Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI

459. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State¹

Paris, November 1, 1956—1 p.m.

2123. Following is description of events leading up to Suez hostilities given me by Pineau this morning. Pineau said that from the beginning French had considered the seizure of Suez Canal as a much more serious matter than did the United States. French looked upon this action as merely a step in Nasser’s march toward domination of the whole of Middle East and North Africa. Therefore, French, as they explained at the time, felt that it was vitally necessary to take energetic action to cause prompt loss of face to Nasser. Pineau said that French were convinced if situation was allowed to drag time would work for Nasser and Soviet Union against the Western powers, including the United States. He said French were convinced that American influence throughout area had no possibility of withstanding the Soviet infiltrations backed as they were by Nasser. Pineau said that this obviously was a fundamental difference in the evaluation of the situation by France and Great Britain on one hand and by the United States on other hand. Pineau then mentioned confidential démarche made to French by Sultan of Morocco and Bourguiba indicating that unless drastic action was taken against Nasser their position would be hopelessly compromised, and he said Great Britain had received similar information from Iraqi Government.

Pineau said that while French Government had been shocked and upset by casual attitude of Murphy on his arrival in London immediately after crisis, they had felt that Secretary had at that time understood seriousness of situation. Pineau said that he and French Government were well satisfied with results at first London conference and that on departure of Menzies mission for Cairo had really believed that it might be possible to avoid military action.

Pineau then said that divergence between United States and Franco-British policy first became acute after failure of Menzies mission when Secretary opposed an immediate recourse to United Nations Security Council, and instead suggested creation of Users Association. Pineau said that misunderstanding regarding fundamental purposes of Users Association was total. He said that French and British had originally considered that Secretary had suggested creation of this Association for purpose of bringing strong moral and economic pressure on Egypt as an alternative to military action. However, it rapidly became obvious that this was not the purpose of the United States. From the French point of view the Users Association as it emerged from second London conference, and in particular after it became apparent that United States was not prepared to use it as a means of denying Canal dues to Egypt, was a totally useless exercise. Pineau then discussed Security Council meeting which dealt with Suez and said that from French and British point of view the results had been inadequate as there was no indication that Egypt would agree to international administration of the Canal and therefore there had been no loss of prestige for Nasser.

Shortly after conclusion of Security Council meeting and after Pineau’s return to Paris, Israelis approached the French and said that Israel had determined that she must act in self defense. Israelis told French that they had reached conclusion that United States had in effect decided to side with Nasser as against Israel and to allow the annihilation of Israel. The Israelis further said that in view of the rapid increase in Egyptian military capability due to the receipt of increasing quantities of Soviet arms, the fate of Israel would be sealed in a few months time. Matter was then taken up with United Kingdom Government and general agreement on present course of action was reached. Final decisions were taken during the course of Eden-Lloyd visit to Paris and decision was taken jointly by United Kingdom and French not to inform the United States. Both governments felt convinced that United States was in error regarding its evaluation of the danger of Nasser and considered that prior consultation with United States on this subject would serve no useful purpose.

I thanked Pineau for his frank exposé and said that there was one question I would like to ask which was not clear to me, and that was how the question of entry of Iraqi troops into Jordan figured in this affair. Pineau replied that discussions on that subject were primarily a smoke screen to divert attention from the decision to undertake a joint operation against Egypt.

I then asked Pineau what the objectives of the joint action were. Pineau replied the Israeli objective was the total destruction or capture of all Egyptian forces east of Suez and that Franco-British objective was the occupation of the Suez Canal zone. He emphatically denied any intention of extending the Franco-British occupation further into Egypt. I then asked Pineau what were French and British intentions regarding Nasser. He replied that this was a matter which would have to be left up to the Egyptian people and he said that French and British realized that they could not impose a government on Egypt. He said he hoped that the Egyptian people seeing the catastrophe which Nasser had prepared for them would themselves in due course act to get rid [of] him. In answer to a further question Pineau said that Israelis expected to complete their military operations in another two or three days and that French and British felt that occupation of Canal Zone could be completed in 8 to 10 days at a maximum. As to ultimate objectives, Pineau and French and British felt that a conference should be called whose membership should be very carefully thought out. The Soviet Union would obviously have to be a member, but care should be taken to limit the membership of disruptive nations. He felt that this conference might settle all the outstanding problems in the Middle East once and for all. He listed these problems as:

1. Arab-Israeli Peace Treaty.

2. Status of Suez Canal.

3. Future status of Jordan.

In terminating Pineau felt that he should tell me that French Government considered that while communications from President Eisenhower had been very measured and his television speech had contained nothing to which they could take exception, they had felt that public position taken by United States at United Nations and words used by United States delegate during debate there had been unnecessarily violent and had caused unnecessary damage to Franco-American relations. Pineau said that once this affair was settled he and French Government would devote all their energies to repairing breach in Atlantic alliance but they hoped that United States in meanwhile would exercise care and moderation in public utterances so as not to render this task more difficult.²

Dillon

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 651.74/11–156. Secret; Priority. Received at 12:11 p.m. Repeated to USUN and London. The time of transmission on the source text (11 p.m.) is in error. According to the sequence of telegrams from Paris, telegram 2123 was evidently sent at 1 p.m.
2. Rountree and Dulles discussed telegram 2123 during a telephone conversation on November 2: “Mr Rountree said he just read Dulles’ telegram from Dillon, wherein Pineau has told him the whole unmitigated story, explaining the whole thing in cold facts. Dulles asked if the British are involved—Rountree said Oh, yes. Israelis approached them immediately after Security Council meeting in N.Y. (Israelis meeting held in Paris.) That is when they were firmed up— that is when we knew they were firmed up. The Baghdad thing was a complete smoke-screen, just to divert attention. Mr. Dulles commented that it is all very interesting—Mr. Rountree added, particularly so in view of communications which came from the top level.” (Memorandum of telephone conversation prepared in the Office of the President, 4:36 p.m., November 2; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries)