Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI

461. Memorandum by the President¹

Washington , November 1, 1956 .

1. The first objective of the United Nations should be to achieve a cease-fire because this will:

(a) Keep the war from spreading.

(b) Give time to find out what each side is trying to gain.

(c) Develop a final resolution that will represent the considered judgment of the United Nations respecting past blame and future action.

2. The United States must lead because:

(a) While we want to do all the things in 1 above, we want to prevent immediate issuance by the United Nations of a harshly worded resolution that would put us in an acutely embarrassing position, either with France and Britain or with all the rest of the world.

(b) At all costs the Soviets must be prevented from seizing a mantle of world leadership through a false but convincing exhibition of concern for smaller nations. Since Africa and Asia almost unanimously hate one of the three nations Britain, France and Israel, the Soviets need only to propose severe and immediate punishment of these three to have the whole of two continents on their side; unless a good many of the United Nations nations are already committed to something more moderate that we might immediately formulate. We should act speedily so as to have our forces in good order by 5:00 p.m. today.

(c) We provide the West’s only hope that some vestige of real political and economic union can be preserved with the Moslem world, indeed, possibly also with India.

3. Unilateral actions now taken by the United States must not single out and condemn any one nation—but should serve to emphasize to the world our hope for a quick cease-fire to be followed by sane and deliberate action on the part of the United Nations, resulting, hopefully, in a solution to which all parties would adhere by each conceding something.

4. We should be expected, I think, to suspend governmental shipments, now, to countries in battle areas and be prepared to agree, in concert with others, to later additional action.

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Memoranda. Attached to the source text is a note from Eisenhower to Dulles, dated November 1, which reads: “Just some simple thoughts that I have jotted down since our meeting this morning.” Eisenhower initialed the note.

   According to the record of President’s Daily Appointments, Dulles met with Eisenhower at the White House from 12:50 to 1:27 p.m. on November 1. (Ibid.) No account of this conversation has been found in the Eisenhower Library.