Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI

604. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, November 23, 1956, Noon¹

Washington, November 23, 1956, Noon

OTHERS PRESENT

• Secretary Hoover
• Mr. MacArthur
• Colonel Goodpaster

I joined the meeting a few minutes after it had begun. Mr. Hoover was saying that State’s study indicated that it would not be possible to set a time table of precise dates. The President said he agreed, but what he was looking for was the sequential order in which certain conditions might be expected to develop or be created. Mr. Hoover said that they did believe that this could be prepared.

Mr. Hoover next reported to the President regarding U.S. action on two resolutions affecting the Suez. The first of these is being put in by the Secretary General, and we intend to support it.² The second is an Afro-Asian resolution, which tends to embarrass Britain; on this we plan to abstain.³ The President pointed out that, if the Secretary General’s resolution carries, the second one is not necessary.

Mr. Hoover said that State is exerting all possible pressure to get the UN forces into the Suez. Hammarskjold is progressing slowly—now planning to take until about December 7th, and we are trying to accelerate the movement.

Mr. Hoover said he planned to have Ambassador Caccia in for a talk regarding the latter’s query whether we were going to consult with the British.⁴ He proposed to say that we have consulted steadily. On their side, they have maintained practically a blackout for the last five weeks, and have not consulted us in advance of decisions or actions. Mr. Hoover said he will ask if they intend to start consulting us now. The President said he should stress that we are avoiding anything that can be interpreted as abandoning the UN position.

Mr. Hoover said the oil situation is becoming very critical. European countries are feeling the pressure, and are putting pressure on us. Although the companies are doing a good job, efficiency is below what it could be with pooling. The psychological factor—the feeling of the Europeans as to whether we are supporting them or not—is assuming major importance. In his opinion we can only delay for another 24 hours or so. He said that we have sent background information to all of our embassies, giving special emphasis to elements of our policy as the different areas require. The President said he thought Mr. Hoover should tell Caccia that the first thing we must all give our attention to is helping out on oil. But in order to do that, we must stay 4-square with the UN, so Britain must take some preliminary actions. He was certain that we should tell King Saud as the British take certain actions we feel that we should take certain measures of support. He thought this should be explained to all the Arab countries, excepting Egypt. Mr. Hoover referred to reports that Egypt had called on Saud to supply a quantity of oil, and to pay for it out of his own funds, and that Saud was doing so.

The President thought that we are in a period in which we can strengthen our bilateral arrangements with the various Arab countries, not being so bound as in the past by the Arab-Israel dispute. These might tend to bring Egypt into an appropriate role. He would be prepared to take some bold constructive action in this regard. Mr. Hoover said that Egypt has been caught instigating violence in Libya and Lebanon, and there was discussion of the possibility of inducing those countries to break off diplomatic relations with Egypt.⁵

[Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects.]⁶

G
Colonel CE, US Army

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Top Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster. According to the record of the President’s Daily Appointments, this meeting actually began at 11:45 a.m., and Goodpaster joined it at 11:57 a.m.
2. Reference is to the draft resolution, the text of which Hammarskjöld handed to Lodge in New York on November 22. Under its operative paragraphs, the draft resolution provided that the General Assembly would note with approval the aide-mémoire of November 17, which contained the understanding reached by the Secretary-General and the Egyptian Government concerning the basis for the presence and function of UNEF in Egypt (Annex to Secretary-General’s report of November 20, U.N. doc. A/3376) and the actions taken thus far by Hammarskjöld in connection with arrangements for clearing the Suez Canal. The draft also provided that the General Assembly would authorize Hammarskjöld to proceed with the exploration and negotiation of agreements so that the clearing operations might speedily and effectively be undertaken. The text of this draft resolution was transmitted to the Department of State along with Hammarskjöld’s request that the United States sponsor the resolution in Delga 164, November 22. (Department of State, Central Files, 320.5780/11–2256)
3. Reference is to a draft resolution cosponsored by 20 Afro-Asian nations, which was circulated to members of the General Assembly on November 22. (U.N. doc. A/3385) This draft resolution reiterated previous calls to Great Britain, France, and Israel to comply with U.N. resolutions requiring withdrawal from occupied territories. Delga 168, November 22, which transmitted the text of the draft resolution to the Department of State, also noted that according to Ramsbotham, the British Government would take it very hard if the United States supported this resolution, as Great Britain was carrying out its withdrawal in terms stated by the United States and Canada during previous debates, that is, phased withdrawal as soon as possible following the arrival and functioning of UNEF. (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/11–2256)
4. During the evening of November 21, Ambassador Caccia had called on Hoover to deliver an oral message from Foreign Secretary Lloyd inquiring whether the United States was prepared to discuss Middle Eastern problems with the British at that time or whether the United States expected the British Government to make its own decisions for the area without consultation. (Telegram 3666 to London, November 21; ibid.)
5. During the Acting Secretary’s Staff Meeting that morning, the growing pressure on Lebanese President Camille Chamoun and the possibility of Egyptian involvement was discussed. (Tentative Notes by Greene, November 23; ibid., Secretary’s Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75)

6. Additional documentation indicates that other developments took place at this meeting that are not recorded here. According to a handwritten notation on this memorandum, Hoover handed to Eisenhower during the meeting an unsigned memorandum, dated November 23, containing a brief discussion of Macmillan’s suggestion that Lodge and Eisenhower make statements endorsing a position to be expressed in a forthcoming speech by Lloyd (see telegram 2871, Document 602). The memorandum, initialed by Eisenhower, recommended that the United States await Lloyd’s statement before making a decision. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File)

   Attached to the Department of State file copy of the memorandum printed here is a separate unsigned, undated memorandum entitled “Call on President” which contains a list of items which Hoover intended to raise with Eisenhower on November 23 and handwritten notations, presumably by Hoover, describing the President’s reaction. In addition to several points recorded here, it notes that Eisenhower preferred that Macmillan alone, rather than Butler or the two together, should visit the United States and that the timing should be dependent upon a withdrawal of forces from Egypt, an agreement with the Secretary-General on the Canal, and the attitude of the Arabs (which would probably be satisfactory after withdrawal). Eisenhower also agreed that the French could come later if they wished and that once a favorable reply was received from King Saud (see telegram 182, Document 586), the United States could proceed immediately with the MEEC plan. (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/11–2356)