be required.
In strongest terms, Lloyd objected to final paragraph SYG’s report on arrangements for clearance Canal (document A/3376)4 if it were taken at face value to mean all Anglo-French forces must be out before any clearance could begin. He felt it was “dangerous nonsense” to tie withdrawal as a precondition to beginning clearance. He said fortnight’s loss of time could make all difference to smaller European countries. He said he felt Britain had sufficient reserves to withstand such delay and, therefore, he was arguing more in behalf other countries than for UK.
Lloyd said he had presented this argument to all members of Commonwealth and to members of SYG’s advisory committee and they were generally sympathetic. Lloyd hoped build up considerable body opinion in GA on this point of view and felt he had made good start with Ceylon’s reference to this this afternoon.
[Here follows discussion of technicalities related to the clearing of the Suez Canal.]
Lloyd concluded conversation by stressing importance UK Government attaches to clearing Canal forthwith. He said if Assembly refused authorize clearance operation to proceed on emergency basis, UK might have reconsider question of withdrawal. UK felt salvage operation should proceed “pari passu.”
At same time withdrawals proceeding, Lloyd made strong plea for US to make public statement in GA supporting UK position on emergency nature of clearance and expressing confidence in UK announced intention withdrawal. He felt this most important in reestablishing Anglo-American solidarity and averting present anti-American trend in British public opinion.
Following is type of statement I would propose to incorporate into a speech on resolution containing SYG’s report. This would be in response Lloyd’s request and only if UK can give US indications actual withdrawal of UK battalion has begun:
“This looks like real progress. Let us hope that this foreshadows speedy compliance with the General Assembly resolution for withdrawal of all non-Egyptian troops. I have just been informed that the (blank) battalion has just stepped on board the (blank) at (blank) a.m. this morning heading for (blank)”.
[Page 1178]Such a statement pleased UK and tends to commit them, without going beyond the facts. In telecon with Lodge Acting Secretary approved gist thereof.5
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/11–2256. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. Received at 12:29 a.m., November 23.↩
- On November 24, Hammarskjöld appointed a three-member team to handle the clearance of the Suez Canal. Lieutenant General Raymond A. Wheeler, formerly of the U.S. Army Engineer Corps, was to assist Hammarskjöld in organizing the technical aspects of the project. John J. McCloy, Chairman of the Board of the Chase Manhattan Bank, was to advise Hammarskjöld and Wheeler on financial problems. Alfred George Katzin, a Deputy Under Secretary in the U.N. Secretariat, was appointed to assist Hammarskjöld within the Secretariat. (The New York Times, November 25) General Lucius Clay evidently was not formally involved in the Canal clearance operation.↩
- “Report of the Secretary-General on compliance with General Assembly resolutions 997 (ES–I) and 1002 (ES–I),” November 21, U.N. doc. A/3384. Lloyd’s letter to Hammarskjöld is dated November 21.↩
- “Report of the Secretary-General on the clearing of the Suez Canal,” November 20.↩
- No account of this conversation has been found in Department of State files.↩