Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI

334. Memorandum of a Conversation, Secretary Dulles’ Suite, Waldorf Astoria, New York, October 12, 1956, 2:30 p.m.¹

USDel/MC/36

New York, October 12, 1956, 2:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
  • The Secretary
  • Mr. Phleger
  • Mr. Rountree
• United Kingdom
  • Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd

SUBJECTS

• (1) Hammarskjold’s Understanding of Oral Agreement
• (2) Organization of the SCUA
• (3) Procedure and Tactics in the Security Council

Mr. Lloyd came to see me at his request. He had with him several pieces of paper,² one set of which represented Hammarskjold’s understanding of what had been orally agreed to.³ This was in three parts—one relating to “principles” of which there were six, the other relating to “mechanisms” and the other relating to “arbitration”. There were also some pieces of paper prepared by Fawzi, which were quite vague.

The statement of principles in the Hammarskjold memorandum were [was] good, and included the proposition that the Canal should be insulated from the politics of any nation. The mechanisms included cooperation between the Users’ Association and the Canal Authority with reference to such matters as tolls, non-discrimination, improvement of the Canal, etc. Provisions on arbitration were rather vague, and I got the impression that they were primarily for scenery.

Lloyd asked as to how we might proceed. He said that he could not wait around here indefinitely. On the other hand, he had to have something specific to take back to London. He said that Pineau had been somewhat less obstructive today, and he (Pineau) indicated that if he had something concrete, he might be willing to accept it and try to sell it to the French Government. Lloyd said that Eden stood ready to go to Paris to persuade Mollet, if this proved necessary.

I pointed out that it seemed to me that the heart of any arrangement was that the Users should be entitled to organize themselves as they saw fit and to handle the funds. I said that if they had a really effective organization and had control of the Canal’s pocketbook, then they would really speak with authority. I said, however, that a Users’ Association organized along Menon’s lines, which could not speak except through 16 politically divided nations, would be utterly ineffective.

Lloyd said that Fawzi had indicated that the Users could organize themselves any way they wanted. Lloyd said he agreed about the importance of collecting the tolls, but felt that it was probably better to leave this implicit rather than explicit. I said I agreed with that approach provided it was clear that nothing was done to preclude the Users’ Association from collecting the tolls as agent for the shippers which voluntarily used the Association, and then dealing for all of these with the Egyptian authority.

I also pointed out that there was need for some provisional measures. I said Spaak’s plan⁴ to perpetuate the present status quo was bad because the Users were not yet organized and not dealing with the Egyptian Canal Authority and the Egyptians had all they wanted and that all that they wanted was to preserve the status quo which under the Spaak formula they could do by merely prolonging negotiations ad infinitum. Lloyd said he recognized that this was an important aspect of the matter which had not been adequately dealt with. He hoped, however, that Belgium, Iran and Yugoslavia might perhaps come up with something acceptable along these lines.

Lloyd indicated that an effort would be made between now and 5 o’clock to get some greater precision on the second part of the Hammarskjold paper and then that Hammarskjold might report this to the Council at closed session at 5 o’clock. Egypt perhaps could not formally accept at that time, but might indicate that it would not object to the Security Council approving this paper as a basis for future proceedings and as a substitute for the Anglo-French Resolution.

I said that the Russians had still to show their hand. Lloyd said that Pineau had talked with Shepilov, and, according to Pineau’s report, Shepilov had said that he thought there should be international rather than purely Egyptian operations and control of the Canal. I said this was hardly credible and that perhaps Pineau had misunderstood Shepilov. Mr. Lloyd admitted that that was a possibility.

Mr. Phleger joined us and then Mr. Rountree as we considered future procedures.

I asked Lloyd whether it was worth while my staying around. He said he thought it was vital and that what I said at 5 o’clock might be decisive. I asked him what he wanted me to say at 5 o’clock, but he indicated that he did not yet know. I said I would be sitting next to him and that if he wanted to tip me off, I would try to be responsive. Lloyd said that Pineau now indicated that he would be willing to stay over until Sunday, if the prospects were good, and the thought was that if we could get through the closed session with some indication of the acceptability to Egypt of the Hammarskjold memorandum, then there should be time taken to draft a substitute United Nations Security Council resolution and organize support for it with the idea that it might be adopted perhaps on late Saturday or on Sunday.

At this point, Mr. Lloyd left to join with Pineau and Fawzi at the Secretary-General’s quarters.

John Foster Dulles⁵

1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 788. Secret. Drafted by Dulles. The source text indicates Phleger and Rountree were not present for the full conversation.
2. No copy of the papers, shown by Lloyd to Dulles, has been found in Department of State files.
3. On October 11, Hammarskjöld told Barco that there should be a paper listing the points of substance which Fawzi, Lloyd, and Pineau had covered during their secret discussions with Hammarskjöld. The Secretary-General also expressed the belief that Fawzi and Lloyd would bring such a paper to the meeting scheduled for October 12; see Document 330.

4. On October 11, Spaak handed Barco the text of a draft resolution to be delivered to Dulles. The draft resolution recommended the conclusion of an international convention, which would establish certain principles, provide certain guarantees for the users, and ensure close collaboration between the Egyptian Canal Authority and the users association. The final paragraph (3) of the draft resolution stipulated that the status quo would be maintained, pending entry into force of the convention. The memorandum of conversation by Barco and attached draft resolution are in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 788.

   On October 12, Barco informed Spaak that Dulles believed that this matter should first be considered by France and the United Kingdom and was personally opposed to paragraph 3 of the draft resolution. Barco assured Spaak, however, that the Secretary still had the matter under consideration. (Memorandum of conversation by Armour, October 12; ibid., Central Files, 974.7301/10–1256)

5. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.