531. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State1

2238. Re Deptel 1708.2 Message reftel delivered by me to Mollet at 12:15 a.m. local 11:15 GMT. Pineau also present. Neither Mollet nor Pineau clear regarding desires of President in particular as to whether phrase “I sincerely hope that the UN proposal for the cease fire and the entry of UN troops are being accepted without conditions” was meant to include agreement to immediate evacuation of French-British forces and retreat of Israeli troops from Sinai area.

I suggested that Mollet call Eden for clarification which he did in my presence. Mollet reported Eden as saying that President only touched lightly on subject during their telephone conversation. Eden then said that it was impossible for French-British forces to withdraw until UN force arrives. He further said that UN force in British view could well be composed of elements from smaller countries as requested by UN proposal.

Mollet then ordered full Cabinet meeting to consider subject. It clear to me that he personally now prepared to accept UN force without French or British participation. Pineau in accord and this [Page 1034] will be French position if Cabinet approves which I consider probable.

French however will not withdraw forces until UN force in place and ready to function. French also wish U.S. to offer such arms as may be necessary to UN force. This also Eden’s position as reported by Mollet after telephone conversation.

Pineau also said U.S. must guarantee UN force. I pointed out this guarantee already implicit in President’s message which reasoning accepted by Mollet and eventually by Pineau.

I feel Mollet prepared give unequivocal favorable reply to President’s message provided no withdrawal French forces implied prior arrival UN force. Pineau however has more complex attitude and was worrying whether unconditional acceptance might not imply commitment to use force to insure return Israeli troops within frontiers Israel.

I endeavored keep problem within simple bounds of Presidential message and felt that Mollet not sympathetic to Pineau complexities. Council of Ministers may however be influenced by Pineau to some extent. Therefore exact form message French will send Hammarskjold remains unpredictable.

Dillon
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/11–656. Secret; Niact; Presidential Handling. Received at 8:35 p.m., November 6. A copy in the Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File bears the marginal notation by Goodpaster, “President informed”.
  2. See footnote 1, Document 527.