Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI

405. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State¹

London, October 29, 1956—1 p.m.

2322. Reference: Embtel 2317² and Deptel 3009.³ In two and half hour private conversation with Lloyd last evening, at which Barbour and Beeley also present, we discussed Middle East, Suez, Algeria (reported separately)⁴ and Cyprus (also reported separately.)⁵ Re Middle East and Arab-Israel situation in particular, Lloyd equally concerned with us over Israeli mobilization, and said with feeling, and I believe evident conviction, that major Israeli attack either on Jordan or Egypt at this time would put Britain in impossible situation. Although British also have reports Israeli troop movements south rather than east, Lloyd inclined believe Israeli attack more likely to be directed against Jordan than Egypt. While he noted that Israelis apparently have a recent Egyptian foray against Israel which they could use as pretext for reprisal, he unwilling believe Israelis would launch full scale attack Egypt despite temptation to do so, in present circumstances. He also said categorically his recent conversations with French give him no reason believe French are stimulating such an Israeli venture, although he has reports that Israelis may have received additional Mysteres in last few days. Lloyd’s major concern is threat further large-scale attacks on Jordan which he feels might be decisive in the present state of Jordanian weakness. His apprehension extends to speculating that Jordan could be lost entirely in the near future, with disastrous repercussions in Iraq and consequently on the Baghdad pact. He said UK might even have to try to get out of its commitment to Jordan. Meanwhile, he also fears a coup in Libya, where his information indicates Egyptian penetration is so extensive as to make a coup possible at any time. Lloyd repeatedly emphasized the seriousness of the position in which Britain would find itself in the event of an all-out Israeli attack either on Jordan or on Egypt in the light of the UK-Jordan treaty and the Tripartite Declaration, and although he reiterated that he still would like to see something happen to Nasser, his concern over the consequences of Israeli initiative carried sufficient conviction for me to conclude that any UK complicity in such a move is unlikely. Similarly, I thought his doubts that French would find it in their interests to stimulate Israeli ventures at this time are genuine. This connection, we mentioned possibility French might be exploiting Athos arms case as pretext direct action against Egypt. Lloyd discounted that idea believing French motivated by desire strengthen case against General Assembly consideration of Algeria. He did note, however, that apparently virtually all French Cabinet except Pineau is more inclined toward direct action against Egypt than continuance of efforts find peaceful solution Canal problem through further negotiation.

Concerning Suez, discussion covered status and prospects resumption negotiations with Egyptians and SCUA with particular reference to payment Canal tolls. Lloyd confirmed information I have previously reported,⁶ that Hammerskjold is now trying to get Egyptian concurrence in statement its position which will constitute Egyptian proposal for implementation six principles agreed by Security Council and thus constitute basis for resumption negotiations. Lloyd is still optimistic that Egyptian action along that line will be forthcoming within the next few days and that consequently negotiations may be resumed promptly, possibly though not ideally behind the scenes in New York before and during the General Assembly. Lloyd intends proceed New York in advance of Assembly meeting. Lloyd gave fuller information re his last meeting with Pineau, which differs somewhat from reports obtained from other sources. He said he asked Pineau to come London to convince him generally of necessity proceeding with further negotiations toward peaceful settlement Suez situation. French Cabinet broadly reluctant pursue matter through negotiations, preferring invoke stronger measures presumably economic since military force not advocated this time. Lloyd, whose Cabinet colleagues are also not united behind desirability further negotiations but are prepared to give him reasonable period in which to seek negotiated solution, believes that he succeeded convincing Pineau negotiations should be pressed. He is not sure how Pineau will make out in persuading the French Cabinet, but believes they will concur if something is forthcoming from the Egyptians without too much delay.

On SCUA and Canal tolls, we went over carefully the communications which you and Lloyd have exchanged, ending with your message Deptel 2851.⁷ I took line that on my reading of that message gap between US and HMG, regarding both concept of SCUA and the specific problem of Canal tolls, is less real than apparent, and that I in fact saw no divergence other than in relation to timing, which it should be possible to resolve. Lloyd concurred although he professed to be confused as to what you contemplated should be done in the interim period before a final settlement is arrived at with Egypt. I went over minutely in this connection the two paragraphs of your message, beginning “nevertheless I appreciate” and concluding “impounded SCUA pending such an arrangement”. In my view, these paras were clear and not susceptible misunderstanding.

As a result this discussion, we reached a consensus of opinion on a five-step program which we all believe consistent with the positions of both sides and which Lloyd is prepared to support with his Cabinet colleagues. British will make available today a paper setting forth their understanding of this program, which I will transmit with comments immediately upon receipt.

Atmosphere of conversation was frank and Lloyd was forthcoming in his attitude. He is still smarting under public portrayal both in US and UK press of US-UK divergences, particularly in view of close coordination which in fact took place on both sides at SC meeting in New York. However, he now seems less concerned with individual incidents which have contributed to this situation than with press campaign which has capitalized thereon to present distorted picture of the magnitude of such disagreement.⁸

Aldrich

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/10–2956. Top Secret; Limited Distribution. Received at 2:06 p.m.
2. Document 386.
3. Document 384.
4. In telegram 2321 from London, October 29, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/10–2956)
5. In telegram 2328 from London, October 29, not printed. (Ibid., 747C.00/10–2956)
6. Reference is presumably to telegram 2295, Document 385.
7. Dulles’ message to Lloyd, Document 358.
8. Later on October 29, the Embassy in London reported in telegram 2333 that, according to a Foreign Office official, the British Foreign Office did not understand the reason for the Israeli mobilization and had requested the British Ambassador in Tel Aviv to seek an explanation from Foreign Minister Meir. (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/10–2956)