365. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State1
1886. Eyes only Secretary and Ambassador Aldrich. Reference your 1448.2 I do not feel that French Government considers that [Page 767] basic United States policy on Suez is dictated by electoral situation. They do feel, however, that electoral situation has influenced tone and frequency of public statements. More important they do not feel it appropriate or desirable push Franco-United States differences toward showdown prior to election. I consider it very likely that French shortly after election will push hard for their longstanding thesis that Atlantic Alliance cannot be limited in area but must involve world wide political agreement. Mollet in speech at farewell dinner to Gruenther last night brought this up saying “is it really possible to limit the North Atlantic Alliance to one area of the world? we do not think so …3 Foreign policy, a world wide policy, must be a single whole (un tout)—solidarity is not divisible”.
I continue to feel that key to future events in Suez lies in decision to be taken by Great Britain. French cannot undertake military action alone and will only act jointly with British. However, in joint United Kingdom-French meetings I think French Government will continue to favor forceful measures if solution along lines 18 power proposal not otherwise obtainable. Best method to counter French tendency toward action would appear to be Egyptian suggestions of such a concrete nature as to require renewal of United Kingdom-French-Egyptian negotiations.
Finally while French do not appear to be giving much thought to meeting of General Assembly, I would assume that once Assembly is in session it would supply strong moderating influence.