385. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State1
2295. Eyes only for Secretary. At farewell dinner for Gruenther last night given by Eden, I was able discuss recent developments briefly with both Eden and Lloyd. Eden was in mellow, relaxed mood in contrast recent occasions on which I have seen him. He expressed view that Israel–Jordan situation and Egyptian involvement therein is of more fundamental importance even than Suez problem. On latter, Lloyd said there have been relatively few developments looking toward further negotiations between UK, France and Egypt, but understood that Hammarskjold is in process drafting letter to Fawzi in effort facilitate resumption negotiations. In response to question, Lloyd added still uncertain whether negotiations would take place Geneva October 29.
Specific information on developments connection such possible negotiations has been difficult to obtain owing largely, I think, to fact Lloyd and Eden have been essentially handling matter personally, but also due to detectable reticence government and officials to express opinions as to prospects. However, from various official sources we have learned that Hammarskjold has in fact drafted a letter which he proposes to send Fawzi and which purports to set down the measure of agreement reached between the UK, France and Egypt in talks at New York. He apparently has shown letter to UK Del New York but has not asked comments. It is not clear whether letter has yet been despatched to Fawzi. FonOff lower level view of text is that British would probably find it acceptable as basis for further negotiations, but they are extremely skeptical whether it clearly reflects Fawzi’s statements, particularly in regard to machinery for the arbitration of disputes and “police” sanctions for compliance. They consequently doubt Egyptians will accept. Information re discussion when Pineau last came to London two days ago is particularly scarce. However, an official who should be in a position to know states Lloyd called Pineau here to attempt to persuade French to agree to further negotiations with the Egyptians without additional preliminary Egyptian clarifications. British apparently prepared proceed negotiations that basis if necessary, and were sufficiently optimistic that clarifications would be forthcoming, or negotiations could proceed without them, to retain hotel accommodations Geneva for 29.
[Page 792]We have also sought to get at bottom of British complaints over US role in Suez crisis. While public criticism has appreciably diminished in recent days with apparent realization among widespread serious elements that irresponsible outbursts endanger the fundamentally important US–UK relationship, efforts to emphasize to responsible officials the extent to which the US has gone in supporting Britain throughout the crisis at a difficult time and on an issue on which United States public opinion was largely unconcerned have been less than completely successful in top political official circles. I have been told, I believe reliably, that Lloyd still feels that the SCUA organization was originally conceived as an instrument of pressure on the Egyptians short of military action and that its development since its origin has been toward an instrument by which to compromise with Nasser on the basis of his continued control over the Canal with his prestige undiminished. Lloyd is further said to feel that this course is driving him into closer alliance with France and away to some extent from US, which he deplores. Among other things, he believes the French are politically inept and may be counted on to make major political blunders, such as the arrest of the five Algerian leaders.
I do not wish to over-emphasize the seriousness of this current British attitude, which I firmly believe to be a temporary manifestation largely resulting from the frustration into which Eden and Lloyd and the other members of the Cabinet, notably Macmillan, got themselves by their original reaction to the Suez seizure, and the letdown which inevitably follows. I think, however, that it does explain, though of course not justify, to a certain extent some of the brittle attitudes which are now being taken by the British, not only in relation to Suez but on such other matters as Cyprus, and in fact may be expected on anything affecting the British position in the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/10–2656. Top Secret. Received at 8:15 p.m.↩