Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI

462. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State Washington, November 1, 1956, 2:08 p.m.¹

Washington , November 1, 1956, 2:08 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Question of Projects for Assistance to Israel, and Related Matters

PARTICIPANTS

• Ambassador Abba Eban, Israeli Ambassador Minister Shiloah, Embassy of Israel
• The Secretary
• NE—Fraser Wilkins

The Secretary said Ambassador Eban must have surmised recent developments had made it necessary for the United States to review projects for assistance to Israel and related matters. He asked Ambassador Eban if he had anything to say which would have a bearing on this question.

Ambassador Eban replied he wished to make a personal observation that his remarks in the past had been based on his knowledge of Israeli policy. The Secretary responded that he had no personal feelings and that he relied upon what governments did rather than on their statements alone.

Ambassador Eban said he had just spoken to Prime Minister Ben Gurion. Ambassador Eban said there had been a complete collapse of Nasser’s forces in the Sinai Peninsula. They were in headlong flight toward the Suez Canal and were leaving all of their military equipment behind them, including hundreds of Soviet tanks, guns and other Soviet matériel.

Ambassador Eban believed that with the fall of Nasser we were now standing at a crossroads of history which was equivalent to the collapse of other dictatorships in the past. The spread of Soviet Communism which had been the mainstay of Nasser’s regime had also been checked. These developments in the Near East were equivalent to the defeat of Soviet Communism in Eastern Europe. The opportunity for peace among Near Eastern states which had been missed in 1948 was now possible in 1956. Ambassador Eban urged the United States to seize this opportunity.

Ambassador Eban continued that the Government of Israel appreciated the moral and economic assistance which it had received from the United States. He realized that during recent months there had been differences of judgment between Israel and the United States regarding developments in the Near East. He recalled the President’s belief that in spite of differences in judgment between countries, they should endeavor to maintain their friendship. Ambassador Eban thought that the United States would act as Israel had if it had been confronted with the same type of threat on its frontiers and that Israel was entitled to take such steps as it considered necessary for its defense.

Ambassador Eban reiterated that Israel desired no territorial gain in Egypt and that Israel had only acted because of the mortal threat which Egypt presented. Prime Minister Ben Gurion wished him to say Israel believed the general armistice agreement should be restored. The Government of Israel would be prepared to undertake withdrawal from its present position in Egypt to the armistice line provided there were binding undertakings that threats to Israel’s security would be removed, including fedayeen activity, and that Israel’s maritime freedom would be respected, including passage of the Suez Canal. Prime Minister Ben Gurion also wished him to say that as Israel had become linked with two other friendly nations in its action it would be bound to take counsel with them on any proposal for the withdrawal of forces.

The Secretary said we should not limit our consideration to regrets about the past. He believed, however, that current developments had been a grave blow to the structure of peace and to the United Nations. It would not be possible just to wipe out events that have been taking place. We should not think only in terms of returning to the status quo ante but in terms of the precedent which might be set that any nation which is harassed could strike back with military force. Could we say that Pakistan could strike at India? If so, military anarchy would result. Mr. Shiloah intervened that Pakistan might find it necessary to strike if Indian leaders uttered threats against it. Had any Indian leader so spoken? The Secretary responded that public leaders of many countries were given to public statement but it was not what they said but the sum total of their actions that counted. The Secretary repeated that a return to the status quo ante was not enough and that we should adhere to the principles and purposes of the United Nations. Any immediate gain achieved through force would weigh lightly in the balance.

The Secretary and Ambassador Eban agreed that as they were both leaving for New York in a matter of minutes, they could continue their discussion there.

Ambassador Eban and Minister Shiloah later told Mr. Wilkins that Prime Minister Ben Gurion planned shortly, perhaps tonight, to make a statement during which he would stress the leading role which President Eisenhower had been playing in efforts towards a restoration of peace. Ambassador Eban hoped that the United States in considering steps which it might take with respect to countries engaged in hostilities in the Near East would not treat Israel any differently than it did any of the other countries.²

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/11–156. Confidential. Drafted by Wilkins on November 5. The time of the meeting is from Dulles’ Appointment Book. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers)

   Shortly before this meeting with Eban, Dulles told Attorney General Brownell over the telephone that he had decided against making a public announcement concerning the U.S. suspension of shipments to Israel. (Memorandum of telephone conversation by Bernau, November 1, 2:01 p.m.; Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations)

2. Following this conversation, Dulles telephoned Allen Dulles at 2:26 p.m. Their conversation, as transcribed by Bernau, went as follows: “The Sec. said as a matter of intelligence, Eban came to see him and talked to Ben Gurion half an hour ago. The Egyptian forces had been completely defeated in the Gaza area—fleeing back and abandoning great quantities of Soviet equipment. He was in a very jubilant mood… . The Sec. said we probably will call for a cease-fire.” (Ibid.) Secretary Dulles then departed for the Military Air Transport Service terminal and at 3 p.m. left for New York. (Chronology for November 1; Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 803)