401. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State1
424. Reference: Department telegram 355.2 I delivered President’s message to Ben Gurion at his home in Tel Aviv at 8 p.m. He appeared tired and voice weak. He promised written reply, which he said he hoped I would cable, by morning, but he then responded orally to me using with elaboration self-exculpating explanation Foreign Ministry gave Embassy official Friday (Embtel 419)3 he said:
While Iraq’s interest in penetration of Jordan remained threat, it was greatly over-shadowed by new military alliance of Egypt, Jordan and Syria which tightened noose around Israel’s neck. Almost immediately after Jordan elections, Hussein announced his determination to fight Israel. Now there was unified tripartite military command [Page 812] which “even child knows is not directed against US, Soviet or even Britain”.
He continued: “We don’t know from what point of ring around us we can expect attack if it is going to come. It may start from Syria where we have many settlements, or Jordan, or in south. We decided it was necessary to mobilize few battalions to face seven brigades which Syria has; put some on Jordan border; and few more in south. Mobilization is purely precautionary measure imposed on us by events. We shall be as happy as President if things remain quiet”.
Against this encircling hostility, he repeated he had been obliged to call up “few more units”. Such call up was conspicuous because unlike Arabs, who had large standing armies Israel had to rely on reserves. It had only tiny permanent establishment, maintained to manage military stores, camps and equipment and to receive and train new recruits. “We decided Friday and Saturday to mobilize few more units of our reserves. Then if we are attacked, they can hold line until rest are mobilized”.
Developing his case of Israel being obliged to put itself in defensive posture from feeling of insecurity and frustration, he reviewed “disappointment” with SC decision on canal which he said had assured free transit to everyone but Israel. He declared Egyptian Cabinet member after Council meeting had specifically excluded Israel, and he said even “our good friend India” has declared that remedy for Israel lies in international court.
But even more important to Israel, he said, was Jordan and Egyptian blockade of Straits of Tiran which threatened Israel’s very existence by choking flow of Israel manufactured goods to probably only real markets available to them in Asia and Africa.
In view of fact Ben Gurion spent so much time and effort in defense of his mobilization activity, I told him that my interpretation of President’s letter was not that he objected so much to mobilization as such and for self defense but that he feared there might be elements and local developments not confined to self defense—that hostilities might come from such action.
He replied US would have no reason to worry if it succeeded in persuading other people to keep peace but “I am not sure you will succeed”.
On question of safety US nationals, he avoided giving me unequivocal assurances, saying however, “I don’t think there is any danger.” We talked about air activity re my problem of women and children for whose safety as well as for all US nationals I had evacuation plan to invoke if necessary. He replied, “I cannot be certain but I think there is now sufficient means for aerial protection. We hope to intercept them before they come. We have good [Page 813] radar installations, but I cannot tell you with certainty that none would get through.”
I raised question of Fedayeen as danger to US nationals. He admitted they were constant threat, although he said he did not think their activities would be directed against non-Jews.
Comment: Ben Gurion was in good spirits, despite degree or two of fever for which he had had medical attention today, and was very cordial to me. However, I felt he was deliberately minimizing extent of mobilization which still appears very large and is not to be dismissed in terms of “few battalions”. He spoke, I felt, with considerable and deliberate caution and was not very effective in creating feeling of assurance there will be no hostilities.4
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/10–2856. Secret; Niact. Received at 10:13 p.m., October 28.↩
- Telegram 355 transmitted Eisenhower’s message to Ben Gurion, Document 388.↩
- See Document 382.↩
- Early the next morning, the Embassy in Tel Aviv informed the Department that the President’s message of October 28 to Ben Gurion had been delivered to the office of Ben Gurion’s military aide at 5:35 a.m., October 29. (Telegram 426, October 29; Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/10–2956)↩