323. Letter From the Acting Secretary of
State to the President1
Washington, October 10,
1956.
Dear Mr. President: I have your letter of
October 82 raising a number of questions on the Suez
situation.
The Secretary, I believe, would want to discuss personally with you
three of your thoughts, namely, the possibilities of a White House
statement, a plan wherein Nasser would make a public offer, and your calling
another conference.
The other points contained in your letter were discussed by me with
some of our senior officers and I am enclosing a memorandum covering
them.
Faithfully yours,
[Attachment]
MEMORANDUM
- 1.
-
Question: “Without direct
reference to the Suez, we might make public some of the
results of studies conducted under the leadership of
ODM concerning the
world’s future need for big
[Page 685]
tankers. If we should conclude to
go ahead with the construction of some of these
(approximately sixty thousand tons) regardless of the
Suez affair, the announcement of our intention might
have a calming effect.”
Answer: We are in close contact
with Dr. Flemming
and Governor Adams
on the desirability of appointing an advisory group to
study this matter.
- 2.
-
Question: “Should we be any more
specific in our communications with Nehru in the hope that
he could influence Nasser into negotiations?”
Answer: We should not be any more
specific in communications with Nehru than we have been.
The President and the Secretary have already had several
exchanges of views with Nehru.3 During recent years India has
tended to support the general course of Egyptian foreign
policy; however, the Indian reaction to Nasser’s
nationalization of the former Suez Canal Company has
been tempered by India’s realization of its own
dependence upon the Suez Canal. Nehru and his
representative, Khrishna
Menon, have been active in recent weeks,
we believe, making suggestions to Nasser for a solution
to the Suez Canal operations. The United States
continues to support the principles contained in the
18-power proposal which provide for international
participation in the Suez Canal operation. Nehru understands
American flexibility within this framework. If we should
now attempt to be more specific in communications to
Nehru we might
give an erroneous impression of willingness to
compromise and thus undermine the general U.S.-U.K.-French discussions with
the Egyptians in New York. As the United States now is
in direct touch with the Egyptian officials in New York,
it would be preferable to hold direct discussions with
them. At the same time, it may be assumed that India
will continue its own efforts to persuade Egypt to
moderate its views.
- 3.
-
Question: “Could the
Organization of American States serve any useful purpose
now or in the future—such as a joint resolution or the
like?”
Answer: The Organization of
American States could serve a more useful purpose in the
future rather than at the present time. If there should
be some agreement between Egypt and the Western powers,
the OAS might be persuaded to adopt a joint resolution
supporting the agreement. Effective action through the
OAS at this stage would not be useful because: (a)
Panamanian resentment over exclusion from the London
conference; (b) some Latin American countries,
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such as Chile,
are lukewarm regarding the U.S. position on the Suez
Canal, although other Latin American countries, such as
Brazil, Cuba and Venezuela, have been favorable; (c) the
principle of nationalization has been popular in Latin
America; (d) the involvement of the U.K. and France introduces
an overtone of colonialism into the matter; and (e) it
might precipitate debate about the status of the Panama
Canal.
- 4.
-
Question: “I assume that we are
secretly keeping our communications [open] with the
oil-producing Arab States, in order to get their
influence somewhat on our side.”
Answer: The United States has
continued in close touch with the oil-producing Arab
States, including especially Saudi Arabia, Iraq and
Iran. In Saudi Arabia there have been a number of
personal and confidential communications at a high level
between King Saud
and American officials regarding the Suez Canal. In Iraq
we have endeavored to assist the Iraq Prime Minister on
several important matters, including Iraq’s relations
with Saudi Arabia and with Jordan. In Iran we have
continued consulting with the Shah and other Iranian
officials on various aspects of Near Eastern matters,
including the Baghdad Pact and SCUA.
