567. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State1
574. Re Embtel 573.2 I saw Ben Gurion at his residence in Jerusalem this afternoon. He talked at such length that I again required heavy military escort for an after dark return to Tel Aviv.
He received me without any great warmth, I felt, and aside from his friendly opening comment of thanks for President’s message (Deptel 494)3 he spoke in serious and often sharp tones, raising his voice fit some emotion of occasion [sic]. The feeling and resentment I had expected last Thursday night when I repeated to him, as a supplement to President’s letter of November 7, the serious comments made to Minister Shiloah by Acting Secretary Hoover (Deptel 483),4 came forth with added emphasis today.
The Prime Minister launched at once [into] a spirited discussion of existing factors threatening peace in this area due primarily to the [Page 1108] Soviet penetration policies in Middle East as well as the effect of their recent oppressive action in Hungary on Arab thinking; prospect of Nasser’s resurgence or at least survival with Soviet help; distinct possibility of Soviet use of Syria as a penetration instrument; and in general, encouragement given in these fields by the current United States Middle East policy including threats to Israel regarding withdrawal of troops.
Prefacing his remarks with statement, “speaking as a member of free world and not only as Prime Minister of Israel, I offer the following humble opinion.” He then said in substance:
- (1)
- US Government is making mistake if it believes that Soviets’ brutal and oppressive acts in Hungary will create unfavorable impression among Arabs—on contrary, Arabs will admit Soviet is country which can act forcefully and promptly, even though ruthlessly, whereas United States uses words only. He said he had noted that Arabs, despite an obvious inconsistency in principle, voted in United Nations with Soviets on resolution demanding withdrawal of Soviet troops in Hungary. He expressed some surprise and regret over India’s mild treatment of Soviet act as compared with India’s denunciations of those forcefully opposing Nasser.
- (2)
- The Middle East area is in immediate and critical danger from Soviet action. Soviets are now or soon will supply arms, material and other forms of military assistance to Egypt and Syria. In this connection there are two great dangers to peace in the area—Nasser and President of Syria Quwwatli. He said neither are communists but both have community of interest with Soviets in taking over entire area. Hussein will go same way and Nuri Said’s days are numbered. Ben Gurion saw “the spector of entire Arab world, with African continent included later, under Soviet domination unless something is done soon to eliminate Nasser and Quwwatli”.
He is confident there are many liberal elements in both Egypt and Syria who hate Nasser and Quwwatli but they are not getting encouragement from United States. He cited as an example premature surrender in Port Said by Egyptian commander who did so, in his opinion, because of his hatred for Nasser. Prime Minister terminated this part of his conversation with statement that, “if United States does not act, whole Middle East and Africa are in danger—and with that free world is in danger”.
He said it was “an undeniable fact” that Nasser had opened Middle East and Africa to Soviet penetration and now Quwwatli was assisting him. He regretted to say it but United States had saved Nasser and continues to help him. Referring to his conversation with me last November (Embtel 515),5 he said, “I told you then that Nasser would endanger Middle East and Africa. Unfortunately, I was [Page 1109] right. Now it is a fact.” He noted United States was the only big western power to oppose destruction of Nasser.
He then referred to Mister Hoover’s strong words to Shiloah and seemed to be very much upset over threatening tone and actual threats contained therein. He felt these threats were unnecessary—that President’s letter was enough. He asked whether Nasser had ever been so strongly threatened—had he ever been threatened with expulsion from UN, or application of economic sanctions, et cetera because he defied Security Council resolution? Will anyone now speak to Nasser re demands of UN Charter that he live at peace with fellow members—or re principle of freedom of transit of Suez if he should undertake to deny such freedom? Will anybody threaten him now that he has Soviets firmly behind him, and especially after United States has issued such strong threats to Israel regarding withdrawal of her troops from Sinai? He agreed with President there should be peace with justice but he wanted justice for Israel.
Regarding the realistic threat of Nasser to area and especially to Israel, he said he was asking USG if it would be just that Egyptian forces return to Sinai territory and again threaten frontier of Israel with Soviet arms. (Commented that incidentally Sinai was not originally Egyptian territory but had been passed on to Egypt by British who obtained it from Turks.) He said Egyptian threat to Israel had been proven to be far greater than anyone imagined. Equipment and supplies captured by Israel forces in Sinai were on enormous side. There was far more Russian equipment and quality was far better than anyone had predicted. Furthermore, he was impressed with fact that, despite starving masses in Egypt, war rations for Egyptian officers were much better than those enjoyed by Israeli officers.
He then commented on colonialism. He said he knew United States does not think highly of colonialism and although he was not taking sides with French or United Kingdom he must point out that their brand of colonialism is quite different than that of Soviets. UK and France had in fact relaxed their policies to considerable extent— India for example, and Morocco and Tunisia. On other hand Soviets had no intention of releasing any of their satellites in Europe. At moment they were brutally destroying Hungary. Ben Gurion said he was surprised United States had sided with Soviets against British and French “at the beginning”.
With reference to his reply to President’s letter Prime Minister said “he would fulfill what he had undertaken” but he felt it his bounden duty to warn United States of consequences of its present Middle East policy on the free world. He said he hoped I would report his remarks in spirit in which he gave them (his concern for free world and peace in this area).
[Page 1110]At end he repeated his expressions of gratitude for President’s kind words of thanks. He said comments he had just uttered would have been made other night when I delivered President’s message but he did not want to couple them at that time with his reply. I noted his awareness of Soviet threat and felt confident his comments on all points raised would be read with interest by the Department.
Comment: I am inclined to believe Ben Gurion did not make his comment on Thursday night for a number of other reasons including: He had not fully felt the impact of our warnings, he was fully occupied with immediate problem of determining a policy, getting Cabinet approval, preparing broadcast and reply to President’s letter; that he has in meantime received some indication of breadth of public disapproval as well as sharpness of opposition of non-government parties especially Herut. Although he obtained Cabinet approval he merely informed leaders of opposition parties, and Begin, most important Herut party member, at meeting of Foreign Affairs and Security Committee Friday criticized government for entirely too precipitous decision. Begin, who was in Sinai, had not participated on Thursday with Ben Gurion when he informed opposition parties.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/11–1156. Secret; Priority. Received at 10:22 a.m.↩
- Telegram 573, November 10, reported that Eisenhower’s November 9 message to Ben Gurion (see footnote 4, Document 560) had been delivered at 3:55 p.m., November 10. (Department of State, Central Files, 711.11–EI/11–1056)↩
- Telegram 494, November 9, transmitted the text of Eisenhower’s November 9 message to Ben Gurion.↩
- Telegram 483, November 11, contained a summary of the points made by Hoover to Shiloah on November 7; see Document 551. (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/11–756)↩
- Vol. XIV, p. 784.↩