311. Letter From the President to the Acting Secretary of State 1
Dear Herbert : AS you could tell from my telephone conversation,2 I have not any very definite views of what I might do either now or in the future in order to prevent the Suez business from getting out of hand. Some thoughts such as the following occur to me:
- (a)
- Assuming that Foster finds the going very sticky at the UN, he might think it helpful if I should issue a White House statement outlining our position and detailing our step-by-step moves to keep the peace. The statement might also contain a frank warning that the United States will not support a war or warlike moves in the Suez area. It would insist that negotiations must be continued until a peaceful but just solution is reached—regardless of how long it takes.
- (b)
- Without direct reference to the Suez, we might make public some of the results of studies conducted under the leadership of [Page 663] ODM concerning the world’s future need for big tankers. If we should conclude to go ahead with the construction of some of these (approximately sixty thousand tons) regardless of the Suez affair, the announcement of our intention might have calming effect.
- (c)
- Of course the British and the French are bitterly against building up Nasser. This concern has been rather overtaken by events since he has already become, mostly as a result of this quarrel, a world figure. If therefore, we can think of any plan that we could accept, even though it falls somewhat short of the detailed requirements listed by Britain and France, we might through some clandestine means urge Nasser to make an appropriate public offer. Such action ought to start negotiations toward a peaceful settlement.
- (d)
- Should we be any more specific in our communications with Nehru in the hope that he could influence Nasser into negotiations?
- (e)
- Could the Organization of American States serve any useful purpose now or in the future—such as a joint resolution or the like?
- (f)
- I assume that we are secretly keeping our communications with the oil-producing Arab States, in order to get their influence somewhat on our side.
- (g)
- A more spectacular thing might be for me to invite a number of nations to a conference, including most of the eighteen who agreed upon the “London Plan” as well as India, Egypt, Israel and possibly Saudi Arabia.
As you know, I am immersed in the sum total of affairs necessitated by governmental and political work. None of the items on this list has been deeply studied; I send it to you more as a clear indication of my readiness to participate in any way in which I can be helpful than as a series of suggestions. However, if you see any virtue in any one of these possibilities, please have it studied, but only by your most trusted and reliable staff officers—those that surely will not leak.3
With warm regard,
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Memoranda. Secret. A marginal notation on the source text reads: “6:20 p.m.” The source text, which is signed by Eisenhower, is attached to a covering note from Hoover to Dulles, dated October 8, which reads: “In connection with the attached letter, it occurs to me that as a result of the political situation the President may feel under some pressure to take a more direct part in the proceedings.” A copy of Eisenhower’s letter is in the Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series.↩
- See supra .↩
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On October 8, Hoover replied in a letter which reads: “I have your letter on the Suez situation, pursuant to our telephone conversation of this afternoon, and I am forwarding it to Secretary Dulles in the pouch this evening.
“When I talked with the Secretary later today, he felt somewhat more reassured about the outcome than previously. While nothing specific had taken place, he believed that the atmosphere was a good deal better.
“We will, of course, keep in close touch with you.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series) The letter was initialed by Eisenhower.
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