Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI

406. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, October 29, 1956¹

Washington, October 29, 1956

SUBJECT

• Tense Situation in the Near East and Israeli Mobilization

PARTICIPANTS

• Ambassador Abba Eban, Embassy of Israel
• Mr. Reuven Shiloah, Minister, Embassy of Israel
• NEA—William M. Rountree
• NE—Fraser Wilkins

Ambassador Eban called at his own request today. He thought it would be desirable to keep in touch daily during the present tense situation in the Near East. He said he had received a report of Prime Minister Ben Gurion’s discussion of October 28 with Ambassador Lawson² which fully confirmed the sense of Ambassador Eban’s own remarks to the Secretary on October 28 that the Israeli mobilization had been purely precautionary and protective. Ambassador Eban observed that, on the other hand, there were abundant signs in the Arab states of preparations for an attack on Israel. Three fedayeen units had been captured, which was clearly indicative of Arab aggression against Israel. The Egyptian Navy was moving toward Israeli waters. Egypt, Syria and Jordan had established a joint command. At a recent meeting decisions had been reached to intensify and concentrate fedayeen activities in Israel. Fedayeen activity was as much a method of warfare as would be an invasion by regular armed units; consequently, it was necessary for Israel to take precautions. Prime Minister Ben Gurion had said that he would be happy if peace and tranquillity could be preserved between Israel and its Arab neighbors and that the United States need have no concern if it were able to restrain the Arab states.

Ambassador Eban and Mr. Shiloah emphasized their regret that Senator George reportedly stated on leaving a briefing session between the Secretary and several Congressmen that there was some doubt that the United States would be able to restrain Israel. Ambassador Eban categorically rejected the implication contained in the statement that Israel would attack. No danger arose from Israeli defensive measures. The American press was distorting the situation. It was saying that Israel was moving at this time because Jordan was weak, because the Soviet Union was busy in Eastern Europe and because Egypt was preoccupied with the British and French over Suez. Ambassador Eban urged that the Department take such steps as necessary to prevent such speculation by the American press. He hoped that the interpretations which he had today read in the press were not an accurate reflection of statements by Departmental spokesmen.

Ambassador Eban recalled the Secretary had told him on October 28 he believed Israel had never been safer than it now was. Ambassador Eban thought the United States’ analysis and the Israeli analysis of the situation had never been further apart. The Government of Israel thought the danger was now greater than it had ever been. He asked if the Department had any specific information or any assurances from the Arab states on which the Secretary’s remarks might have been based.

Ambassador Eban said the Government of Israel had been surprised to read in the press that the United States had renewed its economic aid program to Egypt. Israel believed that this would result in further inflation of Nasser’s prestige and would strengthen his hegemony in the area. Ambassador Eban asked if the United States had now decided to assist Nasser.

Mr. Rountree said he appreciated Ambassador Eban’s account of Prime Minister Ben Gurion’s conversation with Ambassador Lawson. He wanted Ambassador Eban to know that the United States was deeply concerned and wished to stress that we could only look at the facts and not the intentions to evaluate the dangers inherent in the situation. It went without saying that the Government of Israel was entitled to take measures within Israel for its self defense. In the absence of evidence of attack by the Arab states, however, Israeli mobilization might understandably lead to apprehension in the Arab states. The President had expressed his deep concern to the Arab states as well as Israel. We had no knowledge of the intentions of the Arab states nor could we provide Israel with assurances it would not be attacked. We had, however, examined the general situation in the area and saw no reason for concern at this time in Egypt or in Syria, although there was evidence of extreme tension in Jordan. There was no question in our minds that Israel could move defensively within Israel. The United States hoped both sides would take steps to preserve peace and tranquillity and viewed aggressive action by either side with equally deep concern.

Mr. Rountree said that he was unable to throw any light on the newspaper articles to which Ambassador Eban referred. At this time there was considerable interest in Middle Eastern developments. Speculation naturally resulted. He was certain, however, that no responsible officials in the Department of State would comment in a one-sided way. He had not been present when Senator George and other Congressmen had talked with the Secretary, but understood the Secretary had explained the situation in the Near East in perspective. Senator George’s comment could not be taken as epitomizing the substance of the Secretary’s remarks to the Congressmen on Egypt.

Mr. Rountree continued that the United States had never terminated its aid mission in Egypt. In 1955 a program for development assistance had been drawn up. Commitments and contracts had been entered into between the Government of Egypt and private suppliers. It had taken several years to produce and ship items thereunder. Penalty clauses affecting private contractors were attached to some of these contractual relations. We were following all shipments carefully. There were no new PL 480 programs, nor additional commitments for CARE. It could not be said as Ambassador Eban had indicated that the United States was taking steps to strengthen the Egyptian position or increase the prestige of Nasser. It was clear from an analysis of the facts that recent press accounts had been misleading.

Ambassador Eban and Mr. Shiloah also commented that press accounts of United States aid to Egypt were having an important political effect. Ambassador Eban said there had never been a case when Israel had urged the United States not to give economic aid to an Arab country. Israel had only asked that military aid not be given to Arab countries. If only CARE and PL 480 were involved, he would not have mentioned it today. He understood that present commitments to Egypt included locomotives, engines and similar items. If the United States permitted such items to go forward, the public would believe Egypt had come out on top in the Suez Canal question. Eban believed further evidence of Egyptian success could be found in reports of a Suez compromise. This compromise would not provide for the passage of Israeli shipments through the Suez Canal. The net result was a growing lack of confidence in the outcome of the Suez controversy.

Ambassador Eban and Mr. Shiloah returned to the question of Israeli mobilization and noted Prime Minister Ben Gurion had emphasized an important military difference between Israel and the Arab states. The Arab states had large standing armies whereas Israeli forces were small; consequently, any increase through calling up Israeli reserves would be conspicuous. Both Israeli representatives emphasized at some length the importance of renewed fedayeen activities. It was their view that fedayeen units should be regarded as similar to regular military units. Minister Shiloah said that although each fedayeen incident might seem small, they were now being conducted on such an intensive scale that they were tantamount to large-scale attacks. Ambassador Eban thought that Israel would have the right to protest against fedayeen activity under the UN Charter. He noted that the President had said on April 9, 1956 that the United States would assist a victim of aggression. It would be desirable, accordingly, to define aggression. It seemed to him that fedayeen activity could be described as aggressive and hoped that we would make this point to the Arab countries. At the present time the Arabs thought they could get away with fedayeen activity under the UN Charter in the sense that they had found a new way of fighting which could not be called aggression.

Minister Shiloah thought it would be beneficial if the Department could take steps to repair the public impression that Israel had become a trouble maker. He realized that the Department was not responsible for comments in the press but he thought we might find ways to correct through background press conferences.

Mr. Rountree said that it had never been the desire of the Department to present a lopsided account of an existing situation. At the present time the Near Eastern atmosphere was tense and highly charged. In making U.S. concern known, we had presented our views to the press, to the Congress and to other governments in a balanced objective manner.

Mr. Rountree reiterated that he did not challenge Israel’s right to take action within Israel. He earnestly hoped there was no cause for concern as a result of Israeli mobilization. He noted that mobilizations were generally followed by military activity. He added that in so far as fedayeen activity was concerned there might be differences of opinion among various UN members as to whether it constituted aggression. He thought it important that there be maximum cooperation with the United Nations in the maintenance of peace and tranquillity between Israel and its Arab neighbors. Mr. Rountree referred to pending negotiations between Britain, France and Egypt and noted that they were suspended at the present moment. The United States continued to support the six principles on which agreement had been achieved in the Security Council and the proposal supported by the 18 powers in London. The United States had no thought of other settlements. There was also general agreement among the members of SCUA with regard to its basic objectives, although certain differences of views had appeared on some other points.

Mr. Wilkins, who was called from the meeting at this point, returned with press tickers reporting that Israeli forces had invaded Egypt and had taken up positions near the Suez Canal.³ Mr. Rountree remarked that we had obviously been having an academic discussion. Ambassador Eban said he would be returning immediately to the Israeli Embassy where he hoped to receive further information.⁴

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/10–2956. Confidential. Drafted by Wilkins on October 31.
2. Summarized in telegram 424, Document 401.
3. Telegram 443, October 29, reported that the spokesman of the Israeli Army had made the following announcement: “Units of Israel defense forces have penetrated and attacked Fedayeen bases in the Kuntilla and Ras el Naqeb area and have taken up positions west of Nahel road junction towards the Suez Canal. This operation was necessitated by the continuous Egyptian military attacks on citizens and on Israel land and sea communications, the purpose of which was to cause destruction and to deprive the people of Israel of the possibility of peaceful existence.” (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/10–2956) This telegram was received in the Department of State at 4:45 p.m. A statement issued that same day by the Israeli Foreign Ministry is printed in United States Policy in the Middle East, September 1956–June 1957, pp. 135–137.

4. At 3:40 p.m. on October 29, Dulles telephoned Lodge in New York. Their conversation went as follows:

   “The Sec. said the Israelis have moved into Egyptian territory. We don’t know yet in what force or whether it is a raid from which they will retire etc. The Br. and Fr. are coming in and we will see if they will act in the UN calling upon the Israelis to withdraw. Partly it is to smoke them out to see where they stand. L. said the [Security Council] meeting tomorrow is on Palestine and the plan was for Hammarskjold to make a statement—stalling device to carry over until next week. L. thought of getting the Chinese to ask the purpose of the mobilization but they agreed it looks as if this overtakes it all. The Sec. said but you can’t be sure although it increases the likelihood of a major war. Hammarskjold has a telegram (2) from Burns and they are on the wire. It confirms what the Sec. said earlier in the conv. L. said he cancelled the thing in LA. Wilkins got on and someone from the Mission read the telegrams.” (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations) The texts of the two telegrams from Burns were transmitted to the Department in telegram 432 from USUN, October 29, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/10–2956)