Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI

366. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, October 23, 1956¹

Washington, October 23, 1956

SUBJECT

• Near East Situation

PARTICIPANTS

• Mr. A. D. P. Heeney, Ambassador of Canada
• Mr. S. S. Rae, Minister, Embassy of Canada
• G—Mr. Robert Murphy
• NE—Mr. Donald C. Bergus

The Canadian Ambassador reported that the contract for the sale of Canadian F–86 aircraft to Israel had been concluded. Payment had been effected for the eight aircraft to be supplied for the months of September and October. These planes were now Israel property. Four aircraft would be supplied monthly until the entire twenty-four had been delivered to Israel. The November quota of four might be added to the eight already paid for so that shipment of twelve planes could be made by sea before shipping on the St. Lawrence was halted by ice. Other arrangements might have to be made for the shipment of the remaining twelve aircraft. This was a matter of concern to the Israel Government, as the Canadians were transferring title to the planes in Canada. The Canadian Government had reserved the right to intervene to stop the transaction if political conditions so warranted.

The Canadian Government was not happy at what had developed along the Israel–Jordan border since the announcement of the Canadian sale of jets to Israel. The fact that the British had felt impelled to remind the Israelis of the Anglo-Jordan Treaty had also been disturbing. There had not been a substantial Arab reaction to the Canadians over this transaction, however. On balance the Canadian Government had decided to go ahead with the matter but would appreciate the views of the United States. Mr. Heeney inquired concerning the Department’s assessment of the Jordan elections.

Mr. Murphy stated that we were not happy over the results of the election. Mr. Bergus mentioned that we had not yet received our Embassy’s comment on the final result but there was some ground for belief that the results had not been quite so dire as some observers had predicted.² In reply to a question, Mr. Bergus mentioned that so far as we knew, Iraq troops were to remain stationed on Iraq territory near the Jordan border for the time being, although the matter was still under discussion in the Iraq Cabinet. Israel had taken a public position violently opposing the entry of Iraq troops into Jordan. The Ambassador asked if we intended to take any steps at the Security Council.³ Mr. Murphy replied that the next step seemed to be the statement of the Israel representative. He understood that the possibility of asking General Burns to speak before the Council was being discussed in New York.

The Ambassador summarized by asking if the United States saw any reason why the Canadian transaction with Israel should not be completed. Mr. Murphy replied that he did not. So far as he was aware, the Secretary’s position on the matter was unchanged.

In reply to a number of questions on the Suez Canal problem Mr. Murphy stated that no date had yet been set for the Geneva meeting. The United States felt that such a meeting should take place and the initiative now appeared to rest with Egypt. Perhaps each side was trying to outwait the other. Press accounts of differences between the United States and Britain on the question of the disposition of tolls had been greatly exaggerated and Mr. Murphy thought that such problems could be resolved. The United States was inclined to look upon SCUA primarily as a negotiating body.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 784A.5622/10–2356. Drafted by Bergus.
2. In the Parliamentary elections held in Jordan on October 21, three Communists were elected to the Jordanian Chamber of Deputies. According to a Department of State estimate, dated October 25, 19 of the total 40 members of the new Parliament were considered anti-Western and 9 of those elected were considered neutrals. Of this latter group, it was anticipated that some would be willing “to jump aboard a pro-Egyptian anti-Western band wagon.” Moreover, the 12 pro-Westerners elected were considered weak. (Memorandum from Bergus to Wilkins, October 25; ibid., 785.00/10–2556)
3. On October 15, Jordan requested a Security Council meeting to consider the situation on the Jordan-Israel Armistice Demarcation Line (U.N. doc. S/3678); 2 days later, Israel asked the Council to consider persistent violations by Jordan of the Jordan–Israel General Armistice Agreement. (U.N. doc. S/3682). The matter was discussed by the Security Council at the 744th meeting on October 19 and at the 745th meeting on October 25. (U.N. docs. S/PV.744 and S/PV.745) The discussion was to be resumed on October 30, but was deferred because of the outbreak of the Hungary and Suez crises. Consideration of the Israel–Jordan question was not resumed during 1956.