458. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the Secretary of State and the Director of Central Intelligence (Dulles) Washington, November 1, 1956, 11:58 a.m.1
TELEPHONE CALL TO ALLEN DULLES
The Sec. asked if he gathered from what A [Hen] said that he thinks Nasser may be toppling. Yes—he just had a pretty complete briefing on the military situation and thinks he is pretty well on the ropes. They think his air force will be knocked out by tonight. The Israeli troops are better. After the Sec. left2 and the question came up and Radford and A. slightly differed. A. thinks Nasser might accept a cease-fire. He is up against overwhelming force. He does not think his military potential is very high and thinks he realizes it. The Sec. said no one thought they were going to win an old-fashioned war. The Sec. assumed the millitary collapse but wondered re Soviet infiltration, economics etc.—there is no question of the Arab world feeling. A. said that is not a good place for guerrilla warfare. There may be fighting in Cairo but he would imagine the Br would hold on the Canal. The Sec. assumed war would be carried on not primarily in Egypt but along the Persian Gulf and North Africa. A. said the area will be in flames but the military flames may not be so bright as they don’t have much. The Sec. said there would be a strain on the Br and Fr and it will be economic and quickly— the oil problem will be acute pretty soon. A. would not take small measures against Israel—wait if you can. The Sec. said we are not [Page 919] making any statement but in fact are suspending shipment of arms of military stuff and economic assistance programs but not announcing sanctions against Israel. A. asked if the Sec. were going for a cease-fire or withdrawal in the UN Res. The Sec. said he does not know. A. thinks he [we] would more likely get a cease-fire. The Sec. said you can’t get one which will be effective—a lot of underground business. A. said true but you are working for time, for where do we go from here, aren’t you? A. said it would be difficult for a ceasefire in the Sinai peninsula. The Sec. asked does it mean anything? Then A. said yes—you only have hours and have to get something understandable to the people and not too complicated—simple and dramatic and then grapple with the difficulties later. A. is inclined to think Nasser might take it. They have not shown up well—not prepared. A. complimented the Sec. on his presentation.
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations. Transcribed by Bernau.↩
- Reference is presumably to the Secretary leaving the 302d meeting of the NSC that morning; see Document 455.↩