Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI

566. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, November 10, 1956¹

Washington, November 10, 1956

SUBJECT

• General Discussion of Current Situation

PARTICIPANTS

• Deputy Under Secretary Robert D. Murphy
• Mr. Herve Alphand, French Ambassador
• Mr. Charles Lucet, French Minister
• Mr. F. de Laboulaye, Counselor, French Embassy
• C. Burke Elbrick, EUR
• W. R. Tyler, WE

The Ambassador called at his request. He referred to his conversation with the President on November 8 and said he had been much encouraged by the President’s remarks on the need to do everything possible to strengthen the Western alliance.² The Ambassador said he had brought with him a reply from Prime Minister Mollet to the President’s letter of November 7, which emphasized the belief on the part of the French Government that a meeting of the three Western Heads of Government should be held as soon as possible.³

Mr. Murphy said that the President favored the idea of such a meeting, and fully recognized the importance of discussing matters of mutual interest, but that the problem was one of timing. It was most important, Mr. Murphy said, that nothing should be allowed to derogate or detract from the priority task of carrying out the UN resolution. To meet at this time would risk weakening the efforts of the UN, which should command the fullest support of us all, and be facilitated in every way. Ambassador Alphand agreed, but pointed out that the UN Resolution raised several extremely important questions which need answering and required immediate consultation first. As examples, he mentioned:

1) How long was the UN Force expected to stay? (The French feel that it should remain until peace with Egypt has been achieved and the Canal question settled.)

2) Where would it be stationed? (The French feel that Nasser’s ideas on this seem to be contrary to what is desirable.)

3) When will the UK and French forces be expected to withdraw? (The French insist on phasing out as the UN force takes over, progressively, and are not disposed to withdraw simultaneously with the arrival of the UN force’s first units.)

4) Will the area occupied by the UN force be entirely free of Egyptian forces?

The Ambassador stressed that the two major issues were: a) an Arab-Israeli peace settlement, and b) the settlement of the Suez Canal problem. The French Government, he said, is opposed to leaving these matters to the General Assembly. It feels strongly that they should be discussed and settled by the Security Council at the Foreign Ministers’ level.

Mr. Murphy reminded the Ambassador that the Security Council was subject to a Soviet veto, and that, for example, its decision of 1951 on Israeli shipping, had never been observed or enforced. The Ambassador replied that it was a vicious circle: the three were expected to defer their meeting in order not to diminish the chances of execution of the UN resolution, but the chances of execution themselves depended on the three meeting first and agreeing on what had to be done. He insisted on the need for reestablishing Western solidarity and said that the Secretary General of the UN could not be expected to settle problems which required the assent of the three powers. Both these considerations argued, in the view of the French Government, for an early meeting of the three. The Ambassador added that he thought that the delay should not be greater than a fortnight or so, and Mr. Murphy said that about a fortnight might be considered to be a suitable lapse of time.

Mr. Murphy said we had looked at the situation carefully and had concluded that the Security Council held out little chance of making progress, and that the best hope seemed to be to refer the two resolutions, on Suez and Palestine, to the General Assembly when it meets for the first regular session on November 12th. The Ambassador objected that this meant that the resolutions would certainly be voted before the three could meet, and that this would thereby prejudge the course of action to be taken, which should, on the contrary, first be determined by agreement between the three.

At this point the Ambassador discussed the substance of Prime Minister Mollet’s reply to the President and the justification for the French Government’s belief that the general situation was increasingly menacing. It was agreed that the Soviet Union was striving to create the impression that it was very active in behalf of Egypt and the Arab world, and that it wanted people to believe that it was prepared to send in volunteers at once—both in order to exert pressure on the UK and France, and to maintain its pose of the champion of the Arab cause. It was, however, difficult to determine how much of this was political warfare, and how much it corresponded to reality. Mr. Murphy said there was, no doubt, an orchestration of Soviet efforts to create a sense of menace and terror. On the other hand, we had no evidence that the Soviet Union had in fact embarked on a course leading to imminent aggression. He said the Soviet Union was in the somewhat awkward position of having to give the Arabs the impression that it was living up to its inflated promises and declarations. At the same time, we don’t really know what the Soviets have in mind, or what agreements they may have recently concluded with Syria.

The Ambassador mentioned the case of the super-tanker “Statue of Liberty” which was blocked in the Canal, and expressed his Government’s fears that the Egyptians might be intending to scuttle it, now that its Dutch crew had been ordered off by Egypt. Mr. Murphy said we had received similar news, and that we entertained similar apprehensions.

In conclusion, the Ambassador referred to the French request that we should agree to represent French interests in Saudi Arabia. He said the matter was most urgent and important. Mr. Murphy said we had cabled our Ambassador in Saudi Arabia to find out what the situation was, and were expecting a reply at any moment. He added that we would notify the French of our answer as soon as we were in a position to do so.⁴

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/11–1056. Secret. Drafted by Tyler.
2. A memorandum of this conversation by Elbrick is ibid., Presidential Memoranda of Conversations: Lot 66 D 149. According to the memorandum, Alphand told President Eisenhower that Soviet forces were massing in Eastern Europe and the French Government felt it would be helpful if Eisenhower could make it clear that the United States would stand with its allies, the United Kingdom and France, in the event of hostilities in Europe. In response, Eisenhower noted that two of his recent statements had been designed to express this position and that another such statement would not be timely. Prior to this meeting between Eisenhower and Alphand, Hoover had sent Eisenhower a memorandum which predicted Alphand’s request and recommended that Eisenhower refuse to issue another statement. (Ibid., Central Files, 611.51/11–856)

3. Hoover handcarried Mollet’s letter to the White House on November 10. A copy, under cover of a note from Howe to Goodpaster, is ibid., 396.1/11–1056.

   Regarding Eisenhower’s message to Mollet, transmitted to Paris in telegram 1725, November 7, see Document 545 and footnote 1 thereto.

4. On November 11, President Eisenhower sent the following response to Prime Minister Mollet:

   “I thank you for your message of November 10. You may be sure that we are very much aware of the importance of the problems you mentioned, and I also hope that we shall be able to meet soon and have a full exchange of views. However, I feel that the most important thing now is to give full and undivided support to the execution of the UN program, including the introduction of the UN forces and the withdrawal of the Anglo-French forces. It is my view that nothing should be done which might hinder or slow up this urgent task. After it has been carried out successfully, we should then be able to consider arrangements for a meeting. I have sent a similar message to Prime Minister Eden.”

   The Department of State transmitted the text of the message for delivery to Paris in telegram 1784, November 11. (Ibid., 320.5774/11–1156)