Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI

524. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, November 6, 1956¹

Washington , November 6, 1956

SUBJECT

• Message from the French Government to the President

PARTICIPANTS

• The Acting Secretary of State
• Mr. Robert Murphy—G
• Mr. C. Burke Elbrick—EUR
• Mr. William R. Tyler—WE
• Mr. Hervé Alphand, French Ambassador
• M. Charles Lucet, French Minister

The Acting Secretary received the French Ambassador who said that he was under instructions from his Government to see the President urgently in order to deliver a message to him. The Acting Secretary explained that the President was out of town,² but that he would be glad to convey to him any message which the French Ambassador might have for him. Ambassador Alphand expressed his thanks and proceeded to summarize the substance of his Government’s message to the President as follows:

The French Government is greatly concerned by the threat in the letter from Bulganin to Eden and Mollet,³ and cannot exclude the possibility of an attack by the Soviet Union against the UK and France. The French Government does not know what form this might take. However, the Ambassador said that his Government is in possession of intelligence reports from Central Europe of a concentration of Soviet divisions in Czechoslovakia, with a possible threat to Austria. The Ambassador was instructed to tell the U.S. Government of the importance the French Government attaches to the Soviet Union being warned in advance of the result of such a threat of attack, by the U.S. Government recalling the existence of the North Atlantic Treaty, and its commitment to resist any attack against its allies. Because of the gravity of this message, the Ambassador was instructed to deliver it personally to the President. The Ambassador subsequently made two further points: first, the reference to the Austrian situation was given only as an example, since the French Government is aware that Austria is outside the NATO area and guaranteed by the United States; and second, the French strongly agree with the view, often expressed by the Secretary of State, that miscalculation by a potential enemy can be avoided if a clear warning is given of the consequences of aggression.⁴

The Acting Secretary, in reply, said he fully recognized the importance of the French Government’s message. He emphasized that the only way to get the situation back on the tracks was for the French and British Governments to accept unequivocally and unconditionally the UN resolution calling for a cease fire, with the withdrawal of forces, and the acceptance of a UN police force. The Ambassador suggested that this was a different matter, to which the Acting Secretary replied that on the contrary, the two were intimately related. He added that we had just heard unofficially that the French and British Governments had accepted the UN resolution. The French Ambassador said he was not informed of this, and then referred to the Swiss proposal for a meeting of the five heads of Government. The Acting Secretary said the U.S. Government appreciates the sincerity of the Swiss proposal but that it could not be even considered before the UN resolution had been accepted and acted upon.⁵

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751.5/11–656. Secret. Drafted by Tyler.
2. On the morning of November 6, President and Mrs. Eisenhower drove to Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, to vote in the national elections. He returned by plane to Washington, arriving at the White House at 12:38 p.m. (Record of the President’s Daily Appointments; Eisenhower Library)
3. See footnote 2, Document 511.

4. A handwritten notation by Tyler on a typed “Memorandum from the Government of the French Republic to the President of the United States of America”, reads: “This the only copy of the Nov. 6 message from Mollet to the President, which Ambassador Alphand handed me informally on Nov. 7, 1956.” The text of the memorandum reads: “In view of the threat contained in the letter addressed by Marshal Bulganin to the governments of the United Kingdom and France, the French government does not exclude the possibility that an attack can be directed by the Soviet Union against both countries, in a way which it is obviously impossible to foresee.

   “The French Government desires to bring to your attention highly reliable intelligence reports indicating troop movements in Central Europe and notably in Czechoslovakia, which constitutes a threat to Austria.

   “It is essential that the United States government should make known in advance its attitude by confirming in a non-equivocal way that the provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty would apply immediately upon a Soviet attack directed against the allies of the United States.” (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, DeGaulle, Mollet, Gaillard 7/56 thru 1/61)

5. A short time after this conversation, Alphand telephoned Tyler and said that he was extremely worried by the thought that Hoover might have intended to convey the idea that unless the French and British Governments agreed to accept the U.N. resolution, the United States would consider itself released from its obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty. Tyler told Alphand that there was not the least justification for his concern; Hoover had very clearly addressed himself exclusively to the point that the United States felt that in order to get the general situation back on the tracks, it was essential that the British and French Governments should accept the United Nations resolution. Alphand said he was greatly relieved to hear this. (Memorandum of telephone conversation by Tyler, November 6; ibid., Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199)