332. Memorandum of Discussion at the 300th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, October 12, 1956, 9:15–9:40 a.m.1
[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]
1. The Suez Canal Situation
The President was delayed a few minutes. As he entered the Cabinet Room he remarked with a broad smile that he was sorry to be late but the Council must remember that he was a politician these days (laughter).
Mr. Jackson then explained that the order of Council consideration of this morning’s agenda had been changed and that the first item would be the report by the Acting Secretary of State on recent developments in the Suez situation. He thereupon called on Secretary Hoover.
Secretary Hoover2 informed the Council that he had in his hand [Page 702] notes from Secretary Dulles from New York which he would like, if agreeable to the President, to read to the Council. The written report described the purpose of the closed sessions on the Suez problem currently being conducted in New York.3 These closed meetings were brief in duration and spaced in such a way as to permit time in between for frequent meetings of the interested foreign ministers. Nothing in writing had yet come of any of these meetings but Secretary Dulles believed that early agreement in principle was a possibility. Nevertheless, many difficulties remained to be ironed out. This portion of the report was followed by statements indicating Secretary Dulles’ view that SCUA could conceivably be developed as a means of implementing any future agreement which might be reached. According to Secretary Dulles’ observation, the British were showing a marked disposition to compromise with the Egyptians. The French, on the other hand, were adhering rigorously to their original position. At this point Secretary Hoover said he would like to enlarge somewhat on Secretary Dulles’ report. It was his own belief that the British and the Egyptians were now very close to agreement and that in fact the chief reason why no agreement has yet been reached is French opposition.
Resuming his reading of Secretary Dulles’ notes, Secretary Hoover went on to state that it was still too early to say that an agreement would be reached. For example, the Egyptian Foreign Minister, Fawzi, might be repudiated by President Nasser or the U.K. Government might not support the moderate position now being taken by the British Foreign Minister. Finally, the French might prove unwilling to go along. Despite all these dangers, Secretary Dulles believed that for the moment at least, progress was not discouraging.
The concluding portions of Secretary Dulles’ report dealt with the possibility of developing SCUA as a means of implementing any agreement which might be reached by the foreign ministers.
At the conclusion of Secretary Hoover’s report, the President asked if there were any questions by members of the Council. There were none.
The National Security Council:4
Noted and discussed a report by the Secretary of State, as presented by the Under Secretary of State, on developments regarding [Page 703] the Suez Canal situation, particularly at the United Nations Security Council.
[Here follows agenda item 2.]
3. Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security
General Cabell stated that he would confine his briefing this morning to developments in the Middle East. He discussed briefly the Israeli attack across the border of Jordan on October 10 and stated that this attack had made still more precarious the stability of the Government of Jordan. He predicted that the forthcoming elections in Jordan were likely to go strongly in the direction desired by the Leftists, the ardent Nationalists, and the pro-Egyptian elements in Jordan. General Cabell went on to comment on the serious problem which had been raised by the proposal to permit Iraqi troops to be stationed in Jordan. Quite apart from the repercussions of such a move in Israel, it was also possible that the Syrians and the Egyptians would move forces into Jordan if Iraqi forces actually crossed the border. General Cabell concluded with a description of the Jordan attitude toward the proposal that Iraqi troops be stationed in Jordan and noted in closing that thanks to the acquisition by Israel of a number of French Mystère aircraft, Israel had once again secured air superiority over the Arab states. It seemed clear to General Cabell that any moves by the Arabs in Jordan which Israel deemed a threat to its security would certainly result in large-scale military action by Israel.
At the conclusion of the intelligence briefing the President reverted to Secretary Dulles’ report on the developments in the Suez situation and stated that in essence he and Secretary Dulles were in agreement that if the United States could just keep the lid on a little longer, some kind of compromise plan could be worked out for a settlement of the Suez problem. Time and time alone will cure the disease; the only question was whether we could be sure of the time.
Secretary Hoover commented that no sovereign nation can ever admit it is in the wrong and British prestige was very heavily engaged in the Suez issue.
The President reminisced at this point on the invasion of North Africa. He stated that while he had much to quarrel with in President Roosevelt’s policies, he did admire the manner in which Mr. Roosevelt had reacted to General Eisenhower’s deal with Admiral Darlan. The storm both in Washington and in other allied capitals was terrific when news of the deal leaked out. General Eisenhower was fully prepared to be relieved of his command and believed that this was a small sacrifice for the advantages gained in the Darlan deal. Nevertheless, both Roosevelt and Churchill stood [Page 704] up firmly against the storm of protest and there was no talk of a replacement of General Eisenhower.
The National Security Council:5
Noted and discussed an oral report on the subject by the Acting Director of Central Intelligence with specific reference to the Arab-Israeli situation.
[Here follows agenda item 4.]
The President then inquired whether there were any further items on the agenda. On being informed that there was no other business, the President said jocosely that this had been a fine meeting of the National Security Council. Secretary Wilson observed that the brevity of the meeting was not a very good index of the actual troubles facing the United States (laughter).
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Gleason. The time of the meeting is from the record of the President’s Daily Appointments. (Ibid.)↩
- In preparation for this meeting, the Bureaus of International Organization Affairs (IO) and Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (NEA) prepared briefing papers for Hoover. The IO paper, forwarded to Hoover on October 11, contained a summary of principal Security Council developments on the Suez situation. (Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 61 D 167, Near East) The NEA paper, forwarded to Hoover on October 11, was a talking paper on the non-U.N. aspects of the Suez Canal situation and on other Near East developments. (Ibid., S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC–Misc Memos–1956)↩
- Transmitted in telegram 335, supra.↩
- The following paragraph constitutes NSC Action No. 1619, approved by the President on October 16. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council, 1956)↩
- The following paragraph constitutes NSC Action No. 1621, approved by the President on October 16. (Ibid.)↩